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1. General Introduction
“Every  economic  action  takes  place  in  the
framework of a moral or ethics”
Jean-Jaques Laffont
“...economics  needs  to  take  account  of  the
alternatives  to  utilitarianism  that  have  been
advanced in the past half century, such as the theory
of justice of Rawls...”
Anthony Barnes Atkinson
In my thesis I apply the ethical  model developed by John Rawls (1999) to three systems
which  have  an  economic  dimension:  European  Union,  tax  compliance  and  environmental
sustainability.
With this task my purpose is to answer to the following overarching research question: is an
impartial and non-binding agreement, conceived in a Rawlsian frame, sufficient to generate fair and
stable  redistributive institutions?  This general  research question is  then addressed  and inflected
according to the specific economic domains mentioned above and considered in detail through the
next Chapters.
Given the diversification of the analysed topics, also the adopted research methodology turns
out to be differentiated: the European distributive institutions are examined in depth by means of a
theoretical-deductive approach which catches on Rawls’s international social contract theory; the
distributive issues linked to tax evasion and environmental sustainability are approached with tools
belonging to behavioural and experimental economics.
The reminder of the Introduction is dedicated to outline the distributive issue within John
Rawls’s  social  contract  theory,  with  the  attention  focused  on  international  and  experimental
distributive  justice.  The intent  is  to  move gradually  from a perspective concerning  the general
theoretical  frame  to  the  specific  issues  constituting  the  research  core  of  the  thesis,  that  is  the
economic  analysis  in  a  Rawlsian  perspective  of  the  European  integration  (Chapter  2),  of  tax
compliance (Chapter 3) and of pro-environmental decisions (Chapter 4).
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1.1 The role of ethics in the economic theory: in Adam Smith’s perspective
The attempt to undertake an economic analysis starting from premises belonging to an ethical
theory should not be considered exceptional at all if we remind that more than 250 years ago the
person who is  usually designated as the founding father of the economic science, Adam Smith,
followed  exactly  the  same  kind  of  approach.  Indeed,  not  only  the  economic  discipline,  when
formally born, was in essence a branch of moral philosophy (Sen 1987); even more relevantly,
Smith’s  Theory  of  Moral  Sentiments (representing  his  ethical  doctrine,  Smith  1994)  is  to  be
considered as the moral-philosophical foundation on which later the Scottish author built his more
famous Inquiry on the Wealth of Nations (economic analysis, Smith 1976).
With the aim to offer a cogent justification concerning the general methodological approach
underlying my doctoral writing, in the final Appendix I illustrate in detail the structured relationship
between ethics and economics such as conceived by Adam Smith. However it has to be clear that
the general Appendix is not to be interpreted as a part of the answer to the research question, but
rather as sort of premise to the research question itself and to its following economic enquire.
Thus in the Appendix I show how the interaction between Smith's two mentioned works and
sphere does not give rise to a conflict (the so called Adam Smith problem), but to a broader and
coherent system where the moral regulatory mechanism of the impartial observer is assumed at the
basis of the correct functioning of the market institution (Smith 1976, pp. 82-83). Thus it is possible
to claim that the formulation of the WN relies on the thesis developed within the TMS, so that the
latter essentially constitutes the (moral) foundation of the former. This means that within the Adam
Smith’s overall project the ethical background plays a fundamental role in the construction of his
economic  theory  based  on  the  market  institution,  that  is  his  ethical  theory  constitutes  an
indispensable prerequisite for a correct functioning and interpretation of his economic system.
Therefore,  after  having  sketched  both,  the  economic  system  relying  on  self-interested
impulses and on the division of labour proposed in  the  WN and the  moral  apparatus based on
sympathy and on the figure of the impartial spectator described in the  TMS, I provide a careful
description of the precise relationship which links the two books and therefore the two spheres of
ethics and economics in Adam Smith: he did not conceive the former as merely accessory to the
latter,  but  he  rather  considered  premises  of  ethical  and  moral  character  as  necessary  for  the
development of a structured and reliable economic theory. From this analysis it will be possible to
conclude that, according to the Smithian approach, a valid economic analysis has to be grounded on
pillars of ethical nature: this is exactly the general idea at the basis of my thesis.
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Indeed, what  is important for this dissertation is not the specific framework developed by
Adam Smith, but rather the extension of the “Smithian method” and its exegesis. In particular, the
precise hierarchy between ethics and economics assigned by the father of economic science can be
broadened and interpreted on a more general level as the necessity of an ethical contextualization
before proceeding with an economic analysis (Sen 1987). Again, this is the overarching approach
underlying my whole thesis, which is instead based on the ethical system developed by John Rawls
(1999).
Before describing in detail the Rawlsian ethical frame and in order to avoid misunderstanding
it may be helpful to highlight some relevant analogies and distinctions between Smith’s approach
and John Rawls’s theory. In particular, in developing their moral frames, both the authors more or
less explicitly deal with institutions, meant here simply as the “rules of the game” played by the
economic agents. However, while according to Adam Smith we essentially derive moral institutions
through empirical experience (bottom-up perspective), Rawls aims at providing a normative theory
of just  institutions (top-down vision).  Thus, although their approaches and their  analytical tools
diverge, both the authors address relevant issues concerning the shape of economic institutions.
What has to be clear I that I introduced Adam Smith and analysed his books only in order to
provide  a  preamble  to  the  general  relationship  between  ethics  and  economics  I  believe  it  is
important  for  works  like  mine.  However  in  my  thesis  I  am  exclusively  concerned  with  the
“economic implications, especially when it comes to economic institutions and their consequences”
of Rawls’s social contract theory (Little 2014, p. 521).
1.2 John Rawls’s social contract theory: an ethical system based on the veil of ignorance
As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the specific moral ground adopted at the basis of the
economic research carried out in this doctoral dissertation is the ethical model designed by John
Rawls (1999).  The following Sections of the Introduction  aim thus at  providing the theoretical
contextualization wherein the analysis of the next three Chapters develops.
Rawls contextualizes his  theory within the social contract tradition1 (Boucher et  al.  2003,
Darwall  2003 and Skyrms 1996),  that  is  that  set  of  theories  which lay  the  legitimacy and the
1 Rawls explicitly makes clear how his moral theory aimed at representing a systematic alternative to the utilitarian
tradition (Harsanyi 1976) which had been dominating the philosophical and economic debate at his time. Rawls
pursued this goal because, in his opinion, when the utilitarianism deals with specific distributive issues it admits
some morally unacceptable compromises.
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foundation of political institutions and moral norms on an agreement. Then, at the basis of his social
contract theory John Rawls places the following observation:
 “although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is typically
marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests. There is an identity of
interests since social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would
have if each were to live solely by his own efforts”; however, the author goes on,
“there is  a  conflict  of  interests  since  persons  are  not  indifferent  as  to  how the
greater  benefits  produced by their  collaboration are  distributed,  for  in  order  to
pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share” (Rawls 1999, p. 4).
Thus, in order to deal with those “conflicting interests” that arise about the distribution of
benefits,  Rawls proposes an agreement between the involved parties. In other words, a contract
becomes the formal tool to derive the norms aimed at governing the distribution of the benefits
achieved by means of the social and economic cooperation between individuals.
As other theories inspired by the concept of social contract, also Rawls's scheme develops in
two distinct phases (Sacconi 1991, pp. 68-69). In the first (constitutional) phase, the one concerning
the contract in the state of nature, people formally free and focused on pursuing their own interests
agree on the main principles necessary to regulate all the following relations that will take place in
the second phase, the one where individuals “enter” the society (of law). Very importantly, the first
phase of the Rawlsian social contract, termed by Rawls himself as “original position”, follows a
Kantian setting, that is the agreement phase “is not [...] thought of as an actual historical state of
affairs” but it is rather “understood as a purely hypothetical situation” (Rawls 1999, p. 11, Rawls
1977, p. 161). In other words, Rawls’s original position is equivalent to the adoption of a particular
perspective,  so  the agreement and its  principles are conceived as the result  of a simple  mental
experiment2.
A further feature of the general setting concerns then the specific aim of the Rawlsian social
contract. In particular, Rawls circumscribes the goal of his hypothetical contract to the identification
2 From this assumption it follows a second analogy with Kant’s social contract theory regarding the role played by
the hypothetical agreement. More precisely, since it is not concrete the social contract assumes a prescriptive and
comparative  stand,  such  that  “[o]ur  social  situation  is  just  if  it  is  such  that  by  this  sequence of  hypothetical
agreements we would have contracted into the general system of rules which defines it” now (Rawls 1999, p. 12).
Said otherwise, we have to assume the perspective of the original position to evaluate the adherence of the existing
state of affairs (institutions) to the systems of principles arisen from the (hypothetical) agreement. In this way "one
conception of justice is more reasonable than another, or justifiable with respect to it,  if rational persons in the
initial situation would choose its principles over those of the other for the role of justice (Rawls 1999, pp. 15-16).
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of those principles which can shape the society’s “basic structure” (Rawls 1999, pp. 6-10 and pp.
47-52), viz. “the way in which the major social institutions fit together into one system, and how
they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of advantages that arises through
social cooperation” (Rawls 1977, p. 159)3.
Finally it is important to specify two qualities of the subjects who take part in the original
agreement. The definition of the parties involved in the agreement procedure is among the most
important features  of each contractarian theory, because the attributions in terms of knowledge,
beliefs, capacities, limitation etc. inevitably condition the outcome (principles). Rawls himself is
clear on this issue: “depending upon how the contracting parties are conceived, upon what their
beliefs and interests are said to be, upon which alternatives are available to them, and so on [...]
there are many different contract theories” (Rawls 1999, p. 105).
Together with the instrumental rationality, which “must be interpreted as far as possible in the
narrow sense,  standard in  economic  theory,  of  taking the  most  effective  means  to  given ends”
(Rawls 1999, p.12), two main features distinguish the contractual parties of the Rawlsian setting.
One  element  concerns  their  meta-personal  interests:  “the  parties  in  the  initial  situation  [are]
mutually disinterested”  or said  otherwise,  they  “are  conceived as not  taking  an  interest  in  one
another’s interests” (Rawls 1999, p. 12)4. Besides, the parties are constrained with regards to the
particular information they can access. More precisely, subjects in original position are excluded
from any particular information which could twist the substance of the norms they are called to
decide about. Thus, in original position,
“no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he
know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence
3 Since for Rawls the subject of the original agreement is exclusively the "basic structure", Amartya Sen (2009)
reproached Rawls of transcendental institutionalism (or, as I prefer, for institutional fundamentalism). Sen moves
his criticism about Rawls's theory over two complementary lines. First of all Sen insists on how Rawls's approach is
excessively focused on institutions, not paying enough attention to the actual life of people. Indeed in Sen’s opinion
a theory of justice cannot be neither “confined to the choice of institutions, nor to the identification of ideal social
arrangements. The need for an accomplishment-based understanding of justice is linked with the argument that
justice cannot be indifferent to the lives that people can actually live” (Sen 2009, p. 18). Secondly, Sen highlights
how Rawls's theory is limited because it identifies,  by means of two principles of justice (which might not be
unique), an ideally perfect solution, while providing no hints on how to reduce actual and real inequalities in a
comparative perspective: “in general the identification of a transcendental alternative does not offer a solution to the
problem of comparisons between any two non-transcendental alternatives” (Sen 2009, p. 17, and pp. 96-98).
4 Translated  in  a  more  familiar  economic  language,  Rawls  assumes  that  subjects  in  original  position  are  not
characterized by any kind of other-regarding preference (like altruism, benevolence, inequity aversion or reciprocity
etc.).
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and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the
good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his
psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability to optimism or pessimism”.
Eventually, “[t]he persons in the original position have no information as to which
generation they belong” (Rawls 1999, p 118).
“In this manner the veil of ignorance is arrived at in a natural way”, since it is excluded “the
knowledge of those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their
prejudices”  (Rawls  1999,  p.  17).  Basically,  behind  the  veil  of  ignorance  no  one  can  design
principles (norms or institutions) which might favour their particular situation, that is no one can
take advantage of their personal contingencies in defining the principles5.
Thus, since for Rawls “no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged by natural fortune or
social  circumstances  in  the  choice of  principles”  (Rawls  1999,  pp.16),  only  behind the veil  of
ignorance the principles for the basic structure of a society are the outcome of a fair agreement:
given that the veil of ignorance restricts the particular information available to the parties everybody
is  equally  represented  since  everybody  has  to  choose  in  the  same  situation  of  perfect
(mis)informational  symmetry.  On  the  contrary,  “[a]greements  reached  when  people  know their
present  place  in  an  ongoing  society  would  be  influenced  by  disparate  social  and  natural
contingencies” (Rawls 1977, p. 161).
1.2.1 The two principles of justice
The next step requires  to  focus on the decision-making process,  viz. the actual reasoning
adopted  by individuals  behind the veil  of ignorance to  derive those norms which are  meant to
regulate the institutional network of a society. In Rawls's opinion, given the setting of the original
position, it is possible “to think of the [norms] principles as the maximin solution to the problem of
social justice” (Rawls 1999, p. 132). Said otherwise, the heuristic device of the maximin, through
which the alternatives are ranked according to their best worst-off outcome, is the most appropriate
decision-making criterion to adopt given the (un)available information to the parties behind the veil
of ignorance (Rawls 1999, pp. 130-139).
5 Given the veil of ignorance on particular information the parties have to reach an agreement only on the basis of
impartial and general considerations. Indeed Rawls (1999, pp. 118-123) specifies how the knowledge of laws and
general theories of human society remains available to the parties.
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Rawls  specifies  then  how  his  setting  does  not  contemplate  any  assumption  concerning
individuals’ risk aversion as well as regarding the probabilistic distribution of the outcomes which
might characterize a society during its second phase. Not only the adoption of probabilistic or risk
aversion assumptions would make the maximin criterion less suitable for his social contract model,
but  these  hypotheses  are  also  implicitly  excluded  by  the  (thick)  veil  of  ignorance  in  original
position: with the veil of ignorance not only the involved parties have no access to the probabilities
concerning the different outcomes of the second phase, but they are also excluded from knowing all
the possible social states (Rawls 1999, p. 134).
Within this general framework it is possible to describe in detail the objects of the agreement,
which constitute the central nucleus of the Rawlsian ethical theory. However,  before specifying
their formulation and their meaning in depth it is essential to define some general features 6 of the
principles themselves. According to Rawls they have to be: general, public, definitive and they have
to impose a clear ordering about conflicting claims (Rawls 1999, pp. 112-118). This means that any
redistributive principle without one of these features would be automatically rejected. Moreover, for
Rawls the principles are to be ranked in a lexicographic ordering. This kind of ranking “requires us
to satisfy the first principle in the ordering before we can move on to the second, the second before
we consider the third, and so on”, that is “[a] principle does not come into play until those previous
to it are either fully met or do not apply” (Rawls 1999, p. 38).
Given all the features described so far, and above all given the restrictions on the particular
information, according to Rawls people behind the veil of ignorance would unanimously agree7 on
two well defined principles (Rawls 1999, pp. 52-78), which are here stated through one of their
numerous formulations:
“the first requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, while the
second holds  that  social  and economic inequalities,  for  example inequalities  of
wealth  and  authority,  are  just  only  if  they  result  in  compensating  benefits  for
everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls
1999, p. 13).
6 These features are endogenously defined within the original position itself, before deciding about the principles.
7 Unanimity  follows  by  construction:  since  everybody  is  subject  to  the  same  restrictions  about  the  particular
information, everybody applies and everybody is "persuaded" by the same reasoning. This setting implies that there
is no real bargaining on the principles (since all  the parties  are equal, they have formally and substantially no
bargaining powers).
The Rawlsian ethics is condensed in these two principles.“The first principle simply requires
that certain sorts of rules, those defining basic liberties, apply to everyone equally and that they
allow the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all”. Being this principle located
at the top of the lexicographic ranking it follows that “[t]he only reason for circumscribing basic
liberties and making them less extensive is that otherwise they would interfere with one another”
(Rawls 1999, p. 38). From a more practical perspective that means that for no reasons it is allowed
to barter higher material welfare of somebody with a smaller set of liberties of anybody else. Said
otherwise, it is not allowed to compensate a loss of freedom with any kind of economic benefit. For
Rawls there is only one exception for not fully achieving the requirements of the first principle of
justice: it occurs when two or more liberties are conflicting (Rawls 1999, pp. 171-228),
The second principle, termed by Rawls “difference principle”, governs economic and social
inequalities and it requires that “each person [and in particular the least advantaged, has to] “benefit
from permissible inequalities in the basic structure”8 (Rawls 1999, p. 56). While the first principle
describes a sort of general background for the society “to start”, the difference principle, which is
“strictly speaking, a maximizing principle” (Rawls 1999, p.68), embodies in a more explicit way the
redistributive rule which aims at regulating the division of those material benefits which are the
result of the socio-economic cooperation between people.
One immediate issue related to the difference principle concerns the way to identify the least
advantaged subjects within a certain society, and more in general the way to measure benefits and
inequalities.  Rawls tackles the problem adopting the  concept  of “social primary  goods” (Rawls
1999,  pp.  78-81).  As  defined  by  Rawls,  these  are  objective  (instrumental)  goods  which  every
rational individual is supposed to wish in a quantity as large as possible, independently from their
specific ex-post preferences. Indeed for Rawls, more social primary goods enhance the possibility
to achieve our own aims (plans of life) whatever they are. Thus, regarding the social primary goods
every person has the same kind of preference 9: the more the better.
Getting back to the essence of the difference principle, this basically states how an ex-post
unequal distribution of social primary goods is to be considered fair (from the original position
point  of view)  only  as  long as the uneven distribution maximizes the expectations of the least
advantaged subjects. However, in order to explain why the difference principle is considered by
8 The complete version of the second principle, which includes a further specification, is provided by Rawls a few
pages later, but that formulation does not add anything to the present analysis: "[s]ocial and economic inequalities
are to be arranged so that they are both (a) to the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged and (b) attached
to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity" (Rawls 1999, p. 72).
9 This concept allows also to build up an objective and publicly shared index to measure benefits and inequalities.
Thus the comparability challenge which usually hinders the utilitarian conception is simplified too.
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Rawls  himself  as  the  best  rule  among  all  the  possible  alternative  distributive  schemes,  it  is
necessary to look also at its philosophical justification.
Rawls  explains  the  moral  reason for  the  difference  principle  as  it  follows:  “[t]he  natural
distribution [of talents and resources] is neither just nor unjust; nor is it unjust that persons are born
into society at some particular position. These are simply natural facts”. However “[w]hat is just
and unjust is the way that institutions deal with these facts” (Rawls 1999, p. 87). That means that,
since “[n]o one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in
society” (Rawls 1999, p 87), the spontaneous distribution of those benefits generated through the
social  and  economic  cooperation  cannot  be  considered  morally  legitimate.  Therefore  the
construction of the difference principle in the original position is based on the idea to implement
those  institutions  which  can  turn  some  natural  facts  into  a  morally  just  distribution,  exactly
redistributing primary social goods towards the most disadvantaged by the natural lottery.
Thus, from a pure philosophical perspective (which acts in parallel and not in substitution of
with the economic maximin reasoning), the second principle of justice aims at defining an equitable
way to deal with the arbitrariness of the case concerning the initial distribution of resources and
talents, so that in a good approximation these are to be considered also as a common asset and not
only as individual instruments achieved by chance. Said otherwise, since we have to take the natural
distribution simply as given, the only way to morally legitimate the arbitrary distribution of talents
and wealth is to act on the ex-post outcome of the social and economic cooperation based on those
capabilities and resources.
In synthesis, through the redistribution of social primary goods operated by the difference
principle it is ideally (practically) possible to nullify (diminish) the differences which depend on
mere  chance and which  might,  through the economic  cooperation,  benefit  the  most  (arbitrary)
advantaged subjects in the natural distribution, without at the same time taking into account the
(naturally) most disadvantaged parties (Sandel 2009, pp. 150-166). Thus, inequalities are justified
only if they improve the conditions of the worst-off.
Because the Rawlsian decision-making model constitutes the ethical frame at the basis of the
whole  following  economic  analysis,  a  final  remark  seems  to  be  necessary:  through  the  next
Chapters  the  focus  will  be  exclusively  on  the  difference  principle  and  its  redistributive
prescriptions.  In other words, the first principle of justice, that is the realization of the broadest
scheme of liberties for anyone, will be implicitly assumed as realized. Indeed, according to their
lexicographic order, only considering as completely satisfied the prescriptions of the first principle
the second principle can be taken into consideration.
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1.2.2 The problem of the agreement stability and the sense of justice
After individuating the principles that are supposed to shape the basic structure, John Rawls
dedicates a consistent part of his work (Rawls 1963, Rawls 1999 and Rawls 2001) to analyse the
stability of the original agreement underlying the principles of justice. His main goal is to explain
how the chosen principles, representing a distributive preference, agreed ex-ante behind a veil of
ignorance, can become stable ex-post in the real word, after the veil is dropped.
This  kind  of  analysis  is  not  trivial  at  all  if  we  highlight  that,  according  to  Rawls,  the
agreement in the original position, despite being fair, is not conceived as binding. In other words the
distributive  preferences  (ethical  norms)  expressed  behind  the  veil  of  ignorance  are  neither
automatically  implemented nor they are enforced by external  mechanisms:  in the  second phase
anyone could not follow the agreed rules, that is, after the veil is droppeseveryone could decide to
deviate from the unanimously chosen distributive principles because these do not coincide with
their ex-post individual real interests. Said in a more familiar economic language, in the real world
everybody  is  in  the  condition  to  free-ride,  gaining  higher  benefits  by  taking  advantage  of  the
collective efforts.
Thus, even if taking part in the agreement the parties unanimously recognize the mutually
beneficial  perspective embodied in a particular distributive preference (difference principle),  the
game  where  the  involved  parties  independently  decide  whether  or  not  to  implement  those
preferences keeps being non-cooperative. For this reason, according to Rawls, in the second phase
the parties are supposed to adhere to the prescriptions of the first moment of the agreement. Thus,
“[j]ust arrangements may not be in equilibrium then because acting fairly is not in
general  each  man’s  best  reply  to  the  just  conduct  of  his  associates.  To  insure
stability men must have a sense of justice or a concern for those who would be
disadvantaged  by  their  defection,  preferably  both.  When  these  sentiments  are
sufficiently strong to overrule the temptations to violate the rules, just schemes are
stable. Meeting one’s duties and obligations is now regarded by each person as the
correct answer to the actions of others” (Rawls 1999, p. 435, italics added).
Therefore, according to Rawls, every subject entering the original position (agreement) should
develop a sense of justice, that is a strong and effective desire to act ex-post consistently with the
ex-ante chosen principles without the intervention of any external enforcement is necessary. Said
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otherwise,  a  distributive  preference  (or  principle)  agreed  ex-ante  in  the  original  position  must
generate by itself an endogenous motive (sense of justice) to comply with it, without the necessity
to appeal to any exogenous system of enforcement. This must be true even when it is apparently
against agents’ strict self-interest, that is when the game in the real word is non-cooperative.
Further details about the sense of justice will be analysed in depth through the next Sections.
However, a preliminary specification seems to be necessary in order to make clear this concept. In
particular, according to Rawls the sense of justice is based on a the tendency to answer in kind
(Rawls 1963 and Rawls 1999, pp. 429-440), that is a person decides to adhere to the prescriptions of
the principles of justice on the condition she thinks that the other individuals who took part in the
agreement will do the same.
1.3 International and empirical distributive justice from a Rawlsian perspective
Rawls's  ethical system is much broader and richer than what sketched so far. Besides his
theory had a remarkable influence beyond the philosophical debate: his work generated a sizeable
secondary literature in the political and economic spheres as well. In order to understand how much
his theory has been at the centre of a wide research involving different fields it is sufficient to recall
that in the last decades John Rawls’s writings have had on average about 10,000 quotes per year,
with a total of about 182,000 quotes at the time this thesis was completed.
This enormous amount of secondary literature means that it  would require another doctoral
thesis to provide a complete and systematic analysis of all the debate arisen around Rawls’s social
contract theory. Instead, the purpose of this Introduction is more modest and limited. In particular,
the next few pages aim at providing a circumscribed introductory description concerning the two
macro areas of research taken into consideration in the reminder of the thesis: the distribution of
resources between states, with a specific attention to the European framework, and the experimental
works about Rawls’s social contract theory.
15
1.3.1 John Rawls on international distribution of resources
According to Rawls, the theoretical frame and its conclusions presented in the Section 1.2
apply exclusively within closed systems like nation-states (Rawls 1999, p. 7). However, in the §58
of his main book (Rawls 1999, pp. 331-335) he did not neglect to sketch the way in which the
international  context  should  be  approached  from the  perspective  of  his  social  contract  theory.
Instead,  he  provided  a  complete  framework  which  extends  in  a  systematic  way  his  theory  to
relations between states  only in two following works,  both of  them titled The Law of Peoples
(Rawls 1993, 2001),
In particular, Rawls deals with the international setting by means of a second level original
position10 (Rawls  2001,  p.  10),  where  the  moral  subjects  of  the  social  contract  are  not  single
individuals anymore, but rather (representatives of) peoples11. In the second level original position
“the parties are subject to a veil of ignorance properly adjusted for the case at hand:
they do not know, for example, the size of the territory, or the population, or the
relative strength of the people whose fundamental interests they represent [...] they
do not know the extent of their natural resources, or the level of their economic
development, or other such information” (Rawls 2001, pp. 32-33).
Considering  these  analogies  with  his  domestic  theory  and  since  in  one  passage  Rawls
underlines how “the procedure of construction, and the various steps gone through, are much the
same in both cases” (Rawls 1993, p. 37), it might be intuitive to think about a simple and linear
extension of the two principles of domestic justice (Rawls 1999) valid this time across nations.
However in another passage Rawls specifies how “there is no reason to think that the principles that
apply to domestic justice are also appropriate for regulating inequalities in a society of peoples”
(Rawls 1993, p. 63). Therefore the domestic principles cannot be considered as fully general norms.
Thus,  even  if  the  standard  procedure  is  applied  at  international  level,  the  Rawlsian
international theory is not immediate in its subsequent conclusions. Indeed Rawls “decomposes” the
10 “[A]fter the principles of justice have been adopted for domestic justice, the idea of the original position is used
again at the next higher level” (Rawls 1993, p. 41).
11 With the term "peoples" Rawls basically means citizens united by a common sympathy (Rawls 2001, p. 23, note
17), and according to him “what distinguishes peoples from states [...] is that just peoples are fully prepared to grant
the very same proper respect and recognition to other peoples as equals” (Rawls 2001, p. 35).
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hypothetical second order (international) original position in three distinct moments12 (Rawls 2001,
p. 70), with the intention to take into account the possible and reasonable pluralism among peoples
(Rawls 2001, p. 40). The first (Rawls 2001, pp. 11-58) and the second part (Rawls 2001, pp. 59-88)
deal  with  what  Rawls  calls  the  “ideal  theory”.  In  the  “ideal  theory”,  liberal  and  decent  (or
hierarchical)13 peoples,  behind  the  veil  of  ignorance,  agree  on  the  following  8  principles  for
regulating their international relations (Rawls 2001, p. 37):
1. Peoples  are  free  and  independent,  and  their  freedom and  independence  are  to  be
respected by other peoples
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other
than self-defense
6. Peoples are to honor human rights
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that
prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime14
The third moment of The Law of Peoples (Rawls 2001, pp. 89-120) is then split by John
Rawls into two sub-types of “non ideal theory”:
“one kind deals with conditions of noncompliance, that is, with conditions in which
certain  regimes  refuse  to  comply  with  a  reasonable  Law  of  Peoples”  (outlaw
states); “the other kind of non ideal theory deals with unfavorable conditions, that
is,  with  the  conditions  of  societies  whose  historical,  social,  and  economic
circumstances  make  their  achieving  a  well-ordered  regime,  whether  liberal  or
decent, difficult if not impossible” (burdened societies) (Rawls 2001, p. 90).
12 As clarified by Paden, "the delegates are divided into [different] groups that negotiate [three] separate contracts"
(Paden 1997, p. 222).
13 Decent peoples, though they are not liberal, they are characterized by the two following features: they do not have
aggressive aims towards other peoples and they respect human rights (Rawls 2001, pp. 64-67).
14 The last principle (8) was not included in the first version of The Law of Peoples (Rawls 1993, p. 43). Moreover,
one question  seems legitimate  with  regards  to the  one-way duty  of  assistance:  why should  liberal  and  decent
peoples, the only ones who take part in the second order original agreement, assume a redistributive and altruistic
commitment towards those peoples who do not take part in the agreement? (Pettit 2006, p. 54).
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According to this framework outlaw states and burdened societies are not represented in the
second order  original  position  because they  would  not  agree  on the  principles  of  international
justice mentioned above. Indeed for Rawls it would be senseless to ask to those parties who hold
unreasonable  views  or  conditions  to  comply  with  reasonable  principles  of  international  justice
(Beitz 2000, p. 676). In conclusion for Rawls it is not possible to imagine an agreement (a society)
between peoples who are too different15.
1.3.1.1 The relationship between Rawls’s domestic and international theory
The  one  presented  in  the  previous  Section  was  a  brief  reconstruction  of  Rawls’s  social
contract theory when dealing with relationships between states. According to the overall theoretical
framework, John Rawls basically developed two distinct theories, one focused on a national level
and the other one with an international horizon. This articulation makes then clear that for Rawls:
the  principles  of  domestic  justice  cannot  suit  the  international  context  (and  vice  versa);  the
international  principles  themselves  are  not  universally  valid,  that  is  they  are  not  shared  by all
peoples (Nagel 2005, p. 127), because some of them do not hold the minimal political or economic
conditions to reach a fair and durable agreement.
This differentiation given by Rawls to his two theories is even more evident if we focus on the
distributive issue. More precisely, although within the international framework Rawls conceives a
duty of assistance valid between peoples (Rawls 2000, p. 37), according to the structure given to his
theories, distributive justice in the strict sense seems to hold within peoples but not between peoples
(Barcelos et al. 2008, p. 3, Nagel 2005 p. 114, Pogge 1994, p. 195 and Wenar 2006, p. 99) 16. In
15 The structure given by Rawls to his international theory triggers one important issue. In the domestic theory Rawls
(1999,  p.  118,  2001,  p.  34)  explicitly  assumes  that  the  veil  of  ignorance  prevents  the  parties  involved in  the
agreement from knowing their particular conception of the good. However in developing his international theory
Rawls does not seem to be consistent with himself. More precisely, in The Law of Peoples (Rawls 2001) the parties
entering the international original position are required to know if they are liberal, hierarchical, burdened societies
or outlaw states (Rawls 2001, p. 71, note 10), that is they are required to be aware about their own conception of the
good. Paden expresses such criticism in a clear way: “the veil of ignorance for the international original position
differs significantly from that for the domestic original position in that, although the delegates are to be denied
knowledge  of  the  particular  society  they  represent  [...],  they  are  to  know that  they  represent  [or  not]  liberal
societies”  (Paden  1997, p.  219).  Said  otherwise,  the  parties  are supposed to  be  conscious about  their  specific
conception of the good (Buchanan 2000, pp. 704-707, Caney 2002, pp. 99-114, Kuper 2000, pp. 648-650, Pogge
1994, pp. 206-207 and Pogge 2001 p. 247).
16 Thus, "though it is a universal principle that is to apply severally, or within every society, the difference principle is
not global in reach" (Freeman 2006, p. 29), that is the difference principle is locally universal (Blake et al. 2015).
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other  words Rawls  establishes  a  marked “distinction  between  the  strong solidarity  which  must
govern a generous redistribution between the members of the national community they claim to
represent and the much weaker solidarity which must govern a more parsimonious and conditional
assistance from the richer national communities to the poorer ones” (Van Parijs 2012b, p. 643).
Thus
“it may make a great deal of difference on Rawls's theory where the boundary of
[a] society is drawn” (Scanlon 1973, p. 1066), because “it does not really matter
whether one is born in Kansas or in Iowa” while “it matters a great deal whether
one is  born  a  Mexican  or  a  U.  S.  citizen”.  Therefore  we  should  “justify  to  a
Mexican why [Americans] should be entitled to life prospects that are so much
superior to hers merely because [they] were born on the other side of some line – a
difference that, on the face of it, is no less morally arbitrary than differences in sex,
in skin color, or in the affluence of one's parents” (Pogge 1994, p. 198).
These restrictions given by Rawls himself to the international redistributive horizon have been
strongly  criticized  by  the  secondary  literature17,  mainly  because  his  international  theory
substantially ignores the paramount pillar of Rawlsian domestic justice: to provide a fair conception
“that  prevents  the  use  of  the  accidents  of  natural  endowment  and  the  contingencies  of  social
circumstance as counters in a quest for political and economic advantage” (Rawls 1999, p. 14),
while  it  is  quite  evident  how “the parties  in  the international original  position  would view the
natural  distribution  of  resources  as  morally  arbitrary” as  the  distribution  of talents  or of social
positions (Beitz 1999, p. 138, Nagel 2005, p. 119 and p. 124, Pogge 1988, p. 238).
Being aware  about  this  kind  of  possible  objection,  Rawls  tried  to  prevent  it  providing a
justification for not considering an analogous of the difference principle valid at international level,
but for conceiving only a weaker duty of solidarity:
“I believe that the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their
political culture and in the religious,  philosophical, and moral traditions [...],  as
well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members [...] I would
conjecture that there is no society anywhere in the world – except for the marginal
cases – with resources so scarce that it could not, were it reasonably and rationally
organized and governed, become well-ordered’’ (Rawls 2001, p. 108).
17 One ecxeption to this stream is Reidy (2005, pp. 197-201) who finds it attractive to speculate on some corollaries
which would be implicit in the duty if assistance.
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The quoted passage contains a double claim: it does not exist any people so dramatically poor
to be unable to accomplish with the goal of a just society, so a redistributive principle between
peoples is not strictly necessary; even if there are strong and evident differences between peoples in
terms of  resources  and political  and economic development,  those cannot  be  attributed  to pure
arbitrary contingencies, but rather to specific and conscious choices made by peoples themselves
(Rawls 2001, pp. 117-118). In other words the latter consideration simply means that in Rawls’s
opinion “the causes of international inequality [are to be considered] purely domestic” (Pogge 2001,
p. 252) and if a people is poor, even in terms of institutions, it is because that people up a certain
extent  decided  to  be  poor  (Rawls  2001,  pp.117-118).  Therefore,  according  to  Rawls,  no
redistributive reasoning or principle between nations can be invoked: it would be unjust to transfer
resources from one people to another one since there is a direct causal relation between the current
political and economic development of a people and its previous decisions.
In synthesis, the Rawlsian international distributive justice is substantially characterized by
different elements and triggers distinct issues compared to the domestic redistributive case (Pettit
2006, p. 52 and Wenar 2006, pp. 102-104).  Rawls himself explicitly specifies that “how peoples
treat  each  other  and  how they  treat  their  own members  are,  it  is  important  to  recognize,  two
different  things” (Rawls 2001,  p.  83),  highlighting how to two different issues of redistributive
justice might  correspond two alternative approaches and then two distinct solutions,  that is two
different sets of principles (Nagel 2005, pp. 122-124 and p. 127). In conclusion, even though some
authors accused Rawls of creating a “structural  disanalogy” between his domestic redistributive
theory  and  his  international  justice  (Pogge  2001,  p.  249  and Pogge 2003,  pp.  1745-1746),  the
differences  should  not  be  interpreted  as  between-theories  inconsistencies,  but  more  simply  as
different approaches to different circumstances.
1.3.1.2 The European Union within the Rawlsian theoretical frame
Given the specific purposes of this thesis, it is now important to understand which of the two
approaches,  the  domestic or the  international  frame,  is  more suitable to interpret  the  European
institutional  framework.  This  task  is  not  as  straightforward  as  it  might  appear  because  of  two
parallel reasons: first of all Rawls did not clearly include the European Union as a formal object of
any of his theories; at the same time the European Union “is neither a nation or a state, nor mankind
as  a  whole”  (Van  Parijs  2012a).  Therefore  “none  of  the  values  defended  [in  Rawls’s]  works
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provides alone a definitive axiological model that might elucidate the character of the European
Union” (Barcelos et al. 2008, p. 6). This implies that there is not a precise overlap between any
Rawlsian system singularly taken and the European Union. Instead, the last one represents a hybrid
institutional  framework  not  structurally  contextualized  within  the  two  theories.  However,  this
articulated  theoretical  framework  does  not  have  only  a  negative  connotation,  but  also  positive
aspects  because  it  means  also  that  both  theories  become  potentially  suitable  to  interpret  the
European context.
Since the European Union is a set of nation-states, in a first moment it might be intuitive to
approach it with the interpretative categories belonging to the Rawlsian international theory. What
can The Law of People say about the European integration?  According to the theoretical frame
described so far we can claim that the European Union has to be considered a just international
institution,  not  only  because  its  member  states  (peoples)  behind  the  veil  of  ignorance  would
formally agree on the principles of international justice designed for the “ideal theory”, but also and
overall because for Rawls a just Europe (world) is basically represented by a Europe (world) of just
states (Barcelos et al. 2008, pp. 4-5, Nagel 2005, p. 115 and Pogge 1988, p. 235). In other words,
the European Union has to be positively considered in the light of Rawls’s international  social
contract theory since its single member states (peoples) are by themselves just in Rawlsian terms.
This is true in the light of Article 49 of the Treaty of Lisbon which identifies the minimum
political requirements for the formal admission of a state18 to the European Union. Article 49 of the
Treaty  of  Lisbon basically provides the formal basis  for any state to join the  European Union,
identifying the minimum qualifications that a candidate (future member) state must satisfy to enter
the Union. These minimum requirements are also recalled in Article 2, in the Article 6 and more
generally through the criteria of Copenhagen. They go from stability of institutions to democracy,
from respect of human rights to equality. All of them essentially coincide with the features which
make a people just according to Rawls (1999 and 2001). Thus, that the European Union is a just
Society of Peoples (a just international arrangement in the Rawlsian vocabulary) is the simplest and
the most coherent interpretation of the European integration we can provide in the perspective of
the Rawlsian international theory.
But why does this linear and on one side satisfying conclusion does not seem to be fully
compelling? Because we have to recognize how the European Union, given the current level of
interdependence between its member states, is much more than a simple set of endogenously just
systems.  Therefore  the  Rawlsian  theory of  international  justice  represents  a  correct  but  limited
18 Geographically belonging to the European continent.
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perspective to look at the European Union and to appreciate all its  structural elements. In other
words, the European Union triggers some issues which the Rawlsian international justice, such as it
was conceived, does not deal with. In particular, as it was showed above, the Rawlsian international
theory does not contemplate a redistributive scheme between peoples (as strong as the one present
in the domestic theory).
Therefore, in order to analyze the distributive issue within the European Union I suggest using
the Rawlsian domestic theory too. Adopting Rawls’s domestic social contract theory in parallel to
his  international  justice  can  provide  a  more  complete  and complementary  interpretation  of  the
European  Union  institutional  arrangement,  in  particular  regarding  the  distribution  of  resources
between its member states.
It is within this theoretical context that Chapter 2 of the thesis deals with redistribution of
resources at European level from the perspective of Rawls’s domestic theory. In the second Chapter
the general research question is perfected in the following formulation: by means of a Rawlsian
agreement of  domestic  nature  is  it  possible  to  justify  a  redistributive policy  valid  between  the
European member states? In order to answer to this question the adopted methodology is purely
theoretical, and the core result is that we are essentially allowed to extend the range of applicability
of the difference principle from the domestic dimension to the European one to the extent that the
European context satisfies two basic requirements of Rawls’s domestic theory.
In particular, in order to apply Rawls’ domestic model and to draw the related conclusions, at
European  level  the  existence  of  two  specific  conditions  should  be  proved:  a) a  mutually
advantageous cooperative scheme among the involved parties and  b) a set of formal institutions
which defines a common basic structure. Chapter 2 shows that the European Union satisfies, from
an empirical and substantial point of view, the conditions a) and b), therefore it is possible to derive
an actual  European difference principle.  The last  one,  in  particular,  prescribes to  maximize the
expectations  of  the  European least  advantaged,  regardless  of  national  borders. This  preliminary
result implies that the related research question is positively validated.
In conclusion to  Chapter  2  I  also claim that  in  order  to  give an  actual  realization to  the
normative prescription of the European difference principle, the European Union should put itself in
the perspective of creating a sizeable European budget. In particular, by means of a European Fiscal
Union it might be possible to channel in a European budget those resources which are the result of
the economic cooperation taking place at  European level  and which are supposed to  serve the
European difference principle proposes.  Thus the analysis of the European Union in a Rawlsian
perspective  leads  to  an  important  corollary:  the  European  member  states  should  take  into
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consideration to implement Fiscal Union not only for purposes of economic coordination, financial
macro-stability  and  provision  of  European  public  goods.  Instead  the  European  countries  are
expected to move towards a Fiscal Union also for an important reason of moral-normative nature,
which is in general embodied in the constitution of every fiscal system: the reallocation of resources
with the intent to reduce inequalities.  This might move the European Union from being a mere
economic arrangement, to an integration which has some social traits.
1.3.2 Empirical and experimental distributive justice on John Rawls
The impulse to inquiry distributive justice from an empirical perspective can be traced back to
two simple games that lead to a (r)evolution in the economic discipline: the dictator game (Engel
2011 and Kahneman et al. 1986) and the ultimatum game (Forsythe et al., 1994 and Güth et al.
1982). In the former a player has to choose if and how to divide an earned or a windfall endowment
with a dummy player  who has no voice on the division:  the  unilateral  decision of the dictator
constitutes the final payoff distribution between the two players involved in the game. The latter
represents an extension of the dictator game, where to the receiver it is provided a veto power on
the distribution proposed by the dominant player. In synthesis, in the ultimatum game the receiver
can decide whether to accept or whether to refuse the dictator’s proposal. If the receiver rejects the
division proposed by the sender, both of them get nothing.
The participants’ behaviours displayed and observed in these simple games gave rise to new
research queries, because in none of the games the empirical evidence, that is the actual average
payoff  distribution,  coincided  with  the  standard  theoretical  predictions.  In  particular,  while  the
standard economic theory expected that the participant playing in the dominant role would have
shared on average (approximately) zero (in the ultimatum game) in the dictator game, the empirical
results showed that this prediction was inconsistent with the actual behaviour, since the dictators
share with the receiver on average (40%) 30% of their endowment. Such an inconsistency could not
be  explained  by  the  standard  consequentialist  model  of  the  purely  self-interested  homo
oeconomoicus, who is supposed to take into account only the own material status. Therefore this
gap  between  theory  and  empirical  evidence  gave  a  new stimulus  to  the  economic  research  to
analyse in depth the agents’ distributive concerns.
In particular, the economic discipline, in the attempt to enrich the theoretical description of
the economic agent by including in the last one the results of the empirical evidence, took two
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different ways. On the one hand the research focused on better understanding the cognitive limits of
actual economic agents, designing them as rationally bounded (Simon 1997) and therefore endowed
with a set of cheap and intuitive psychological mechanisms (heuristics) which operate as fallible
shortcuts in the self-interested maximization process (Kahneman et al. 2011). On the other hand the
economic discipline extended its horizons taking into account social norms and preferences. In this
second case the economic research developed the idea that, sometimes, self-interested behaviour is
accompanied  by other  regarding concerns  such as  fairness,  willingnes  to  comply,  envy,  equity,
inequity aversion, spite, altruism, positive or negative reciprocity and the like. Nowadays there are
many  theoretical  approaches  which aim  at  modelling  the  economic  behaviour  with  different
mechanism of social norms or preferences (Bicchieri 2005, Bolton et al. 2000, Charness et al. 2002,
Fehr et al. 1999 Fehr et al. 2004, Gintis et al. 2005, Kinbrough 2014, Konow 2000, Krupka et al.
2013, Levine 1988 and Rabin 1993).
Complementary to this development occurred from the theoretical side and which constituted
a remarkable progresses in designing a  social homo oeconomicus,  the economic science started
recognizing  the  importance  of  empirical  research  as  an  additional  tool  to  the  conceptual  and
analytical  approach.  Thus,  through  the  years  we  have  witnessed  thousands  of  surveys,  field
researches and laboratory experiments whose goal was to amend and to provide a sort of empirical
guidance to the theoretical speculation. It is within this second sphere that we can identify the study
of modern empirical distributive justice. Starting from the two simple experiments described above,
the experimental practice developed many alternative designs and approaches in order to describe
as  precisely  as  possible  the  different  types  of  norms  and  social  preferences  which  frame  an
economic decision.
This enlargement of the economic discipline in order to include an empirical perspective on
distributive preferences has taken place through two main approaches. On the one hand subjects
may be required to take fictitious distributive decisions (Gaertner  et al.  2012).  In this  case the
decision is enquired through a survey or a questionnaire and usually there is not a direct relationship
between the choices and the decision-maker’s material status. On the other hand the decisions taken
by  the  individuals  are  meant  to  produce  specific  material  consequences  on  the  wealth  of  the
involved  subjects.  Both  these  methodologies  have been  adopted  also  to  test  Rawls’s  theory  of
justice and his maximin principle (see for instance Bond et al. 1991 and  Michelbach et al. 2003
respectively). In general, however, the behavioural and experimental research about the Rawlsian
decision-making model focused on testing Rawls’s principles against alternative theories which deal
with distribution of resources (Aguiar et al. 2013, Engelmann et al. 2004 and Frohlich et al. 1987).
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Frohlich  et  al.  (1987)  simulated  in  a  laboratory environment  Rawls’s  veil  of  ignorance
procedure. In particular they tested his predictions  on the unanimous consensus on  a distributive
rule  that  maximizes  the  welfare  of  the  worst-off  against  other  distributive  principles  (like
maximizing the average wealth). The understanding of the available principles, measured by means
of a test,  was a precondition for the participants  for continuing with  the experiment.  After this
preliminary phase the participants were asked to decide together between different distributions of
income representing the mentioned principles. In particular, they were asked to discuss about the
given distributive schemes not knowing their position in any scheme. Indeed, they were assigned to
a position after they agreed on a principle, that is  on a distributive scheme. The results of this
experiment showed that the subjects always reached a unanimous agreement on the distributive
principle but none of the 29 groups who took part in the sessions chose the distributive scheme
compatible with Rawls’s difference principle19.
Engelmann  et  al.  (2004)  presented  a  simple  one-shot  distribution  experiment  where  they
compared the relative importance of maximin preferences against other concerns like efficiency or
inequality aversion. They provided to the experimental subjects a decision sheet containing three
different allocations of money between three individuals. Each subject subject had to choose one
scheme among the three proposed. Before taking any decision they were also informed that after
their choice they would have been randomly assigned to the three roles. In this way they face role
uncertainty like behind Rawls’s veil of ignorance. Lastly, only the choice of the participant selected
as person 2 mattered, that is it was considered for the actual payoff distribution. Furthermore, a
control treatment assigned fixed roles in advance. The final results of they study showed that the
maximin preferences (together with other components) have a substantial impact on the distributive
choices  of  the  experimental  subject.  Nevertheless  the  control  treatment  did  not  provide  any
indication that their results were driven by the introduction of the uncertainty stage. 
Aguiar et al. (2013) designed an experiment in order to investigate three different mechanisms
to achieve impartiality in distributive justice. In particular they considered a first-person procedure,
inspired by the Rawlsian veil  of ignorance,  and two third-party procedures, that  is  an involved
spectator  and  a  detached  observer.  In  the  laboratory,  groups  of  four  people  with  different
endowment  levels  were  constituted.  In  particular,  every  group  was  formed  of  three  veiled
stakeholders and one third-party observer (either a detached observer or an involved spectator). The
task of each of the four participants was to choose how to distribute a surplus among the three
19 Of the  remaining  groups 25 groups chose  to maximize the average with  a floor constrain and five  to  simply
maximize the average.
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stakeholders.  The authors found that  the  three  methods induced a  fair  amount  of redistribution
between the subjects.  However,  the levels  of redistribution showed to be significantly different
across the three mechanisms of impartiality. In particular, the detached observers behaved in a more
egalitarian way (in particular 68% of the  decisions were perfectly  egalitarian),  followed by the
veiled stakeholders (57%) and then by the involved spectators (54%)20. 
In synthesis, this empirical literature produced no strong and compelling evidence in favour of
Rawls’s distributive model, even tough it was ascertained that preferences of Rawlsian type do not
depend only on risk attitudes (Schildberg-Hörisch 2010). 
Notwithstanding these non-encouraging empirical outcomes on the distributive preferences
proposed  by  John  Rawls,  the  literature  did  not  exhausted  its  research  interest  concerning  the
empirical enquiry of his theory of justice. Indeed, it is necessary to underline how the difference
principle is more sophisticated than it might seem to be. More precisely, the implementation of a
distributive preference of Rawlsian type is not an innate predisposition, but rather a rational product
of two distinct moments, associated with both of the two stages of the social contract.
More precisely, according to Rawls the difference principle is the result of an ex-ante phase,
where the subjects express their distributive preferences from a particular perspective (the original
position) and of an ex-post phase, where the individuals display those preferences through their
actual  behaviour  in  the  real  world.  Therefore,  within  the  Rawlsian  theory  both  phases  become
essential to observe an economic agent behaving according to the difference principle. However, the
previous  empirical  literature  not  always  took  into  sufficient  account  this  fundamental
interdependence between the two mentioned momenta. 
In particular, it is important to highlight that given their different structural configuration the
two phases might differ with regards to the chosen distributions, that is the same subject might opt
for the difference principle in the first stage and then in the second one, when he realizes he is in an
advantaged position, he might display an actual behaviour which is not concerned at all with the
status  of  the  worst-off.  Despite  this  theoretical  possibility,  it  should  be considered  senseless  to
conceive two phases, if only the second is supposed to have real and effective consequences in the
society. It would be senseless unless the first moment was not conceived with the aim to have a
precise influence on the second one.
As reported in the Section 1.2.2, within Rawls’s theory, the distributive preference displayed
behind  the  veil  of  ignorance  cannot  be  unbound  from  the  pragmatic  implementation  of  the
20 In particular  68% of the  decisions of the  participants who played in  as  the detached observers were perfectly
egalitarian; this percentage reduced to 57% for the veiled stakeholders and to 54% for the involved spectators. 
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difference principle in the real word. In other words, the ex-post behaviours cannot overlook the
mental  experiment  of  the  original  position,  that  is  in  Rawls  system  any  ex-ante  distributive
preference, if not reasonably confirmed by means of an ex-post actual choice, would be an empty
result.  Within  John  Rawls’s  social  contract  theory  this  is  the  problem  of  the  stability  of  the
agreement  through  the  sense  of  justice.  This  issue  was  thus  considered  also  by  somne  reced
behavioural and experimental economic literature.
1.3.2.1 The sense of justice in the laboratory: the social conformist preference model
An  innovative  field  of  literature  on  distributive  justice  explored  in  depth  the  Rawlsian
egalitarian conception and in particular his idea of the sense of justice (see the Section 1.2.2), which
is the substantial glue that bonds the two phases of the social contract. Modelling Rawls’s moral
psychology on a belief-dependent disposition, since for Rawls “the capacity for a sense of justice
[is] built up by responses in kind” (Rawls,  1999, p. 433), the idea at the basis of the proposed
behavioural model is that an individual should implement the distributive preference showed behind
the veil of ignorance only at the condition that he or she believes that the other subjects involved in
the agreement would or will do the same. In particular,
“[t]he reason that explains a particular decision in the ex post game is knowledge of
what the players will  effectively do. Moreover,  this  knowledge about  the other
players' decisions must be consistent with their being symmetrically able to predict
the  others'  behavior  and  to  choose  their  best  response  to  those  predictions.
Therefore, it is not the impartial selection of a desirable ex ante solution, but the
knowledge of other players' de facto behaviors, that provides the proper reason for
acting in the ex post context (Sacconi et al. 2011, p. 281)”.
The behavioural  model  of  contractarian  conformist  preferences (Faillo  and  Sacconi  2007,
Sacconi and Faillo 2010, Grimalda and Sacconi 2005 and Sacconi and Grimalda 2007), following
Rawls’s  setting  described  so  far,  introduces  in  the  utility  function,  together  with  the  standard
material payoff, a psychological payoff assigned by the agent to the compliance expected from the
other players involved in the agreement. In this way “psychological equilibria based on conformist
preferences – with which we formally represent the `sense of justice'  – provide an endogenous
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explanation of social contract compliance” (Sacconi et al. 2011, p. 286) and more in general a solid
justification of distributive preferences of Rawlsian type in the real world.
Consistently  with  the  formal  structure  given  by  Rawls,  at  the  basis  of  the  conformist
preferences model there is the assumption that the individuals play a non-cooperative game where
the Nash equilibria are not mutually beneficial. Besides, the model assumes that before this main
game is played, the subjects take part in a preliminary stage where they can agree on a distributive
rule under an impartial perspective (behind a veil of ignorance). Finally, the rule chosen in the
agreement phase is not automatically implemented, i.e. it is not conceived as binding, therefore the
agreed  norm  should  not  prevent  players  to  reach,  in  the  second  phase,  the  standard  Nash
equilibrium where they maximize only their own material payoff according to the best respond to
the others’ freeriding.
In  particular,  the  theory  of  conformist  preference  explains  how  the  impartial  agreement
becomes a tool for the selection of an alternative (psychological) equilibrium where players comply
with an ex-ante counter-maximizing distributive preference counterbalancing the potential material
loss  with  a  psychological  gain.  The  resulting  utility  function  (1)  is  thus  made  of  two  main
components: a standard consequentialist part based on the material payoff; a conformist preference
part which provides psychological utility under the condition of (expected) reciprocal compliance.
(1) V i( )=U i( )+λiF [T ( )]
In particular:
-  Ui represents the canonical utility gained from the material payoff achieved in the state  σ
(that represents a combination of the players’ strategies). The remaining part of the function
embodies instead the psychological utility;
- T is the collective distributive preference unanimously agreed during the agreement phase.
In other words,  T represents  the  chosen social  welfare function aimed at  ordering all  the
possible states σ of the ex-post world. Moreover, the closer the ex-post distribution of material
payoffs to the norm T, the higher is the value of T;
-  F is  an index of agent  i's  conditional  and reciprocal conformity with principle  T.  More
precisely this parameter measures the contribution, through her choice, of the player i to the
maximization of T, conditioned on the expected actions (which in turn are conditioned on the
player i’s expected actions) of the other players in the state σ. The index can range from 1 (full
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conformity) to 0 (no conformity at all) and operates as a weight on λ, determining how much
the last one can affect the player’s psychological utility;
- λ is an exogenous value meant to represent Rawls’s sense of justice. It embodies the agent’s
motivational force (psychological disposition) to act on the motive of reciprocal conformity
with the agreed norm.
The presented model was tested in different versions of the so called exclusion game and it
demonstrated to have a very robust predictive power (Degli Antoni et. al 2016, Faillo et al. 2008,
Faillo et al. 2014, Sacconi and Faillo 2005, Sacconi and Faillo 2010 and Tammi 2011). Basically,
the exclusion game is a resource allocation experiment, in particular a multiple dictator game, with
a preliminary stage where the participants, in an anonymity condition, have the possibility to reach
a unanimous agreement about the norm (distributive preference) to follow during the second stage,
the actual exclusion game.
Three are the most important features of the game that replicate Rawls’s theory and that at the
same time allow to implement the social conformist preference model: the choice of the distributive
rule is taken behind a veil of ignorance, that is the players agree on a distribution not knowing their
(future) role in the second stage of the game. When assigned, the players' roles are differentiated
with regard to their endowments or to their decision-making powers. Excluding some players from
active roles is  meant  to reproduce the  arbitrary  distribution  of  social  and economic conditions.
Finally, during the actual exclusion game the agreement concerning the chosen distributive norm is
neither formally nor substantially binding, that is the players endowed with full decision-making
powers are not bounded, so they can adopt any available alternative strategy.
Therefore,  given  the  game design,  during the  actual  exclusion  game every  player  in  the
dictator role should choose the strategy which maximizes his or her own payoff independently from
the rule agreed during the ex-ante vote. Nevertheless, the provided experimental evidence showed
in a compelling way how the unconstrained ex-post compliance to the ex-ante chosen distributive
preference is unexpectedly high even in those cases where the groups unanimously agreed about a
counter-maximizing rule,  and in particular about a distributive scheme compatible with Rawls’s
difference principle. These are the words of the authors summarizing their main results about the
exclusion game (Faillo et al. 2014, p. 242): 
“in the agreement treatment we observed that all groups reached an agreement, that
the  large  majority  of  groups  agreed on the  equal  division  rule  and that  a  high
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percentage of subjects chose to comply with the rule believing that other members
of their group would do the same. In addition, on considering the relation among
agreement, expectations and actual choices, we can conclude that the agreement
‘under  the  veil’  induced  the  convergence  of  subjects’  beliefs  of  reciprocal
compliance  and  consequently  activated  a  preference  to  act  in  accordance  with
fairly agreed principles conditionally on reciprocal compliance beliefs”
Thus, the general behaviour observed in the exclusion game was considered consistent with
the Rawlsian concept of the sense of justice and with its formal representation through the social
conformist preferences model. The last one was assumed at the basis of the development of the
research  questions  in  the  Chapters  3  and  4,  which  inquire  respectively  tax  compliance  and
international agreements concerning the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
1.3.2.2 The sense of justice and tax compliance
Developed  in  partnership  with  Professor  Luigi  Mittone  of  the  University  of  Trento,  the
Chapter  3  approaches  tax  compliance  in  a  Rawlsian  perspective.  In  this  Chapter  the  general
research  question  is  inflected  as  it  follows  one:  can  a  (laboratory)  Rawlsian  veil  of  ignorance
generate  more  equitable  (redistributive)  tax  regimes  and  guarantee  long-lasting  voluntary  tax
compliance?
In order to answer to this question the paper moves along three converging research tracks.
First of all, the study is part of the “slippery slope” framework. This theoretical tool clarifies how
individual tax compliance is not the result of a mere mathematical weighting of risks and benefits
connected to the decision to pay or to evade taxes. Instead, according to the “slippery slope” theory,
tax compliance depends as much on deterministic elements like audits and fines as on a broader set
of psychological and environmental variables which drive voluntary cooperation.
Second, the research specifically focus on the Rawlsian concept of the sense of justice and its
behaviouralist  interpretation mentioned above. Summarized in a few words, the sense of justice
embodies the idea that an agreement of Rawlsian nature should generate by itself an endogenous
and increasing over time willingness to comply with the chosen redistributive scheme. Shifted in
the tax context the sketched framework can be approximately illustrated in the following way: after
an ex-ante voting phase where the individuals choose a tax regime behind a veil  of ignorance,
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external enforcement mechanisms like audits and sanctions should not be indispensable in order to
guarantee ex-post tax compliance
Third, the answer to the research question is entrusted to a laboratory experiment which relies
on the exclusion game design. 
In the literature on tax evasion many experimental and field studies proved a behavioural
regularity regarding a positive causation effect between individuals’ participation in the definition
of tax rules (like rates, audits, fines etc.) and the following level of tax compliance. According to
this literature stream, compared to a situation where rules are exogenously assigned, norms and
institutions legitimized in a direct way enhance the cooperative attitude. In brief, letting individuals
to have a voice on specific tax issues increases voluntary tax compliance. However, our study does
not focus on the so-called “participation effect”. Instead, with our experiment we aimed at testing
the effects of two different voting conditions, one of them inspired by the Rawlsian social contract
theory.
In particular, before accessing the actual tax compliance game, in a preliminary voting stage
groups of three players each are asked to reach a unanimous agreement concerning a tax regime (set
of tax rates) to apply to three possible levels of income. The four tax schemes are designed to
generate the same ex-post average wealth. However, they are more or less progressive, that is they
are differentiated with regards to their redistributive effects.
In the baseline experiment we ask participants to reach an agreement on a tax scheme after
they are randomly assigned their personal level of income. In the veil treatment instead, during the
voting stage,  a Rawlsian (laboratory)  veil  of  ignorance is  introduced,  that  is  we ask players  to
unanimously agree on a tax regime before assigning them a level of income.
According to Rawls’s social contract theory and some of its experimental evidence the veil of
ignorance should produce some effects on the distribution of votes itself in the voting stage as well
as on compliance level in the actual game. In particular, with a veil of ignorance the tax scheme
which maximizes the expectations of the lowest level of income (representing the worst-off in the
game) should be chiefly  chosen and compliance in the veil  condition should be not  lower and
constant across rounds compared to the no-veil treatment.
The  empirical  results  showed  in  Chapter  3  only  partially  confirmed  our  theoretical
predictions. This mean that the research question did not find a complete empirical validation. In
particular, in the veil condition the distribution of votes shifted towards a more (but not the most)
progressive, that is redistributive, tax regime. Besides, average tax compliance was not lower than
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in  the  baseline  treatment.  However,  compliance  in  the  veil  treatment  was  not  constant  across
rounds, viz. the impartial agreement was not stable as predicted.
Nevertheless, taken together these are considered a positive result in favour of the Rawlsian
veil  of  ignorance  and its  social  conformist  preferences model.  Indeed,  even though in  the  veil
treatment groups agreed on more progressive tax schemes, which are more demanding for richer
people  by  construction,  the  average  level  of  compliance  was  not  negatively  affected,  and  this
behavioural trajectory was driven by the expectations concerning the level of compliance of the
other players in the tax game.
1.3.2.3 The distribution of resources between generations in a laboratory experiment
Chapter 4, developed in collaboration with Professor Lorenzo Sacconi of the University of
Milan and Professor Faillo of the University of Trento, deals with economics and ethics of climate
change in a Rawlsian framework. More in general the research focuses on distribution of resources
between generations and in particular on modern international agreements which aim at reducing
global greenhouse gas emissions.
Our  study  moves  from  the  observation  that  notwithstanding  more  than  thirty  years  of
international  negotiations on climate actions,  mankind has not been able to  reduce noxious gas
emissions which, through the global warming, might seriously harm future generations. Thus, not
limiting consumption of natural resources today,  the present generation profits  of its  privileged
position on the timeline and enjoys a higher level of wealth at the expenses of future generations,
who will have to bear the costs. This stalemate situation is the result of the intersection of two well
identified circumstances occurring at international level.
First of all, the global reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions, and therefore of the total
present consumption, is systematically conditioned upon the distribution of costs between nations.
More precisely, no nation is really available to pay more than the others reducing more than others
its own current consumption of natural resources in order to reach the common goal.
Second, given that within the current geopolitical frame there are not international institutions
which can enforce, by means of audit or sanctioning mechanisms, compliance to any agreement,
even formal contracts (like the Kyoto protocol) are intrinsically fragile. In other words, whatever
the ideal outcome of an agreement on climate actions might be, given the absence of any institution
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which can change the economic incentives’ structure, the Nash equilibrium always prescribes to
defect not reducing of the current consumption of natural resources.
Within this broad frame we inflect the general research question of the thesis as it follows: can
an agreement of Rawlsian type concerning the management of common natural resources help to
reduce present greenhouse gas emissions and more in general to produce a fair path of consumption
between generations? 
In  his  main  works  Rawls  only  marginally  dealt  with  distribution  of  resources  between
generation.  Nevertheless his  decision-making model  inspired  to  the idea of  a  social  contract  is
considered suitable to inquire the management of natural resources and the related agreements on
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, in moving from the (intragenerational) kernel of his
social contract theory to the intergenerational application of it, Rawls specifies along many passages
that  the  impartial  agreement  which  is  supposed  to  generate  principles  for  the  distribution  of
resources between generations is intragenerational:  since the contemporaries are deprived of the
information on the generation of the history they belong, they are constrained to be impartial also
on the intergenerational  norms.  Within this  framework Rawls  derives  the just  saving principle,
which basically requires to each generation to contribute in a fair way to those coming later.
In order  to  answer  the  research  question  we designed a  laboratory  experiment  shaped on
Rawls’s intergenerational social contract theory. In particular, we group participants in sets of three
people and we place the groups along chains of different lengths. Each group of players is then
meant to represent a set of contemporaries subjected to the decision of all previous groups in the
chain and decides about the destiny of the following ones.
In the baseline treatment, within the active groups players individually have to decide how
much money to withdraw from a common fund. If the total withdraw is lower or equal to the fixed
threshold, the chain can continue and the group in the next position become active. Otherwise the
chain shortens starting from the last generation of the chain itself. The groups cut out are forced to
leave the game and they cannot take any decision.
In the Rawlsian treatment, the sequential dictator group game is preceded by a preliminary
voting phase, where we ask groups to agree, among their inner members, on a rule concerning the
management of the common fund. However,  they are asked to choose an intergenerational rule
before they are told which generation (position in the chain) they belong. Members of every group
can then agree  whether  to  limit  their  individual  withdrawal from the fund,  letting  the chain to
continue  intact,  or  whether  to  appropriate  an  amount  of  resources  higher  than  the  threshold,
shortening in this way the chain.
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Consistently with the Rawlsian just saving principle and its behavioural model we expected
groups to agree mainly on the self-containing rule which allows chains to continue intact, whereas
according to the sense of justice theory we expected participants to abide by the impartially chosen
rule even though in the actual game the agreed rule is not designed as binding.
The experimental evidence strongly confirmed the first hypothesis. However, notwithstanding
an average compliance rate of 80%, given the specific structure of the game, that was not sufficient
to guarantee continuation of the chains compared to the baseline treatment, where groups directly
enter the sequential game without taking part in any agreement stage.
Thus, our answer to the research question is consistent with the general framework about
climate change agreements: everybody is ready to agree that a reduction of greenhouse gases, and
therefore of current consumptions is necessary. However, compliance keeps being an open issue. 
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2. The European Social Contract:
a Rawlsian Approach in Favour of Fiscal Uniona
Abstract.  Why  might  the  European  member  states  seek  for  Fiscal  Union?  General  fiscal
coordination, macro-stability purposes and provision of (European) public goods are certainly
goals  of  paramount  importance  for  the  implementation  of  Fiscal  Union  at  European  level.
However,  there  is  an  equally  important  reason of  moral-normative  nature  embodied  in  the
constitution of any fiscal system: reallocation of resources. The core of the paper is the idea that
Rawls's social contract theory can provide some insights about the implementation of European
Fiscal Union in the re-allocative perspective. The reasoning put forward in the paper shows how
the current European framework can be essentially considered an appropriate object of Rawls's
domestic theory since the European Union holds  those two descriptive  elements  which are
necessary and sufficient to raise redistributive issues, to apply Rawls's pure procedural justice
and  then  to  derive  a  difference  principle  at  European  level:  a) the  mutually  advantageous
cooperation among its  members and  b) a set of formal institutions which constitute a basic
structure.  The European difference  principle  prescribes  to  redistribute  resources in  order  to
maximize the expectations of the most disadvantaged European citizen(s). A corollary which
follows from this  conclusion is  that  the actual  redistribution according to similar scheme is
achievable by means of Fiscal Union at European level.
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“What  would  a just  Europe look like?  What does
justice  mean when  applied  to  that  weird  political
entity  now  called  the  European  Union,  which  is
neither  a  nation  or  a  state,  nor  mankind  as  a
whole?”
Philippe Van Parijs 
Introduction
Indeed,  without  any  of  these  substantial  conditions  it  is  formally  improper  to  insist  to
formulate a difference principle, as much at domestic level as at international level.
The European Union is a compound of nation-states characterized by a particular institutional
asymmetry: as pointed out with different emphasis by Ferrera (2009), Martinsen (2013) and Scharpf
(2002) while some crucial economic issues are directly or indirectly addressed at community level,
social welfare policies remain an exclusive prerogative of the single member states. This implies
that each European member country has its own optimal social policy to respond (with potential
negative spillover effects, see Andreozzi et al. 2017) to the same common economic framework
outlined at European level1.
This situation of institutional asymmetry contributes to generate a fragmented social structure.
Indeed, because of a deficient community social frame, significant inequalities and heterogeneous
re-distributive  effects  emerge  between  and  within  the  European  countries  (Avram et  al.  2014,
Beckfield 2006, Immervoll et al. 2006, Fredriksen 2012). The financial and economic crisis of the
last decade contributed then to accentuate the impact, in terms of inequalities, of this structural
asymmetry: the last one prevented a unified and effective response from the European institutions to
the social needs of its citizens during the crisis. Ferrera (2014) and Martinsen et al. (2014) highlight
this kind of hindrance and the consequent lack of a joint reaction during the crises.
Given  this  current  two-levels  design  there  are  three  possible  options  for  the  future
development of the European Union. The baseline alternative is  to keep the status quo: for the
European Union it is certainly possible to continue to be an institutional chimera, that is a condition
where many national welfare systems coexist within a uniform European economic framework. The
1 A significant  practical  example  is  the  interest  rate:  19 structurally different  European countries  face  the same
interest rate settled by the European Central Bank. Stability and growth pact is another example which involves
every European country.
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second  option  relies  on  a  never  old-fashioned  paradigm,  that  is  to  re-establish  the  symmetry
between the economic and social sphere moving back to the original state of affairs. In this last
perspective  the  European  countries  are  supposed  to  take  back  those  economic  and  political
decision-making powers they have gradually ceased in favour of the European Union: in the light of
the recent Brexit case this option is not an abstract case study for professional thinkers anymore.
The  third  and  the  last  hypothesis  is  suggested  by  Maduro  (2000),  Sangiovanni  (2013)  and
Vandenbroucke (2013). It looks at the opposite direction of the previous one and embraces the idea
to fill up the institutional gap shifting in a certain degree the European Union from being a mere
economic infrastructure towards a reality more careful to the social dimension of its citizens. A
natural consequence of this perspective is then the necessity to endow the European Union with
some concrete social welfare tools and with specific dedicated resources2. 
The reasoning suggested in the paper shows how the constitutive elements which currently
characterize  the  European  Union  substantially  imply  the  third  option.  The  conclusion  that  the
European Union, given its current configuration, should move towards a stronger social integration,
reducing its inner institutional asymmetry and then the underlying inequalities, is reached through
the  adoption  of  a  peculiar  perspective3:  the  Rawlsian  social  contract  theory  and  its  impartial
mechanism of the veil of ignorance (Rawls 1999). The reasoning which follows can be essentially
split into two main blocks:
- the first step consists in identifying, within the European Union, those elements which are
sufficient  and  necessary  to  apply  Rawls's  social  contract  theory.  In  particular,  I  will  show the
existence, from an empirical point of view, of two fundamental elements at European level:  a) a
mutually advantageous cooperation among its member states, b) a set of formal institutions which
constitute a basic structure.
- it  is then necessary to  linger the attention on the direct  consequences deriving from the
application of Rawls's social contract theory to the European Union, that is the European difference
principle. Furthermore I will introduce a corollary of the major conclusion: if European citizens
2 The European Union does not totally lack of any social view. The European Union currently has some (thin) social
traits (see Buchanan 1996, p 253, Dluhosch 1996, pp. 338-339, Kölling 2015, p. 86, Streit et al. 1995, p. 319 and p.
338, Vaubel 1996, p. 317). However its redistributive policy so far has been modest and mostly driven by reasons of
pure economic compensation. Thus the adopted criteria for the limited redistribution of the limited resources mostly
depended on bargaining powers of the single countries rather than on some explicit social purposes (Maduro 2000).
3 Different perspectives and methodologies might be adopted to derive the principles for the European social justice
(Dunaiski 2013, Rawls et al. 2003, Sangiovanni 2013, Scharpf 2002, Van Parijs 2012a, Viehoff 2016).
want their institutions to reflect the restributive social policy embodied in the difference principle
scheme, they might implement Fiscal Union at European level4. 
At this stage of the reasoning the locution “Fiscal Union” might be misleading. Depending on
the context  in  which  is  adopted  it  can  reference to  different  meanings,  suggest  multiple  aims,
usually derived from the broader field of public finance (Musgrave et al. 1989), and more generally
it can be implemented in different degrees and can be characterized by different specific elements
(Fuest et al. 2012). For instance (European) Fiscal Union might be realized with the unique aim to
provide some specific (European) public goods, like a common military defence. Fiscal Union can
suggest also a concept of shared and binding rules concerning the tax policy within a set of defined
economic and political entities. Another possible interpretation implies a shared pool of resources
aimed to face some systemic risks which can be managed better together than from an isolated point
of view.
All  these representations  are  certainly  relevant  when they are  associated to  the  European
context. However, to avoid misunderstandings, it is important to specify from the beginning which
exact meaning is given to the expression “Fiscal Union” throughout the next pages: hereafter with
the words “Fiscal  Union” it  will  be  meant  a European system which can  pool  together  into  a
common budget the resources necessary to pursue and to implement a Rawlsian redistributive social
policy within the European Union. Neither economic factors (specific tax policies, exact amount of
the common budget, etc.) nor political equilibria (legitimization, bargaining rules, decision-making
powers, etc.) will be taken in consideration if not in an accessory way.
The  next  Sections  are  then  organized  as  follows.  Section  1  briefly  introduces  the
methodological issue of approaching the European Union integration from the perspective of John
Rawls's  domestic  social  contract  theory:  The  Appendix  further  examines  in  depth  this
methodological issue. Section 2 is descriptive and focuses the attention on those European empirical
elements which allow the adoption of Rawls's social contract theory. Section 3 provides the main
outcome of applying Rawls’s social contract theory to the European Union, that is the European
difference principle. Section 4 lingers on a corollary of the European difference principle, that is the
European Fiscal Union. The Conclusions summarize the main ideas, provide some final remarks
and address the future research.
4 Within the context of the present paper Fiscal Union at European level is not to be interpreted as a direct outcome
of the analysis of the European Union in a Rawlsian perspective, but simply as a corollary. The straightforward
outcome of the analysis is the European difference principle, which embodies the purpose of social integration;
Fiscal Union is only one of the possible means to achieve that purpose.
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2.1 John Rawls’s social contract theory and the European Union
John Rawls  (1999) conceived  an  impartial  procedure  to  identify  those  principles  (norms)
which can  guarantee  a  fair  institutional  arrangement at  national  level  and at  international  level
(Rawls 2001). In developing his theories Rawls proposing a contractual procedure to establish the
main principles which are supposed to lead human society and its institutions. Within the Rawlsian
theory the impartiality in the choice of the norms is achieved through the veil of ignorance, a tool
which excludes the access to any particular information to the parties involved in the agreement.
Furthermore,  although the whole  decision-making process  and the  agreement  are  conceived by
Rawls as purely hypothetical, their ideal derivation has precise concrete effects. Indeed, even tough
the veil of ignorance is supposed to be only a mental experiment, the agreed principles of justice
(norms  to  shape  institutions)  have  prescriptive  effects  in  the  real  world  after  the  veil  (again,
hypothetically) is dropped.
In particular, at national level (Rawls 1999) the first principle establishes the implementation
for single individuals of a scheme of liberties as broad as possible and compatible with the liberties
of  everybody  else;  the  second principle  of  justice,  relabelled  by  Rawls  himself  as  “difference
principle”,  requires  to  redistribute  those  resources  achieved  by  means  of  social  and  economic
cooperation  in  order  to  maximize  the  expectations  of  the  (group  of)  individual(s)  most
disadvantaged. As far as the international framework is concerned Rawls (2001) lists eight distinct
principles (Rawls 2011, p.37) which are supposed to regulate the relationships between countries in
a fair frame. Thus, according to Rawls’s social contract theory, the main institutions of a modern
society must be arranged to fulfil as much as possible the prescriptions of the principles of justice
impartially chosen behind the veil of ignorance.
Given this theoretical framework, when we try to approach the European Union in the light of
Rawls’s international theory we bump into some difficulties: not only the Rawlsian international
setting leads to some ordinary conclusions with regards to the European Union5; in addition, the
task is made even more arduous by the fact that John Rawls appears to be eurosceptic, and this
should prevent any attempt to analyse further in depth the issue. Indeed, it seems to be natural to
interpret some of his  explicit references to the European Union as symptoms of a more or less
marked euroscepticism: "one question  the  Europeans  should  ask themselves,  if  I  may hazard  a
suggestion, is how far-reaching they want their union to be" (Rawls et al. 2003 p. 9); "the large open
5 See the Section 1.3.1.2.
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market including all of Europe is aim of the large banks and the capitalist business class whose
main goal is simply larger profit" (Rawls et al. 2003 p. 9). 
Thus, basing their analysis on the quoted claims and on the idea that Rawls was skeptical
toward transnational  economic  practices  and institutions  that  weaken the independence  and the
democratic  content  of  single  domestic  societies,  the  previous  (rare)  attempts  to  interpret  the
European Union in the light of Rawls’s thought directly  or indirectly provided an unfavourable
exegesis of the European project.
Kamminga (2014) insists  on rejecting the idea to interpret the  European Union from any
Rawlsian perspective, domestic or international, because according to the author in both cases the
European Union lacks of some fundamental elements to apply Rawls’s theories. In particular, in
Kamminga’s  opinion,  the  European Union does  not  have the  structure  of  a  Rawlsian  domestic
society  because  at  the  European  level  the  mutually  advantageous  cooperative  relations  occur
between  states  rather  than  between  individuals  and  because  the  Union  lacks  of  a  clear  single
political constitution. At the same time, the European Union does not meet the requirements of the
Rawlsian international theory because the this accepts liberal as well as decent people in the Society
of  People,  while  the  Union,  accepting  as  members  only  liberal  society,  is  too  selective  and
demanding.  In  this  perspective,  the  European  Union  is  too  intolerant  according  to  Rawls’s
international standards. 
Barcelos et al. (2008) assume a different perspective. In their opinion the European Union is
an  unidentified  political  object,  characterized  by  a  mix  of  national  and  international  elements.
Therefore we cannot approach the European Union with the standard Rawlsian theories, because
neither Rawls’s international theory nor his domestic justice squarely fit a hybrid and continuously
evolving institution like the European Union. They conclude that “given this hybrid nature of the
Union,  the  description  of  its  values  by  analogy  with  the  domestic  society  [...]  is,  therefore,
unacceptable […] This same hybridism, in the same way, excludes the possibility of conforming the
EU to the [...] model defended in The Law of Peoples” (Barcelos et al. 2008, p. 9).
Using a numerical example Morgan (2008) claims the implicit contradictions of a European
(between states) redistributive principle with the national (within states) redistributive policies. That
consideration apparently prevented Rawls from endorsing the European project, because he was
aware of those possible contradictions.
Therefore, relying on the eurosceptic interpretations we are lead to infer that the European
countries  should  avoid  adopting  any  common  fiscal  system  for  redistributive  purposes,  since,
apparently also according to Rawls himself, when we deal with any remarkable project of European
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integration cons prevail on pros6. However, the conclusion about John Rawls’s euroscepticism has
to  be  considered  too  hasty  for  one  important  reason:  in  his  international  theory  Rawls  only
marginally  took into  consideration  the European framework and more  in  general  the  European
Union is not structurally contextualized within his works. In other words, Rawls neither conceived a
specific European social contract theory nor he explicitly included the European Union as a formal
object of any of his writings. This theoretical emptiness, more than his few explicit (non positive)
references concerning the European integration, paved the way to the eurosceptic interpretations.
In this paper I sustain the idea that it is possible to infer some positive and innovative results
applying the Rawlsian social contract theory to the European Union. In particular, adopting Rawls’s
domestic (national) theory (Rawls 1999) it is possible to achieve some Euro-optimist outcomes,
more precisely concerning the redistribution of resources at European level.
According to the structure given by John Rawls to his domestic theory (Rawls 1999) two
ingredients are sufficient and necessary in order to trigger a redistributive issue within a domestic
framework:
a) a strong social and economic cooperation among the involved parties, which generates benefits
and conflicts. Indeed Rawls opens his main work with the following words:
“although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is typically marked
by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests. There is an identity of interests since
social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each were
to live solely by his own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since persons are not
indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration are distributed”
(Rawls 1999, p. 4).
b) a solid basic structure (Rawls 1977 and 1999), meant as “society's main political, social and
economic institutions,  and how they fit  together into one unified scheme of social cooperation”
(Rawls 1987, p. 3). Said otherwise, the basic structure refers to "the way in which the major social
institutions fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and
shape the division of advantages that arises through social cooperation” (Rawls 1977, p. 159).
6 This conclusion appears to be even more true if we consider that Rawls himself explicitly refused to derive any
kind of international redistributive principle (Rawls 1993, 2001).
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Without these two components it is not possible to apply the domestic theory. Therefore, now
it is  also easier to understand why Rawls refused to conceive a redistributive principle valid at
international  level.  Indeed,  within  Rawls’s  international  theory  the  two mentioned elements  are
completely missing or more simply ignored: there is not (at least for Rawls) a cooperation between
peoples qualitatively similar to the one between individuals belonging to a closed system (Beitz
1999, pp. 132-143, Freeman 2006 p. 39 and Rawls 2001, pp.117-1187); there is not (at least for
Rawls) any clear and specific international basic structure like the one required for redistribution at
domestic  level  (Buchanan 2000, pp.  700-701,  Freeman 2006,  p.  39 and Pogge 2003, p.  1741).
Therefore the derivation of a redistributive principle is neither required nor formally conceivable
since there are not those minimal structural conditions which trigger redistributive concerns.
Freeman is quite straightforward in making this kind of interpretation explicit: “the idea of
social cooperation [...] is central to Rawls’s account of social justice. It underlies his distinction
between  “domestic  justice”  and the  Law of  Peoples.  Moreover,  the  idea of  social  cooperation
informs Rawls’s account of the difference principle. What makes social cooperation possible for
Rawls  are  the  basic  institutions  that  constitute  ‘the  basic  structure’”  (Freeman  2006,  p.  38).
Therefore without the presence of both those elements (cooperation and institutions) at international
level, moral redistributive dilemmas simply do not emerge and applying the standard version of the
Rawlsian  pure  procedural  justice  (Rawls  1999)  essentially  becomes  superfluous,  if  not  wrong
(Freeman 2006, p. 61).
Here  I  assume  that  together  with  the  two  mentioned  elements  all  the  other  Rawlsian
“circumstances of justice” (Rawls 1999, pp. 109-111), that is “the normal conditions under which
human cooperation is both possible and necessary”, are completely fulfilled as well. However, I
deliberately avoid entering the debate on which further elements in the literature of political theory
are considered essential to make redistributive concerns emerge and then to justify principles of
redistributive justice and redistributive institutions, like for example a certain degree of coercion
(Nagel 2005 or Blake 2001). Two are the reasons for this precautionary choice.
First of all the topic is quite recent and the debate on coercion is very animated and still open
(Blake 2016, Sangiovanni 2016 and Valentini 2011). Trying to follow it would uselessly complicate
the  theoretical  framework  necessary  for  the  analysis  of  the  European  Union  in  a  Rawlsian
7 In the examples provided by Rawls in The Law of People (Rawls 2001) there is not any sort of social or economic
cooperation between the two societies taken as reference. The two peoples are presented as economically isolated
and independent one from each other, that is they are basically designed as autarkies. See also (Martin 2015, p.
748).
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perspective.  Therefore  here  it  is  preferable  to  stick  as  much as  possible  to  the  basic  Rawlsian
framework.
 Second, and even more importantly, Rawls never makes explicit that the role of the principles
of justice is to protect individuals from coercive institutions that could harm somebody. Indeed,
within his main work Rawls (1999) uses the words “coercion” and “coercive” only 20 times, the
first in §32 at page 177. So, coercion does not seem to be a fundamental element of the Rawlsian
theory. Thus, even though Rawls seems to admit that “it is reasonable to assume that even in a well-
ordered society the coercive powers of [institutions] are to some degree necessary for the stability
of social cooperation”, however “the establishment of a coercive agency is rational only if these
disadvantages are less than the loss of liberty from instability” (Rawls 1999, p. 211). Nevertheless,
the idea that shines through Rawls’s words is that social institutions should be structured to avoid
coercion as much as possible, and in case coercion is introduced for some reasonable motivation,
the degree of coercion has to be limited and clearly defined.
The  next  Section  aims  at  showing  that  the  two  main  elements  mentioned  above,  that  is
cooperation and a system of institutions, are present within the European framework, therefore it is
possible to apply the interpretative categories of Rawls’s domestic theory and to draw the related
conclusions. 
2.2 The European Union: economic cooperation and basic structure
Is was showed that in order to apply Rawls’s domestic theory to the European Union it is
necessary to verify, from an empirical point of view, whether or not the European Union holds the
two requirements mentioned above, that is the economic cooperation scheme and an institutional
basic structure. However, before moving in that direction it is useful to highlight how it is beyond
the aims of the present analysis  to enter the debate on what  exactly the European Union is  (a
federation, a confederation, an association of compound states, see Buchanan 1996 and Blankart
2007), how the powers within the Union are or should be balanced (Vaubel 1996 and Vaubel 1997),
or how its institutions are or should be legitimized. The existence of certain structural elements is
independent from how we technically prefer defining the European Union. The main intent of the
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next paragraphs is simply descriptive, that is they aim to provide the empirical evidence of those
elements8 which allow to apply Rawlsian domestic justice and its categories at European level.
As for the economic and social interaction meant as a cooperative venture for the mutual
advantage (which generates benefits and conflicts), it is not difficult to acknowledge similar scheme
of  cooperation  within  the  European  Union.  Following  Beitz's  insight  about  the  effects  of
globalization  (Beitz  1999,  pp.  143-153)  it  can  be  immediately  noticed  how  the  “international
economic  interdependence  constitutes  a  scheme of  social  cooperation”  (Beitz  1999,  p.  154)  as
exactly as meant by Rawls for a simple national (closed) system. As regards the specific case of the
European Union and from the point of view of constitutional economics9 Beitz's insight is even
more convincing:  the  economic integration  process  which had begun with the  Treaty  of Rome
(1957, Title I and Title III) gave birth to a formal scheme of mutual cooperation which can be easily
interpreted in the Rawlsian sense. The European Economic Community (Single Market) with its
free circulation of goods, persons, services and capitals constitutes a clear example of social and
economic scheme of mutually advantageous interdependence.  Of course,  as suggested by Beitz,
similar kind of cooperation exists even at a broader international level, but that is not relevant with
regards to the current analysis.
As  far  as  the  benefits  generated  by  the  European  economic  cooperation  are  concerned,
although the economic theory does not agree about the permanent or temporary effects of a market
integration (Badinger 2005), the positive economic outcomes of a market enlargement are broadly
recognized since Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (Smith 19994), where he grasped the positive
implications of the size of a market on the division of labour, and then on the productivity through
specialization. The literature is not unanimous about the precise quantitative effects derived from
the European  economic  integration  (Badinger  et  al.  2011)  and its  determinants  are  not  always
completely clear (Campos et al. 2014 and König et al. 2012). Nevertheless many studies agree on
how the European countries have benefited from the institution of the common market institution
(Badinger et al. 2011, even though the authors highlight how most of the studies are more ex-ante
predictive analysis rather than ex-post quantitative investigations, p. 308).
Despite different methodologies and a “quantitative disagreement”, the following remarks are
sufficient to highlight some of the benefits gained from the European common market (economic
8 Those two (Rawlsian) elements are empirical assumptions it is possible to disagree about, as clearly explained by
Blake (2012, p. 122-126).
9 According to Buchanan the “constitutional economics examines the choice of constraints as opposed to the choice
within constraints” (1991, pp. 134-135). Furthermore it is important to remark how the same author (Buchanan
1991, p. 141) explicitly claims how the Rawlsian distributive problem is an object of study of the constitutional
economics.
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cooperation). Over the period 1950-2000 the “European integration has significantly contributed to
the post-war growth performance of the current EU member states” such that “GDP per capita of
the EU would be approximately one-fifth lower today if no integration had taken place” (Badinger
2005,  pp.  73-74).  “EU  membership  has  had  a  positive  and  asymmetric  effect  on  long-term
economic growth” on the EU-15 member states (Crespo Cuaresma et al. 2008, p. 652). In addition
“there seems to be strong evidence on positive pay-offs from EU membership, despite considerable
heterogeneity across countries” and in a prudent counterfactual evaluation “incomes would have
been around 12 per cent lower today if European Integration had not happened” (Campos et al.
2014,  p.  25  and  p.  21).  What  should  be  clear  from  these  empirical  instances  and  from  the
framework explained so far is that the overlap between the Rawlsian concept of a venture for the
mutual advantage and the European Economic Community (Single Market) is straightforward: the
Treaty on the common market formally defined the mutually advantageous venture10 meant in a
Rawlsian sense. It is then an empirical task to measure the exact economic surplus gained from the
free European market integration.
As for the second element considered essential in order to apply Rawls’s theory of domestic
justice, it is not difficult to identify within the European Union a set of common institutions and
agencies which, in the logic of the present writing, can be interpreted as a European basic structure.
The Treaty of Lisbon (Article 13) formally lists seven common institutions11 whose tasks are to
provide political direction, to manage the Union and to integrate the conflicting interests (Peterson
et al. 2012): elective European Parliament, European Council,  Council (of Ministers),  European
Commission,  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European  Union,  European  Central  Bank  and  Court  of
Auditors. Together, they exert the legislative, the executive and the judicial powers with the aim to
define European policies.
The  seven  institutions  are  then  surrounded  by  hundreds  of  agencies  and  organizations12
(Mathieu 2016) which, performing sometimes at the limits of their formal powers (Chamon 2016),
operate in accordance with the guidelines of the main institutions mentioned above. These agencies,
together with the main institutions, affect individuals’ prospects of live in different spheres, ranging
from ensuring an area of freedom, security and justice (for example Frontex, the European Border
10 Of course it  is  not  necessary a formal treaty for  the existence of  mutually  advantageous economic  and  social
relationships.  Nevertheless  a  formal  treaty  is  an  additional  element  which  strengthens  the  Rawlsian  domestic
interpretation of the European Union.
11 It is not among the aims of the present analysis to provide a detailed description of the main European institutions,
nor, as stated in advance, enter in a debate regarding the equilibria between them or their legitimization.
12 For a complete map of the agencies see the official website https://euagencies.eu/.
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and Cosat Guard Agency) to supervising financial systems (for instance EBA, European Banking
Authority), from providing defense (EDA, European Defence Agency) to supporting EU business
and  innovation  in  the  digital,  energy,  innovation  and  transport  sectors,  from directly  fostering
citizens’ well-being,  like  for example through the European Centre for Disease  Prevention and
Control (ECDC) to helping the developing countries to exploit the potential of their human capital
through the European Training Foundation (ETF). 
In short, the main European institutions and all the agencies which surround them constitute a
dense institutional network which gives rise to a European basic structure. However, some remarks
are due about the set of European institutions interpreted as a Rawlsian basic structure. First of all in
a  Rawlsian  perspective  the  quantity  of  institutions  (on the  European  territory)  is  not  relevant.
Instead, what matters is the substantive quality of those institutions: they are supposed to be capable
of affecting, either by themselves or in conjunction, the distribution of duties and rights, that is to
affect people’s prospects of life.
Considered in this perspective the main European institutions, together with their derivatives,
can effectively and concretely “distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division
of advantages from social cooperation” (Rawls 1999, p. 6). They can deeply affect Europeans’ plans
of life. This conclusion can be reinforced with some concrete examples: the European Parliament is
elected by all the European citizens, so it constitutes a direct link between the European institutions
and the people living on the European territory, and a ban on pesticides voted by the European
Parliament effectively redistributes duties and rights between European citizens. A sentence of the
Court of Justice of the European Union can directly and radically affect the prospect of life of any
(group of) European citizen(s) in case the national laws conflict with the European ones. Again, the
European  Central  Bank,  setting  the  interest  rate,  through the financial  and credit  institutes  can
concretely and effectively redistribute the benefits of the European economic cooperation. 
However, beyond these concrete examples, it is of fundamental importance to remark three
points. First of all a basic structure is not a binomial (zero or one) outcome, which either does not
exist at all or which exists through its full configuration. Instead, a basic structure is an arrangement
which spans on a continuous spectrum and which, according to Rawls, should tend to one, up to the
point that “even in a [perfectly] well-ordered society, adjustments in the basic structure are always
necessary” (Rawls 1977, p. 164) in order to maximize the expectations of the worst-off.
In other words the current European institutional framework represents a configuration which
should be considered “just throughout, but not the best just arrangement” (Rawls 1999, p. 68). This
means the European basic structure, despite being evidently incomplete compared to the national
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ones, has to be constantly improved to tend as close as possible to its full representation. The idea of
moving towards a stronger social basic structure, which can affect the prospects of life of European
citizens by redistributing the benefits of the economic cooperation in a more incisive way than the
actual European institutional arrangement, is the exact attitude of the present work.
Second, it is relevant to underline how the European basic structure is not constituted by mere
second-side institutions which have the only aim of fostering the national ones (Blake 2013, pp.
108-132).  The  European  institutions  act  also  with  their  own  tools,  goals  and  values,  often
independent from the interests of the single nations. They go from promoting the peace within its
territory to defending its external borders, from reinforcing the economic and social cohesion to
fostering the sustainable development, from safeguarding the cultural diversity to promoting the
welfare  of  all  its  citizens.  This  specific  feature  of  autonomy  makes  the  European  institutional
framework closer to the one designed by Rawls for his domestic theory.
Third  and  last  specification,  it  is  important  to  highlight  how  another  international  basic
structure as qualitatively complete as the European one cannot be identified beyond the European
boundaries  nor  at  any  other  international  level.  Therefore  the  uniqueness  of  the  European
institutional  arrangement  plays  a  fundamental  role  in  the  possibility  of  interpreting it  from the
perspective of the Rawlsian domestic theory.
In conclusion, the European economic cooperation and the European basic structure represent
the essential prerequisites to apply Rawls’s domestic social contract theory to the European Union.
The next Section focuses on the outcomes of the European social contract in a Rawlsian perspective
following a reasoning by analogy: the derivation of the European difference principle as normative
redistributive rule at European level and its corollary, that is European Fiscal Union.
2.3 The European difference principle
Given that the European Union holds the essential empirical elements for the application of
the Rawlsian domestic theory it is possible to adopt its formal categories of interpretation. Said
otherwise, it is now possible to make explicit which principles are conceivable for the European
Union as a whole in the perspective of the Rawlsian social contract. For a reasoning by analogy,
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European  individuals  behind  the  veil  of  ignorance13 would  substantially  agree  on  the  standard
(national) principles (Rawls 1999, pp. 52-56)14 to shape the European institutions.
Despite  being  derived  through  a  domestic  original  position,  the  principles  this  time
substantially become valid across the European member states, regardless of the national borders.
Indeed, since the Europeans are deprived by the veil of ignorance of any particular information,
overall of that specific information concerning the territory where they (might)  live in terms of
resources, size of the population, boundaries, economic development and so on and so forth (Rawls
1999 pp. 32-33) they would choose exactly the same two principles conceived by Rawls for the
standard domestic case (1999, pp. 52-65, pp.130-139 and pp. 153-160) and they would rationally
decide to apply them across the European Union considered as a whole.
Indeed the European original position is structurally the same as for the domestic procedure,
and in the specific case of pure procedural justice, the same decision-making structure means the
same outcome, that is the same sort of principles. As mentioned in the section 1.3.1.1, it is true that
Rawls did not come to the same conclusions when formulating his international  social contract
theory. At international level he proposed different principles from those domestic.  However,  it
should  be  remarked  how  he  derived  different  principles  because  the  structural  conditions  he
considered valid for the two cases were different. Instead, I have shown that at the European level
that there is a strong equivalence with the Rawlsian domestic framework.
Thus, the content of the principles chosen behind the European veil of ignorance remains
exactly the same as for the typical national “closed system”, but the actual range of their application
is identified according to the considered basic structure (extension of cooperation), in this case the
European  Union.  The  outcome  is  rigid  with  regards  to  the  essence  of  the  principles  (same
conditions,  same  outcome),  while  the  range  for  their  application  is  tailored  on  the  European
territory.  Again,  the cut-off  point  (Martin  2006,  pp.  227-234 and Martin  2015,  p.  749)  for  the
application of the (domestic) principles in a European perspective has to coincide with the European
Union as a whole. Indeed, behind the (European) veil there are no rational reasons to decide to
apply the principles within the boundaries of the single member countries, and this is particularly
true for the difference principle which affects the redistribution of resources. Behind the veil it is
irrational to apply the principles within specific countries: in a European perspective any ex-ante
13 See (Rawls 1999, pp. 118-123).
14 "The first principle simply requires that certain sorts of  rules,  those defining basic liberties,  apply to everyone
equally and that they allow the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all" (Rawls 1999, p. 56),
whereas the second principle, the so called difference principle requires to "maximize the expectations of the least
favored position" (Rawls 1999, p. 69).
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(behind the veil) decision which identifies a specific internal boundary or a territorial limit for the
application of the principles has to be considered arbitrary and against the maximin reasoning.
Thus,  the range of  validity of the European principles must coincide with the  extension of the
institutions (cooperation) considered behind the veil. 
Focusing now the attention on the redistributive issue, it is possible to claim how behind the
veil of ignorance European citizens would agree to arrange the social and economic inequalities to
the greatest expected benefit of the least advantaged European individuals15, regardless the country
or the nationality: that is equivalent to enunciate a European difference principle which operates at
individual  level16 across  and  beyond  the  boundaries  of  the  single  European  member  states.  A
normative analysis of the European redistributive issue in a Rawlsian (domestic) perspective leads
to  shape  the  European institutions  so that  the  resources  generated  by the  social  and  economic
cooperation within the Union must be redistributed to favour the least advantaged (in terms of
social  primary  goods17)  Europeans:  the  difference  principle  is  not  “statist”  in  its  assumptions
anymore (Kuper 2000, pp. 653-654) and it basically becomes transnational (even if derived from
the application of a national theory).
To reinforce the reasoning presented so far it is possible to provide an introductory example
concerning the working mechanism of the European difference principle. To start, imagine three
European countries (Histogram 1) which act in isolation and which arrange their inner inequalities
in such a way that the least advantaged18 in country A reaches an index of social primary goods of 2
points, the worst-off in B reaches an index of 7 points and the worst-off in country C an index of 5
points.  This is the typical situation conceived by John Rawls,  where every country substantially
15 See (Rawls 1999, pp. 69-72).
16 This  specification  seems to  be  necessary  because  we  might  be  tempted  to  think  that,  since  the  actors  at  the
European level are basically nation-states, the rationale should be to redistribute toward the worst-off member state
instead  of  the  least  advantaged  (group  of)  individuals  between  states.  However,  this  hypothesis  violates  the
assumptions of the Rawlsian domestic social contract theory (which takes individuals as actors) and generates a
clear paradox: if we assume redistribution between member states, in the perspective of a difference principle at
European level we should redistribute resources from Greece (higher GDP) to Luxembourg (lower GDP), or from
Poland (higher GDP) to Norway (lower GDP), although Luxembourg and Norway are two countries among those
with the highest GDP per capita.
17 The social primary goods "are things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants" (Rawls
1999 p.  79),  and  the  social  primary goods  index avoids  problems of  comparability  (Rawls  1999,  pp.  78-81).
Furthermore, the existence of a redistributive principle between states may lead to the problem of redefining the
Rawlsian bundle of social primary goods (Rawls 1999, pp. 78-81), as very cleverly grasped by Paden (1997, pp.
226-227). 
18 Of course also those groups of individuals who are better-off should be taken into consideration. However, the
reppresentation of those groups in the provided examples would not add anything to the general concept.
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worries about the distribution of its own resources and countries do not consider endorsing any
agreement to share or to redistribute their own social primary goods beyond their boundaries. At the
same  time  Histogram  1  adds  a  further  hypothesis:  if  the  three  countries  operate  not  only  as
autarkies, but they cooperate together (that is their citizens constitute an international venture for
the mutual advantage), they can generate a common surplus (EU) of 10 points, since they would
profit from their (international) comparative advantages.
Histogram 1 – Worst-off per country and EU surplus
HISTOGRAM 1: Acting in isolation (and according to their  domestic difference principle) the three
European countries A, B and C can maximize the expectation of the least advantaged of their own nations
as shown by the respective coloured histograms. Should the individuals of the three countries cooperate
together they could generate a common surplus, EU.
Now imagine a second situation.  Individuals  in the  three European countries  engage in  a
mutually advantageous cooperation and, exploiting their comparative advantages, they generate a
surplus at European level. However there is no any clear redistributive scheme, or said otherwise,
European citizens do not agree on any redistributive principle which prescribes how to share the
surplus EU. It is then plausible to assume how the surplus is arbitrary divided by market forces or
by the bargaining powers of the single nations (Histogram 2). In this situation, where there is not a
formal redistributive principle or where there is not a set of institutions (basic structure) which can
concretely redistirbute the common surplus EU, the social primary goods index of the worst-off
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among the least advantaged (located in country A) is assumed to improve by only 1 point. In this
situation the worst-off in country A reaches an index of social primary goods of 3. The total index
increases up to 12 for the least advantaged in country B and up to 9 in country C. However, “the
distribution resulting from voluntary market transactions (even should all the ideal conditions for
competitive  efficiency  obtain)  is  not,  in  general,  fair”.  And  this  outcome  is  possible,  Rawls
specifies, “even though nobody acts unfairly”.(Rawls 1977, p. 160).
Histogram 2 – Market division of the EU surplus
HISTOGRAM 2: Cooperating at European level without reaching an agreement on how to distribute the
surplus EU or without having a basic structure leaves the redistribution at the mercy of other forces.
Instead, how is the European difference principle supposed to act? The initial situation is the
same as  in  the  second  example,  with  the  three  countries  that  engage  in  mutually  cooperative
relationships. This time however, the European surplus EU is supposed to be redistributed in order
to benefit as much as possible the worst-off between the three countries (considered as a unique
set).  Histogram  3  shows  an  egalitarian  distribution  consistent  with  the  European  difference
principle: all groups get a total of 8 points in terms of social primary goods: the index of the least
advantaged is thus maximized. In short, the redistributive scheme proposed in Histogram 3 is to be
considered as the natural outcome of the European difference principle.
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As for the Histogram 3 is concerned a further clarification is due. The egalitarian distribution
proposed in the example is the ideal outcome of the maximin rule – it is “a perfectly just scheme”
where “[n]o changes [...] can improve the situation of those worst off” (Rawls’ 1999, p. 68) - but it
is not the only distribution coherent with the difference principle prescriptions: unequal distributive
schemes are possible and allowed as long as they lead to the maximum advantage of the worst-off
(Rawls’ 1999, pp. 65-73).
In other words, the pure egalitarian solution is just one of the possible configurations admitted
by the difference principle. Paradoxically, also the market division of the Histogram 2 might be
consistent with the difference principle if the other available distributive options could not increase
the expectations of the least advantaged group of European citizens. Indeed, in the Rawlsian social
welfare function weight one is assigned to the most disadvantaged and weight zero to everyone else,
so inequalities are not a primary concern. This means that the index of social primary goods of the
least advantaged is the only variable to take into account in the maximization process. From this it
follows that the egalitarian solution is just a possibility of this one and not a pre-settled goal.
Histogram 3 – Division of the EU surplus according to the difference principle
HISTOGRAM  3:  Egalitarian  distribution  of  the  EU  surplus  according  to  the  European  difference
principle, which maximizes the expectations of the worst-off between those who are the least advantaged
within the single countries.
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2.4 European Fiscal Union in a Rawlsian perspective
Beyond the theoretical analysis provided so far, it remains unclear how the surplus EU should
be quantified and how the resources generated by means of the European cooperation should be
physically pooled together in order to be then redistributed according to the European difference
principle.  As  for  the  first  issue  (quantification)  the  answer  seems  to  be  quite  straightforward,
because the estimate of the European surplus is matter for an empirical investigation. Following the
studies presented in Section 2 (Badinger 2005, Badinger et al. 2011, Campos et al. 2014 and Crespo
Cuaresma et al. 2008) the European surplus might be calculated as the counterfactual difference
between the current  level  of  the  European  economic  activity  and the (aggregated)  hypothetical
economic level should the European countries act as pure autarkies, that is with no transnational
cooperation with other European member states.
Even if the empirical estimate of the European surplus is not a theme regarding the present
theoretical  paper,  one  final  remark  about  this  measure  is  considered  essential:  the  European
difference  principle,  such  as  conceived,  does  not  have  to  substitute  the  national  redistributive
mechanisms,  because it  is  not  supposed act  on all  the  available  resources  within the  European
Union (both national and common). Instead, it prescribes to redistribute exclusively that surplus
generated by the social and economic cooperation which takes place at European level, that is the
redistribution has to be realized only on those resources which are the product of the European
cooperative  scheme.  Conversely,  the  resources  generated  by the  cooperation  which takes  place
exclusively  within  the  single  countries,  that  is  without  any  European  interdependence,  remain
immune from the communitarian redistributive policy. Thus the European difference principle is not
meant as a cosmopolitan distributive principle (Beitz 2000) for the European Union, because the
national surpluses are to be redistributed according to the domestic redistributive schemes.
In general it is not so immediate to think about a compelling rationale for redistributing across
Europe resources generated by the social and economic cooperation which takes place exclusively
within  the  boundaries  of  the  single  member  states.  Indeed,  paradoxically,  applying  a  unique
European redistributive policy on the total surplus (national ones and European considered together)
might erode the social primary goods index of some individuals who are better-off within the single
countries with no common redistributive scheme.
Morgan (2008, p. 9) provides a clear numerical example which highlights such a possibility:
implementing a unique difference principle between nations might lead to a contradicting situation
where the worst-off individual of some particular state is made more disadvantaged compared to the
59
situation where a difference principle is applied within every single country with no redistribution
between states. Thus, with a unique over-arching distributive mechanism there is the risk that a
“society,  or group of such societies,  [are]  worse off under  a [European] basic structure than in
perfect isolation” (Pogge 1988, p. 249).
However, the situation designed in this paper through the European difference principle is
different  from  Morgan’s  (2008)  example.  Indeed,  in  the  present  analysis  the  redistribution  of
resources can be implemented only according to the specific level of cooperation: within-country
(domestic)  redistributive  rule  on  those  resources  generated  by  the  national  cooperation  and
between-countries  (European)  difference  principle  on  the  surplus  generated  by  means  of  the
European cooperation. This is because the European basic structure, even though it is interpreted
from the perspective of the domestic theory, does not substitute the national ones, but it constitutes,
together with the system of cooperation, a second level framework where redistribution of resources
can take place. This becomes even more evident if we consider that not all the social primary goods
on  the  European  territory  are  the  outcome of  the  European  cooperation,  therefore  a  two-level
institutional framework is the situation considered more representative of the European case.
In conclusion there is not any constrain to redistribute resources only once at the highest level,
like stated by Freeman (2006, p. 63)19. Redistribution according to the difference principle can take
place twice or more times, for any level of cooperation and where a basic structure is available.
Thus,  national  and European redistributive schemes are  not exclusive  or  conflicting,  but  rather
compatible and in some degree complementary.
As  far  as  the  exact  European  redistributive  mechanism  is  concerned,  I  assert  how  the
redistribution  of the  European surplus according to the  European difference principle might  be
obtained implementing Fiscal Union at European level. As anticipated in the Introduction, in the
present context Fiscal Union is to be meant merely as a system which can pool together into a
common budget the resources generated by the European economic cooperation. To comply with
the European difference principle a common European budget, reflecting the European surplus,
becomes  essential.  Otherwise,  without  Fiscal  Union,  which  pools  the  resources  together,  the
European  difference  principle  remains  an  elegant  normative  and  theoretical  outcome  with  no
concrete perspectives. 
It is not then an aim of the present paper to enter the debate concerning the practical (technical
or political) implementation of European Fiscal Union. Nevertheless it seems to be legitimate to
19 In this perspective the following consideration becomes then false: "[t]he difference principle can apply only once
to structure economic and property institutions, either globally or domestically. It cannot apply to both." (Freeman
2006, p. 63).
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promote  some  general  considerations.  In  particular,  there  are  two  possible  ways  to  interpret
European Fiscal Union in the light of the European difference principle.  On the one hand it  is
possible to think about a system which constantly collects and transfers the European surplus in
order  to  maximize  the  expectations  of  the  European  worst-off.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  also
imaginable a sort of mechanism of insurance (Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2016 and Thirion 2017) which
pools together the resources and which acts against systematic risks. In the latter perspective the
European surplus might be collected in order to protect the weakest European parties in case of
specific  unfavourable  conditions20,  or  the  budget  might  get into  action when a set of European
subjects goes below a certain minimum threshold.
About  the  way  to  implement  concretely  Fiscal  Union  at  European  level,  Rawls  himself
provides some hints in §43 (Rawls 1999, pp. 242-251) when he describes the distributive branch.
He states how one element of the “distribution branch is a scheme of taxation to raise the revenues”,
and which “make[s] the transfer payments necessary to satisfy the difference principle” (Rawls
1999, p. 246). Thus, a system of taxation at European level should be considered an essential part of
European Fiscal Union in a Rawlsian perspective. Rawls then goes even further suggesting some
specific  taxes which  might  be adopted to  generate the  resources  required for  the redistribution
(insurance  mechanism)  according  to  the  difference  principle:  inheritance  and  gift  taxes;
proportional expenditure tax, that is tax on consumption; a proportional tax on annual consumption;
an income tax is considered as well. It is even possible to speculate about a tax on those activities
which make business across national borders (but within the Union), and so on and so forth.
Clearly these ideas deserve a further deepening, since it is also necessary to consider that an
improper tax scheme might generate frictions which nullify the benefits of the common market for
some countries. However, those specific lucubrations are considered beyond the research question
of the paper.
Final remarks and conclusions
The main conclusions of the analysis concerning the European Union in the perspective of the
Rawlsian social contract theory can be summarized as follows: the current constitutional elements
which characterize the European Union framework imply a precise redistributive scheme embodied
20 Rawls  himself,  between  the  background  institutions  for  distributive  justice,  mentions  a  “stabilization  branch”
(Rawls 1999, p. 244).
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in the European difference principle which is  supposed to act only on the European surplus.  A
corollary that follows that conclusion concerns European Fiscal Union, which represents a possible
way to  implement  such  a  redistributive  scheme  and  therefore  to  complete  the  European  basic
structure.
In  reaching  these  conclusions,  we  have  to  take  into  account  the  difficulties  to  interpret
Rawls’s thought regarding the European Union, as he hardly ever lingered on the topic. However,
we  can  be  confident  in  the  formulation  of  the  European  difference  principle  for  two  specific
reasons. On the one hand we have to understand the fact that the European Union experienced by
Rawls was  very different  from the today’s  Union.  Although John Rawls  was probably right  in
showing  some eurosceptic  traits  in  imagining  a  European  Union based only  on mere  (socially
empty)  economic evaluations,  the current Union is constituted by specific institutional elements
which allow us to move beyond the mere functional economic structure. It is not longer possible to
have  a  European  market,  many  European  supranational  institutions,  a  European  Parliament,  a
European  common  currency  but  not  a  European  system  of  welfare  redistribution:  such  an
institutional asymmetry unavoidably creates unjustified inequalities because of a “redistributive bias
on national policy choices” (Scharpf 1998, p. 6).
On the other hand we should consider that Rawls himself left the possibility for a difference
principle  at  European  level  open.  He  clearly  stated  how there  is  “room  for  various  forms  of
cooperative associations and federations among peoples” (Rawls 2001, p. 36), making explicit then
the  following  hypothesis:  “what  does  the  Law  of  Peoples  say  about  the  following  situation?
Suppose  that  two  or  more  of  the  liberal  democratic  societies  of  Europe,  say Belgium and  the
Netherlands, or these two together with France and Germany, decide they want to join and form a
single society, or a single federal union [...] A voter [behind the veil of ignorance] might vote for the
difference principle (the most egalitarian liberal conception)” between the two states (Rawls 2001,
p. 43, note 53).
To conclude, the normative analysis provided throughout the paper applies Rawls’s theory of
domestic justice to the European Union. The European Union concretely holds those elements, the
scheme of mutually advantageous cooperation and the parallel basic structure thanks to which we
can conceive a European difference principle that requires to maximize the  expectations of the
European least advantaged. The concrete implementation of similar social welfare function requires
to pool together those resources which are generated by means of the cooperation taking place at
European level: this goal might be achieved by means of European Fiscal Union. In this way the
Rawlsian redistributive scheme and Fiscal Union at European level can contribute to reduce the
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institutional gap between the European economic integration and the European social integration.
Instead, the evaluation of the exact amount of the European surplus and the specific redistributive
mechanism are matter for a further research on the topic.
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Appendix: elucidations on the application of Rawls's domestic theory to the European Union
The reasoning to apply Rawls’s domestic theory to the European Union deserves some further
specifications. Indeed, although the deduction of the European principles is essentially consistent
the Rawlsian domestic justice, at the same time the analysis implicitly “borrows” a couple of ideas
usually belonging to cosmopolitan justice21, that is:
- in order to regulate the redistributive issue between societies we should not reason from the
perspective  of  collective  entities  like  peoples  or  states,  but  from  the  point  of  view  of  single
individuals;
- the principles of justice, and in particular the redistributive principles, should be applied as
broadly as possible, and potentially at global level.
As far as the first the cosmopolitan idea is concerned, it is worth recalling how for Rawls
(2001) the parties  who are required to choose the international principles are representatives of
peoples and not single individuals. However this approach to international justice adopted by Rawls
raised many critical reactions, including some concerns regarding the “dramatic adaptation of the
[second  order]  original  position”  (Pogge  1988,  p.  235 and  Pogge  2006,  p.  206).  For  instance,
Buchanan  (2000,  pp.  698)  claims  how  the  device  of  having  the  representatives  of  peoples  is
inadequate  because  “to  say  that  the  parties  represent peoples  is,  in  effect,  to  ensure  that  the
fundamental principles of international law that will  be chosen reflect the interest of those who
support  the  dominant  or  official  conception  of  the  good or  of  justice  in  [a  domestic]  society”
(Buchanan 2000, pp. 698). Said otherwise, considering peoples as the only relevant moral subjects
in order to derive international principles implies that the voice of minorities or in general of those
who might disagree is not taken adequately into account22.
A further critical aspect is emphasized by Beitz, who sustains that to define peoples as the
only relevant moral entities at international level implies that we still do not provide any indication
on how to regulate justice between single individuals who belong to different peoples (Beitz 1999,
p.  132): Rawls’s  setting  “obscures  the  fact  that  the  interests  of  persons  and  peoples  do  not
necessarily coincide” (Kuper 2000, p. 246), leading in this way to “potentially sub-optimal results
21 “Cosmopolitan principles tend thus to have two parts: a defense of a particular metric of fair distribution, and an
argument as to why this metric should not be limited to any particular subset of humanity” (Blake 2012, p. 127).
22 From Buchanan’s consideration it follows that Rawlsian international justice basically lacks of that pluralism which
Rawls (2001, p. 40) tried to embody in his theory at the cost of a byzantine structure.
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for persons” (Kuper 2000, p. 247) because “the interests of individual persons [across the different
peoples] are taken into account only indirectly” (Beitz 2000, pp. 673-674 and Nagel 2005, p. 134).
Another critique in the same direction is provided by Pogge, and it is related to the ambiguity
in the definition of the notion of peoples. Pogge believes that the conceptual role assigned by Rawls
to the term “people” is inadequate, because “in many parts of the globe, official borders do not
correlate with the main characteristics that are normally held to identify a people [and] whether
some group does or does not constitute a people would seem, in important ways, to be a matter of
more-or-less rather than either-or” (Pogge 1994, p. 197). In other words, there is not a clear-cut
distinction between the notion of peoples and other ways of grouping individuals. Therefore using
peoples’ representatives instead of other categories should be considered as an arbitrary choice. The
same kind of perplexity is shared by Van Parijs who states that “a key issue that immediately arises
is who the peoples are” because all over the world “there are over 3000 living languages and only
212 sovereign countries to accommodate them” (Rawls et al. 2003, p. 10). Thus, it is problematic to
identify in the real word precise sets of individuals who constitute the corresponding peoples.
Taken all together these criticisms can be summarized in the following statements:
• at international level we have interests even as single persons and not only as individuals
belonging to specific groups;
• grouping individuals  might  exclude somebody’s claims or interests;  it  is  not  completely
clear which exact criteria should be adopted to identify specific groups (peoples);
• there  is  a concrete possibility to  end up with different  principles of international  justice
given different ways of grouping individuals under the notion of peoples;
• lastly,  it  might  be  problematic  to  derive  a  “whole  family  of  original  positions,  each
corresponding to  one dimension of our [moral]  identities”  (Van Parijs  2012,  p.  643 and
Nagel 2005, pp. 141-142).
In applying Rawls’s domestic theory to the European Union all these perplexities are avoided,
because behind the European veil of ignorance it is assumed the perspective (the direct interests) of
single European individuals23, even if the geopolitical context is international. Together with the
mutually advantageous cooperation and the European basic structure, the individual perspective is a
further element which concurs yo the derivation of a European distributive principle of domestic
nature.
As for the second (cosmopolitan) idea, anyone familiar with the topic, in the claim that the
principles should be applied as broadly as possible, and potentially at global level, can substantially
23 This is also coherent with the requirements of the Rawlsian domestic theory.
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recognize Beitz’s theory of global justice (1999, pp. 127-176), whose “intuitive idea is that it is
wrong to limit the application of contractarian principles of social justice [only within] the nation-
state; instead, these principles ought to apply globally” (Beitz 1999, p. 128). In particular, Beitz's
main achievement built  on the Rawlsian (domestic) social contract theory is  a global difference
principle24:  in  Beitz’s  opinion  “the  difference  between  citizens  and  foreigners  is  not  morally
significant [...] The fact of global interdependence combined with Rawls's Theory of Justice leads
Beitz to enunciate a principle of international redistribution of wealth so as to maximize the position
of the least advantaged person in the world” (Arnopoulos 1981, p. 193).
However Beitz’s reasoning, which blindly extends the principles of the Rawlslian domestic
justice at global level,  has to be take into account some fair limitations.  His reasoning, despite
faultless in theory, clashes in practice, because a normative (redistributive) principle not feasible in
the real world is to be considered useless. In particular it is not possible to agree on the global range
of Beitz’s difference principle because there is not a global basic structure qualitatively similar to
the basic structure conceived by Rawls for a closed domestic system. Although some authors claim
the  opposite  (Buchanan  2000,  pp.  705-706),  at  global  level  there  is  not  a  set  of  international
institutions  which  can  effectively  redistribute  fundamental  rights  and  duties  and  the  benefits
generated by the global economic cooperation. In this perspective “the limits of what is empirically
plausible are worth understanding as part of political [and moral] philosophy” (Blake 2016, p. 319).
“[I]f  there is  [or  not]  possibility  of  doing justice  with  the  [international]  institutions  we have”
(Blake 2016, p. 318) has to be taken into account by the theory. Thus, Beitz (1999, p. 128) and other
cosmopolitan authors' conclusions are incautious insofar they do not endorse the existence of global
conditions (institutions) for the application of redistributive principles at a global level (see Blake
2012, pp. 127-128 and Pettit 2006, p. 107).
As showed in the paper, instead, within the European Union there are the structural conditions
for the application of an analog of the difference principle valid between the European member
states. Thus, for the European Union it is possible to conceive a common redistributive scheme
which applies beyond the national ones, which takes into consideration the interests of the single
European individuals and which at the same time remains feasible from a practical point of view.
That  is  basically  the  idea  to  realize  a  cosmopolitan  view for  a  circumscribed  union  of  states:
24 A similar conclusion is reached also by Paden: "the delegates [in the] international original position would choose
two principles of justice that are similar in form to the principles chosen by the parties to the domestic original
position" (Paden 1997, p. 226).
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"cosmopolitan justice could be realized in a federal system, in which the members of individual
nation-states had special responsibilities toward one another that they did not have for everyone in
the world" (Nagel 2005, p. 120 and Pogge 2001 p. 248).
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3. Neither Punishments nor Rewards:
Fostering Tax Compliance Through the Rawlsian Veil of
Ignorance in a Laboratory Experiment
Klaudijo Klaser and Luigi Mittone
Abstract:  It  is  well  known that  different  deterministic  mechanisms  (like  formal  audits  and
material  punishments)  can  stem  free  riding  behaviour  in  social  dilemmas.  However  the
behaviouralist literature shows us how several other environmental and psychological variables
can influence agents’ attitude to cooperate. By means of a repeated tax compliance game run in
an experimental laboratory, our study measures the effects of a Rawlsian veil of ignorance on
cooperation over time. In particular we found that in our experimental design the (laboratory)
veil of ignorance has an effect both on the ex-ante distribution of votes concerning the adoption
of a specific tax regime and on the ex-post tax compliance level between treatments, but not on
compliance across rounds, which shows to be decreasing.
JEL Code: D02, D63, H26
Keywords:  Experimental  Economics,  Inequality,  John  Rawls,  Tax  Compliance,  Veil  of
Ignorance
73
“Models  of  tax  evasion need to  take into  account
that taxpayers may not only want to maximise their
interests,  however  defined,  but  also  desire  to  see
justice and fairness realised”
Wenzel
Introduction
In the early 70’s Allingham and Sandmo (1972) proposed a utility function which aimed to
explain  individual  tax  compliance  as  a  risky  portfolio  choice  based  on  only  two  exogenous
parameters,  the  probability  of  being  audited  and  the  fine  amount  in  case  of  ascertained
misbehaviour.  However,  the  proposed  normative  model  proved  to  be  insufficient  to  accurately
describe agents’ observed tax behaviour, that is their basic theoretical framework could not predict
in a satisfying way tax payers’ positive choices.
In response to Allingham and Sandmo’s limited approach and in order to better understand
agents’ choice whether or not to abide by the tax law, the following literature on tax evasion focused
the attention on other behavioural variables of psychological, procedural and environmental nature
(Andreoni  et  al.  1988,  Braithwaite  2017,  Jackson et  al.  1986,  Feld et  al.  2007,  Kirchler  2008,
Pickhardt et al. 2014, Richardson 2006 and Tolgler 2002).
Some of  the  variables which  have been recognized to  influence agents'  tax  behavior  are:
endogenous participation in the definition of tax rules (Tyran et al. 2001); perceived fairness of the
tax system (Becker et al. 1987 and Bordignon 1993); audits’ sequences in a repeated framework
(Kastlunger et al. 2009 and Mittone 2006); having a voice on the destination of the tax revenue
(Casal et al. 2016b and Pommerehne et al. 1996); influence exerted by public opinion (Casal et al.
2016b and Kahan 1997); ethical concerns (Alm et al.  2011 and Feld et al.  2002); social norms
(Wenzel 2004 and Wenzel 2005).
A recent theoretical advance tried then to summarize and to conciliate in a unique conceptual
framework the standard economic variables like audit  probabilities  and fines (gathered together
under the label “power of authorities”) with a broad set of behavioural and environmental elements
(labelled  as  “trust  in  authorities”1)  which  have  been  recognized  to  impact  on  tax  compliance
1 In this paper the locution "trust in authorities" might not precisely coincide with the authors' original meaning. Here
"trust in authorities" is meant in its broadest sense, that is as any psychological or environmental element that can
enhance voluntary tax compliance.
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decisions. The so called “slippery slope” (Figure 1) is “a conceptual tool [which] may serve to
understand the importance of  determinants  of  tax behaviour”  (Kirchler  et  al.  2010,  p.  214 and
Kichler 2008). 
Figure 1 – Slippery slope geometrical representation
In particular, the “slippery slope” curve is conceived as a surface within a three-dimensional
geometrical  space.  The  degree  of  tax  compliance,  the  dependent  variable,  is  measured  on  the
vertical axis, while the two sets of forces which are recognized to drive the decision to abide by the
tax law are placed on the horizontal plane.
One axis includes those standard coercive tools which can mechanically enforce compliance
(“power of authorities”). The other horizontal axis gathers together all those behavioural elements
(“trust in authorities”) which cannot be controlled in a deterministic way but which can influence
voluntary tax compliance (Muehlbacher et al. 2011).
Within the “slippery slope” framework formal and informal forces, that is power and trust, are
conceived to be jointly-responsible in determining the degree of tax compliance2. Nevertheless, and
without questioning the importance of the reciprocal influence of  the two mentioned groups of
2 The two sets of forces are recognized to interact dynamically with each other (Filippin et al. 2013, Gangl et al. 2015
and Kirchler et al. 2010). In other words, the two set of variables are not conceived as secluded or independent.
Instead they reciprocally influence each other, and they can either enter a positive symbiotic relationship, mutually
reinforcing each other and then pushing together the tax payer towards full tax compliance, or coercive powers and
(mis)trust can enter a spiral where they have a negative impact on each other, inducing the economic agent to evade
more taxes.
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forces,  it  is  important  to  highlight  how according  to  the  analytical  representation  given  to  the“slippery curve”,  the possibility  to  achieve  full  tax compliance  by  means of  one  single  set  ofvariables is also admitted.The study carried out in the paper goes in the direction of the just sketched intuition. It takesinto consideration the theoretical possibility to obtain full tax compliance by means of one single setof  forces  contemplated  by  the  literature  in  general  and  by  the  “slippery  slope”  framework  inparticular. Indeed, while it is quite immediate to  imagine some cases where full tax compliancemight be obtained by means of coercive tools (“power of authorities”)3, it is not obvious to conceivea frame where full tax compliance is achievable as a pure voluntary mechanism, not enforced byexternal constraints.In  particular we inquire the latter option through an experimental  methodology. Indeed, acontrolled  environment  like  an  experimental  laboratory  allows  to  exclude  authorities  and  anycoercive tool which usually enforce mechanically tax compliance from the tax game design4. In thisway, from a game generally structured as taxpayer vs. tax authority, we move to a tax game framedin the form of taxpayer vs. taxpayer (Pickhardt et al. 2014). Thus, without any authorities or anyother  kind  of  exogenous  coercive  mechanism,  the  tax  compliance  game  basically  becomes  avoluntary contribution mechanism where the vertical “trust in authorities” assumes the form of ahorizontal “trust in other tax p(l)ayers”. The specific framework for the experimental design takesinto consideration two specific fields of literature mainly based on empirical outcomes.On the one hand we move from the literature which provides a compelling evidence of acausation  effect  between  individuals’ participation  in  the  definition  of  tax  rules  (rates,  auditprobabilities, fines, destination of the tax revenue, etc.) and their following level of tax compliance(Alm et al. 1993, Alm et al. 1999, Casal et al. 2016a, Feld et al. 2002, Feld et al. 2006, Pommerehneet al. 1996 and Wahl et al. 2007). In other words, when people have a concrete voice in tax issues a“participation effect” emerges (compared to a situation where the same variables are exogenouslyassigned,  Bortolami  2009  and  Bortolami  et  al.  2009).  By  and  large,  rules  and  institutions3 It is sufficient to imagine a case where the audit probability is settled to p=1 (Feld et al. 2002), or a case where tostimulate cooperation (read compliance) strong rewarding or punishing institutions are introduced (Fehr et al. 2002,Gintis 2005, Gürerk et al. 2006 and Sefton et al. 2007). However informal institutions deserve particular attention,because it  has to be taken into  account  that positive effects  on compliance are sometimes counterbalanced bynegative effects in terms of average returns (Kroll et al. 2007 and Masclet et al. 2003). Indeed, heterogeneity inbeliefs can lead to normative conflicts concerning the right behaviour to adopt (Nikiforakis et al. 2008, Nikiforakiset al.  2012 and Sefton et al.  2007),  such that  swords without words can be worse than words without swords(Ostrom et al. 1992).4 Artificially excluding one set of variables automatically prevents any possible dynamic interaction between the twoset of forces contemplated by the “slippery slope”, see the footnote number 2.76
legitimized in a direct way enhance the cooperative attitude (Dal Bó et al. 2010), therefore also tax
compliance (Feld et al. 2000).
On the other hand we rely on the exclusion game design (Sacconi and Faillo 2005). The
branch of literature based on the exclusion game (Degli Antoni et. al 2016, Faillo et al. 2008, Faillo
et al. 2014, Sacconi et al. 2005, Sacconi et al. 2010, Sacconi et al. 2011 and Tammi 2011) studies
the effects of an impartial and non-binding agreement on a one-shot resource allocation game. The
agreement is structured in the perspective of Rawls’s social contract theory and its outcomes are
interpreted consistently with his idea of the sense of justice (Rawls 1999).
The  novelty  of  the  present  research  is  the  adoption  of  some  elements  belonging  to  the
exclusion game to inquire the effects of an agreement of Rawlsian type, that is reached behind a veil
of ignorance, on tax behaviour. In particular the sense of justice might be one of those psychological
forces which, inducing compliance to the agreement on a chosen tax regime, meant to represent a
distributive scheme, directly generates voluntary tax compliance.
Thus, excluding tax authorities and adopting a laboratory veil of ignorance to choose a tax
regime,  the  research aims to  inquire  tax compliance behaviour  as  a pure  voluntary  mechanism
within  a  Rawlsian  framework.  The  engage  of  Rawls’s  social  contract  theory  and  the  related
experimental literature in the tax evasion field has further interesting implications beyond testing
the two just sketched hypotheses.
First  of  all,  it  provides  an  empirical  test  for  the  “slippery  slope”  theoretical  shape.  In
particular, if it is not possible to achieve voluntary compliance by means of any combination of
environmental and psychological variables,  the “slippery slope” surface should be revisited and
drawn as an asymmetric curve5. Of course we test only one of these “authority free” frames, but our
experiment  might  be  considered  a  further  step  on  analysing  the  conditions  which  can  foster
voluntary tax compliance, and the “slippery slope” theory should take into consideration similar
empirical evidence.
Second, the main aim of inquiring tax evasion should be to find out those tools which can
help to prevent tax evasion, and the veil of ignorance becomes a potential candidate. Thus, even
though the veil mechanism could be hardly implemented in the real word, understanding which
structural  conditions  foster  voluntary  tax  compliance  might  have  relevant  policy  implications
regarding  the  configuration  of  tax  rules  and  their  compliance  through  different  procedures  of
legitimation. The experiment we propose engages with this topic.
5 Furthermore, this revision might have a relevant impact on the dynamic between the two forces mentioned above.
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Third, fiscal policies and tax laws, as well as the Rawlsian theory have explicit redistributive
aims and effects. This overlap might help to calibrate the configuration of the tax regimes given that
we want to obtain a specific outcome concerning the redistribution of resources within a particular
set.  In  particular,  our  experiment  focuses  the  attention  on  the  redistributive  scheme  which
maximizes the expectations of the least advantaged.
Fourth, it might be possible to extend the Rawlsian concept of the sense of justice to the more
familiar concept of civic duty (Orviska et al. 2002), according to which citizens can be collaborative
even if the system allows non-compliance, so that their behaviours do not have to be regulated by
external audits or sanctions (“powers of authorities”), but by their own concern for society and
institutions. Thus, voluntary tax compliance would not be linked narrowly only to the Rawlsian
theory, but it  might be reinterpreted under a more general frame.  This  is a value added of our
experimental framework.
Last but not least,  our experimental design allows to  extend the one-shot approach of the
exclusion game to  the  context  of repeated games.  Indeed (paraphrasing  Torgler  2002,  p.665)  a
“serious limitation [of the exclusion game] is the nature of [the] experiment, which [is] static” (only
one round)  while  “the decision to  [comply]  or not is  a  dynamic rather  than a static problem”.
Therefore (tax) compliance is not an atemporal single decision, but it is rather a set of choices over
time, and a game in a repeated frame can shed light on the compliance dynamic after the veil of
ignorance is dropped.
The next Sections are organized as follows. Section 1 explains the theoretical framework on
which the experiment is designed and it formulates the predictive hypothesis. Section 2 describes in
detail the experimental design. In Section 3 data from the experiment are analysed and discussed.
Appendix shows the instructions provided to the experimental subjects of the veil treatment.
3.1 Rawls's social contract theory and theoretical predictions
Our tax compliance game takes the well established “participation effect” (Bortolami 2009
and Bortolami et al. 2009) for granted and makes a step aside. In particular the study focuses on the
voting procedure itself, measuring the effects of  two distinct voting conditions. One of them is a
standard voting procedure: all players are assigned an income level and then they are asked to vote
on the tax regime (set of tax rates for the different levels of income) they prefer adopting during a
second phase, the actual tax compliance game.
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The second voting mechanism is instead hinged on the Rawlsian social contract theory and on
some of its recent experimental applications. In particular this treatment adopts a laboratory veil of
ignorance  during the  voting  phase,  that  is  players  are  asked  to  vote  for  a  tax  scheme without
knowing their personal income level. They become aware of their position in the distribution of
wealth only after they have reached an agreement on a tax regime. In order to better understand the
differences  between  the  two  treatments  and  the  expected  specific  consequences  of  the  veil  of
ignorance on compliance it is necessary to recall some further details concerning Rawls’s social
contract theory (1999).
John Rawls opens his A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1999) with the following statement:
“although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is typically
marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests. There is an identity of
interests since social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would
have if each were to live solely by his own efforts [while] there is a conflict of
interests since persons are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced
by their collaboration are distributed” (Rawls 1999, p. 4).
In order to decide on the distribution of benefits generated by socio-economic cooperation,
Rawls suggests adopting an impartial perspective termed “veil of ignorance”. This mechanism of
pure procedural justice guarantees that people unanimously agree on fair principles for the society's
main institutions, because the veil of ignorance “excludes the knowledge of those contingencies
which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their prejudices” (Rawls 1999, p. 17).
Specifically, according to Rawls, behind the veil of ignorance
“no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he
know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence
and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the
good, the particulars of his rational plan of life, or even the special features of his
psychology such as his  aversion to  risk  or  liability  to optimism or pessimism”
(Rawls 1999, p 118).
Therefore,  in  the  ignorance condition,  none of  the  involved  parties  can  design principles
which might favour his or her own particular person.
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On the contrary, according to Rawls, the impartial reasoning behind the veil of ignorance is
supposed to induce the involved parties to assume the perspective of the worst possible scenario and
therefore to design distributive principles which aim to "maximize the expectations of the least
favored position" (Rawls 1999, p. 69). Thus, with the second treatment of our tax game we simulate
the impartial procedure offered by the veil of ignorance. 
More in detail, in our tax game we design more or less progressive tax regimes which have
different distributive effects on the lowest level of income. Rawls’s theory suggests that a veil of
ignorance in the voting phase should influence the individual choice of the tax scheme to adopt in
the compliance phase - compared to the baseline treatment, where the players can vote according to
their interest represented by the position in the wealth distribution.
In the veil treatment we ask the participants to agree on a scheme of tax rates before letting
them know the income bracket they will belong to during the compliance task. Basically, in the veil
condition,  while  voting  for  a  specific  tax  regime  the  players  are  deprived  of  the  particular
information  concerning  their  place  in  the  distribution  of  wealth  (within  the  game).  Therefore
nobody can profit from any specific information concerning her or his own wealth status within the
game to propose, that is to vote for a redistributive scheme which mainly benefits their particular
person6.
Instead, according to Rawls, behind the veil of ignorance the players should enter a maximin
perspective  and  vote  for  the  tax  regime  which  maximizes  the  expectations  of  the  worst-off7,
represented in our game by the player with the lowest income level. Thus, since the alternative tax
regimes that the players have to vote about have different material consequences on the wealth of
the worst-off, we can formalize the first hypothesis we aim to test with our experiment.
H1:  compared to  the  baseline  treatment  (where  players vote  after  knowing their  level  of
income in the game), in the veil of ignorance treatment we expect to observe a shift of votes and tax
regimes  towards  the  scheme of  tax  rates  which  maximises  the  wealth  of  the  least  advantaged
position, that is the position occupied by the player with the lowest level of income.
6 That  people  usually  vote  for  tax  rates  that  advantage  their  particular  position  it  was  demonstrated  in  other
experiments, like (Esarey et al. 2012).
7 So far the evidence is mostly aginst a strong effectivness of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance  (Aguiar et al. 2013,
Andersson er al. 1999, Bond et al. 1991, Carlsson et al. 2003 and Frohlich et al. 1987). However we have to take
into account that simulating empirically a pure and perfect veil of ignorance such as conceived by John Rawls is
clearly an impossible task. Rawls's veil of ignorance excludes much more information than what can be hidden in
an experimental laboratory. For example in the game the players’ personal real wealth and their conception of the
good remain perfectly known. Thus the subjects can be made neutral only with regard to their role in the game
(perspective on specific concerns), that is the position in the income distribution.
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After having introduced the decision-making model based on the maximin reasoning, Rawls
(1999) dedicates a considerable part of his theory to analyse the stability of the impartial agreement.
His main aim is to explain how some principles, chosen ex-ante behind the veil, can become stable
ex-post in the real word, after the veil is dropped.
This  kind of analysis  is  really  important  because the agreement,  despite being fair,  is  not
conceived as automatically enforced: everyone can choose to free ride, that is everyone can decide
to deviate from the unanimously chosen distributive rule because this does not coincide with their
own ex-post individual interests. Thus, according to Rawls, it becomes necessary to identify a force
which can support and restore compliance should any tendency which induces the parties to deviate
from the agreement emerge.
In dealing with this issue Rawls does not look for external enforcement mechanisms8. Instead,
he  directly looks  at  the  involved  parties  and their  moral  psychology.  In  particular,  in  Rawls’s
opinion, every subject  taking part in the agreement behind the veil  of ignorance is  expected to
develop an endogenous, strong and effective desire to act in accordance with the set of the chosen
principles.
Said  with  a  Rawlsian  terminology,  after  having reached an  agreement  behind  the  veil  of
ignorance every subject is expected to develop a sense of justice which can counterbalance the
individual  incentives  to  deviate  from the  impartial  principles.  Thus,  by  means  of  the  sense  of
justice, formally based on a system of mutual expectations of compliance, the agreement and its
system of principles, even if non-binding, are expected to become self-enforcing.
Through a laboratory experiment a recent field of literature tried to explore the Rawlsian
egalitarian conception and in particular his idea of sense of justice. The so called exclusion game
(Degli Antoni et. al 2016, Faillo et al. 2008, Faillo et al. 2014, Sacconi and Faillo 2005, Sacconi and
Faillo 2010 and Tammi 2011) is a one-shot resource allocation game with a preliminary voting
stage simulating an agreement behind a veil of ignorance. In other words, before the role in the
game (dictator or dummy player) is revealed to the participants, they have the possibility to reach a
unanimous agreement about how to share a common endowment.
Three are the most important features of the exclusion game which reflect Rawls’s social
contract theory. The choice of the sharing rule is taken behind a veil of ignorance, that is all players
are required to unanimously vote for a distributional rule not knowing their (future) role in the
actual game. In the second stage, the actual exclusion game, the players' roles are differentiated with
8 That  would generate a loop of agreements,  because another agreement would be necessary to  legitimize those
enforcing institutions, which should be enforced by other institutions requiring a third agreement and so on and so
forth.
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regard to their decision-making powers. Thus some participants enter the dictator role and some of
them become dummy players with no voice. Last but not least, the agreement on the distributive
norm of the voting phase is not binding in the second phase, that is in the actual exclusion game the
players assigned to the dictator role are free to share the common endowment regardless of the
agreement reached in the voting stage.
Thus,  given the structure of  the  exclusion game and according to  the  standard  economic
theory, at the second stage every rational economic agent in the dictator position should make the
choice  which maximizes his  or her  own material  payoff regardless  of  the  specific  sharing rule
unanimously approved in the previous voting phase. However, the provided experimental evidence
discloses how the unconstrained ex-post compliance with the ex-ante chosen distributive norms is
unexpectedly high even in those cases where groups agreed on an egalitarian (counter-maximizing)
distribution. 
The observed behaviour was justified and explained through Rawls’s concept of the sense of
justice. In particular, the adopted model of social conformist preferences (Grimalda et al. 2005)
takes into consideration the psychological  utility (Attanasi et  al.  2006 and Attanasi et al.  2008,
Geanakopolos  et  al.  1989)  that  is  gained by  complying with  the  impartial  agreement  and  that
compensates dictator players for their material loss.
Consistently with the mentioned theory and its empirical evidence collected in the exclusion
game we can formulate our second hypothesis
H2: in the veil treatment tax compliance will be at least as high as in the baseline treatment
This prediction deserves some further clarifications. First of all we are not making a claim
about the absolute level of tax compliance in any of the two treatments, but we are rather comparing
the relative  value between the baseline  and the treatments.  Second,  ours  is  a  weak hypothesis,
because we are assuming that the veil tool will not lower the level of tax compliance, but we cannot
make a more precise hypothesis on the positive effect on the veil because we have neither previous
empirical evidence on veiled vs. no veiled agreements nor a specific Rawls’s conjectures on those
two conditions (except that a no veiled agreement would not be reached).
More precisely, according to the conformist preferences model, the compliance level depends
on beliefs. However, we have neither theoretical nor empirical elements to predict the effect of the
veil  of ignorance on players  beliefs.  We can only be sure it  will  not have a negative effect  on
compliance  through belief  since  the  veil  of  ignorance puts  everybody in  the  same perspective,
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aligning the individual  expectations,  but we cannot  formulate  a  prediction on the net  effect  on
compliance.
As  for  the  exclusion  game  structure  and  its  Rawlsian  interpretation,  an  interpretative
limitation emerges. In particular that game is structured as a one-shot compliance task. Instead the
sense of justice and the related compliance behaviour, such as it is conceived by Rawls himself, are
not one-shot occurrences. They are not occasional achievements, but they are rather conceived as
the product of a dynamic process, self-enforcing over time.
Indeed, according to Rawls, in order to be stable “the scheme of social cooperation [...] must
be more or less  regularly complied” (Rawls  1999, p.  6).  Indeed, in  Rawls’s opinion,  “[o]nce a
system of co-operation […] is set up and a period of uncertainty survived,  the passage of time
renders it more stable, given an evident intention on the part of all to do their part” (Rawls 1963, p.
291). In other words a “system in which each person has, and is known by everyone to have, a sense
of justice is inherently stable [because] the forces making for its stability increase as time passes
(Rawls 1963, p. 293).
This is to say that the goal to justify the dynamic concept of the sense of justice with the result
of  a  one-shot  and  static  game  should  be  considered  partially  achieved,  especially  after
demonstrating that testing a feedback only once is likely to produce misunderstandings both the
outcomes  themselves  and their  interpretation  (Hertwig  and Ortmann 2001).  Thus,  conceiving  a
game design where it is possible to repeat the actual compliance task, like our tax game, easily
allows  to  check  the  path  of  compliance,  improving  in  this  way  the  theoretical  and  empirical
interpretation of the sense of justice.
Since after the veil of ignorance is dropped compliance, driven by the sense of justice and its
system of mutual beliefs, is described by Rawls as a self-enforcing process and it is expected to be
more and more stable over time, and since our tax game is designed to repeat the compliance task
across  many  rounds,  it  is  possible  to  formulate  the  third  hypothesis  we  aim to  test  with  our
experiment
H3: in the veil treatment the tax compliance path will be at least constant across rounds
According to all the elements described so far and in particular to the mentioned model on
conformist reciprocity (Grimalda et al. 2005), the system of reciprocal beliefs, activated by the veil
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of ignorance, is fundamental in order to sustain compliance9 (Rawls 1963, Rawls 1999): the players
decide to comply with the agreement,  even if  that means to renounce a share of their  material
payoff,  on  the  condition  they  believes  that  the  other  players  who  took  part  in  the  impartial
agreement will act or would have acted the same way10. 
That means that in the veil treatment compliance across rounds is expected to be linked to
beliefs regarding other players’ compliance. In other words,
H4: in the veil treatment the tax compliance path across rounds will be aligned with players’
beliefs
The last two predictions are implicitly based on dynamic psychological equilibria, which take
into consideration the update of beliefs through time (Attanasi et al. 2006, Battigalli et al. 2005).
3.2 Experimental design
 At the beginning of every experimental session the participants are randomly divided into
groups of three people. Single groups face then two chronologically ordered phases. In the first
phase the players are asked to vote for a tax scheme to be adopted during the second phase, the
actual tax compliance task. In particular in the first phase of the game each group has a maximum
of 6 rounds to vote for a tax schemes. In order to access the second phase the participants are
required to reach a unanimous consensus on a specific tax scheme. Those groups that do not reach a
unanimous agreement about the tax scheme by the end of the 6th round cannot enter the second
phase of the game and they are paid the show up fee. The unanimous agreement is therefore an
essential precondition to enter the actual tax compliance game.
A tax scheme or regime is a set of different tax rates applied to three given levels of income
(see Table 1). The two treatments differentiate only with regard to the voting stage: according to the
treatment the income levels are assigned before (baseline treatment) or after (veil condition) the
9 Beliefs  are  widely  recognized  to  have  an  impact  on  the  cooperative  attitude  in  general  (Chang  et  al.  2004,
Chaudhuri 2011, Fischbacher et al. 2010, Frey et al. 2007, Kahan 1997, Keser et al. 2000, Tyran et al. 2001)
10 The dynamic is very different from models of pure conformity, which assume we adapt our own behaviour to match
others’ expectations on us (Cialdini et al. 2004 and Cialdini et al. 1998).
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voting consultation. The compliance phase is then identical for the two treatments under the design
profile.
The  experiment  is  designed  with  Experimental  Currency  Units  (ECU).  4,000  ECU  are
equivalent  to  €  1  and  the  participants  are  aware  of  the  exchange  rate  because  it  is  explicitly
mentioned in the initial instructions (see Appendix). Within each group the players are randomly
assigned11 (according to  the  treatment,  before  or  after  the  vote)  one of  the  following levels  of
income: 1,500 ECU, 2,000 ECU or 3,000 ECU.
Once assigned the endowment level keeps constant during the experiment, that is individual
income  does  not  change  across  rounds.  Moreover,  within  each  group  the  income  levels  are
exclusive,  that  is  it  is  not  possible  for  two or  three  participants  of  a  group to  have  the  same
endowment.  Given the income exclusivity the initial  expected income is 2.167 ECU, while the
inequality of the initial distribution, measured by a simple standard deviation, is equal to 764 ECU.
Table 1 describes in detail the tax regimes which the participants are asked to vote on. For
example tax scheme A tries to mimic the current tax rates applied by the Italian law on personal
incomes: 23% for yearly incomes up to € 15,000, 27% for incomes ranging from € 15,000 to €
28,000 and 38% for incomes between € 28,000 to € 55,00012. The inequality of this tax scheme is
measured by a standard deviation calculated on the final distribution (full compliance case) of 371
ECU. In other words if the players choose the tax regime A, and they decide to fully comply with it,
they can reduce the initial inequality from 764 ECU to 371 ECU.
The other schemes vary in the progressiveness of the tax rates applied to the three levels of
income.  Tax schemes  D and B are  more progressive,  that  is  they  generate  more equal  ex-post
distributions of wealth than tax scheme A. In particular tax scheme B allows to reach the most equal
distribution of wealth, with a standard deviation of 128 ECU.
On the contrary, tax scheme C presents a flat rates structure and it generates the most unequal
ex-post  distribution,  with  a  standard  deviation  of  527.  That  means  that  tax  scheme C,  despite
reducing the initial inequality, generates an ex-post distribution of wealth which is four times more
unequal than the distribution generated by tax scheme B13.
11 The decision to provide windfall endowments, despite being an extremely controversial issue (Ackert et al. 2006,
Antinyan et al. 2015, Cherry et al. 2002, Cherry et al. 2015, Clark 2002, Harrison 2007, Mittone et al. 2012 and
Spraggon et al.  2009),  is intentionally  made to  simulate a contingent distribution of assets,  fortune and social
circumstances.  Indeed, the presence of some kind of “undeserved” inequality is a central issue in the Rawlsian
social contract theory (Rawls 1999, pp. 10-15).
12 Technically the higher tax rates do not apply linearly to the whole income, but only to the proportion of income that
exceeds the lower threshold.
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Table 114 – Tax regimes (ECU)
All the tax schemes are designed to generate exactly the same expected tax revenue (2,015
ECU in case of full compliance). The tax revenue is then multiplied by a capitalization factor of 2.1
and  distributed  in  equal  shares  (1/3)  to  the  three  players  of  the  considered  group15.  Given the
structure described so far, also the final expected wealth is constant across the tax regimes (2,906
ECU).
This  particular  structure  has  two  implications  concerning  the  voting  phase:  first,  any
utilitarian reasoning centred on maximizing the expected average material utility (Harsanyi 1978) is
formally prevented; second, the choice between tax schemes does not involve any explicit trade-off
between efficiency and equality.
Nevertheless, the proposed tax schemes clearly have different distributive effects. Therefore
the  experimental  subjects  are  supposed  to  focus  and  to  base  their  voting  decisions  only  on
redistributive concerns.
13 In order to take into account inequality we could have also calculated a Gini index, which is 0.23 for the initial
distribution,  0.08 for the regime A,  0.03 for tax scheme B, 0.11 for tax regime C and 0.06 for tax scheme D.
However, this does not change the inequality ranking between tax regimes
14 The values in the table are calculated assuming the full compliance case. All the values, except the tax rates, are
reported in ECU.
15 In particular, the equal share distribution has three distinct implications which can bee deepened in (Esarey 2012
and Fischbacher et al. 2014): the redistributive structure is conceived as a mechanism of transfers even if it is not a
zero-sum game; every tax regime redistributes income from above average earnings to below-average incomes;
players holding a different income level and facing different tax rates have different returns on the paid taxes.
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initial compounded ex-post redistribution expected dev.st.
endowment 1,500 2,000 3,000 tax revenue rate tax revenue (full compliance) wealth (inequality)
tax scheme A
rate 0.23 0.28 0.37
taxes 345 560 1,110 2,015 2.1 4,232 2,566 2,851 3,301 2,906 371
tax scheme B
rate 0.09 0.25 0.46
taxes 135 500 1380 2,015 2.1 4,232 2,776 2,911 3,031 2,906 128
tax scheme C
rate 0.31 0.31 0.31
taxes 465 620 930 2,015 2.1 4,232 2,446 2,791 3,481 2,906 527
tax scheme D
rate 0.19 0.22 0.43
taxes 285 440 1,290 2,015 2.1 4,232 2,626 2,971 3,121 2,906 254
The second phase of the experiment concerns the actual tax compliance task: for 10 rounds16
the players are asked to pay taxes according to the endogenous tax scheme unanimously voted by
their group during the first phase and to their own exogenously assigned level of income. After each
round is played, together with their own ECU payoff, to the participants only the total amount of the
tax  revenue  is  shown.  The  specific  contribution  of  the  other  players  is  neither  directly
communicated nor precisely evaluable. This is a plausible framework because from the point of
view of a single tax payer, in a society it is only possible to observe the total amount of the available
taxes or services, while we cannot directly observe the single decisions of other people, that is the
contributions or the net incomes of people who surround us.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the compliance phase of our game is characterized by the
absence of any external enforcement mechanism which can audit or sanction the players’ deceptive
behaviour. This means that the compliance phase basically reproduces the structure of a repeated
public  good  game  (Chaudhuri  2011  and  Ledyard  1995)  where  the  specific  public  good  is
represented by the tax revenue. In other words, since the agreement on the tax scheme of the first
phase is not binding, in the second phase the players are asked to pay taxes on a voluntary basis in
exchange of a monetary public good.
Given the voluntary mechanism on which the tax compliance game relies on, the payoff
function for the single individual at every round is
(1) πi(t i , t i≠i)=Ei−(t i)+βn∑i
n
(t i)
with n =
2.1
3 0.7
where Ei represents the assigned endowment (level of income), ti measures the paid taxes for every
individual, β is the capitalization rate and n is the number of players per group.
This payoff function implies that the social optimum is theoretically reached when all players
fully  contribute  to  the  tax  revenue  (public  good).  However,  since  the  ratio  between  the
capitalization factor and the number of players per group is less than one and since there are no
external enforcement mechanisms (“authorities”) to stem tax evasion, the actual tax game of the
second phase mirrors a standard public game, including its theoretical predictions. In other words,
in our experimental design the standard Nash equilibrium applies  requiring every player to not
16 In the instructions the number of rounds is not communicated.
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comply at  all  (that  is  to contribute zero) to the chosen tax regime (to the formation of the tax
revenue).
However, although the game is “authority free” and the standard equilibrium predicts a pure
free-riding  behaviour  as  the  best  response  to  others’ behaviour,  as  mentioned  in  the  previous
Section, adopting a veil of ignorance in the voting phase is supposed to modify the psychological
equilibrium of the game, generating sense of justice to the impartial agreement and therefore tax
compliance.
Lastly in the game, contemporary to the compliance decision and through an incentivized
structure, the players are asked to predict the level of compliance of the other two players belonging
to their own group. In each group the player with the best cumulative predictions earns an extra
bonus of €2. Predictions are then used as an indicator of beliefs about others’ behaviours.
Except for the show-up fee and the bonus for the predictions, the experimental subjects are
cumulatively paid for all the decisions they took across the 10 compliance rounds (Laury 2006).
This choice was made with the intention to remark the dynamic process of compliance, which is not
supposed to be framed as a series of one-shot decisions independent one from one another.
As mentioned above, the experiment is then run under two distinct treatments concerning the
voting phase:  the  baseline  treatment and the veil  treatment.  In the  former  treatment the  veil  is
removed and the players  vote  after  they are  assigned their  endowments.  In the  latter,  which is
inspired by the Rawlsian theory and its  behaviourist interpretations, during the voting phase the
experimental subjects are not informed about their personal level of income.
3.3 Data analysis and discussion
All the experimental sessions took place in  the Computable and Experimental  Economics
Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento. They were run using the open source software for
economic experiments oTree (Chen et al. 2016). Each session lasted about 1 hour. The experiment
involved a total of 153 participants (69 in the baseline treatment and 84 in the veil treatment), who
voluntarily decided to participate after a public call. On average the participants were 22 years old,
half  of  them  were  female  and  48%  of  them  were  enrolled  in  programs  related  to  economic
disciplines. The participants were paid by means of bank transfers and on average they earned €
10.50 (show-up fee of €3.00 included).
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In  the  experimental  laboratory  the  participants  were  randomly  assigned  to  a  computer
terminal.  All  the  stations  were  isolated  by  separation  walls  to  avoid  communication.  The
participants read the instructions on the computer screen. The instructions were also read aloud by
one of  the experimenters  in  order to  ensure common knowledge.  Before  the  actual  experiment
started  six  control  questions  about  the  structure  of  the  game  were  asked.  At  the  end  of  the
experiment a non-incentivized questionnaire was provided and 94% of the participants declared that
the initial instructions were clear.
Following the instructions, at the beginning of phase 1 of the experiment, regardless of the
treatment, the participants were randomly assigned to a group of three people. Therefore a total of
51 groups (23 in the baseline treatment and 28 in the veil condition) took part in the experiment.
In both treatments all the groups accessed phase 2, that is all players reached a unanimous
agreement on a specific tax regime. Chart 1 provides the details regarding the round number in
which an agreement was reached.
In  general  almost  half  of  the  agreements  were  reached  during  the  second  voting  round,
showing a quite high propensity of coordination. However, it seems also that the veil of ignorance
slowed  down  the  coordination  process  towards  unanimity17.  Indeed,  in  the  no-veil  treatment
basically all the groups reached the agreement by the fourth round, while the veil “constrained”
25% of the groups to wait until to the sixth round to find a unanimous consensus on a scheme of tax
rates.
Chart 1 – Round of the agreement
During phase 1 in the baseline (veil)  treatment a  total number  of 198 (276)18 votes  were
provided. In Charts 2 and 3 it is possible to observe the percent distribution of votes concerning the
17 The opposite was somehow expected since the veil of ignorance is supposed to homogenize players' perspectives
concerning the distributive priorities. 
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different tax regimes. In the two charts tax schemes are ordered from the one which maximizes the
wealth of the player with the lowest income level (B) to the one with the most contained effects on
the poorest player (C).
Chart 2 – Distribution of votes per tax regime
Chart 3 – Distribution of tax regimes
From the charts above we can claim that our hypothesis  H1 is, strictly speaking, disproved:
the veil of ignorance did not produce any effect on the number of votes provided to the tax regime
which  maximizes  the  expectations  of  the  least  advantaged  player,  that  is  tax  scheme  B.
Nevertheless, the charts show that a veil effect exists, even though not in favour of tax regime B. In
particular, the veil of ignorance shifted the votes from tax schemes A and C to tax regime D, which
is the second most advantageous for the player with the lowest level of income.
Indeed, in the veil condition tax scheme D was chosen almost half of the times, compared to
22% in the baseline treatment. This is an interesting empirical regularity. It shows us that there is a
18 This is further evidence of the “unanimity slowdown” in the veil treatment compared to the baseline design: in the
former case players voted on average 3.3 times, in the latter 2.8.
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hard kernel of students thinking that tax regime B is the fairest one regardless of the treatment. On
the contrary the veil produces an effect on a share of participants who are not really convinced of
the fairness of the two least progressive tax schemes.
Furthermore, it is interesting to notice how the vote dynamic between the two treatments is
mainly driven by male students (Charts 4 and 5).
Chart 4 and 5 – Distribution female (left) and male (right) votes per tax regime
As for the individual compliance, looking at the aggregate data (obtained by pooling together
the  two  treatments),  we  cannot  draw  different  conclusions  from  previous  results  achieved  in
repeated public good games without punishments (Fehr et al. 2002, Kroll et al. 2007, Ledyard 1995
and Chaudhuri 2011). Substantially the average individual compliance in the first round starts at
about 80% and then it steadily declines to less than 60% in the last round19 (Chart 6). 
Chart 6 – Individual tax compliance and beliefs
19 Compliance level might be higher than what it is usually find in the related literature, but in interpreting our results
we have to take into account the participation effect generated by the voting procedure (see Section 1). 
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Focusing the attention on the aggregate predictions concerning others’ compliance we can
notice  two interesting  empirical  facts.  First  of  all,  on  average beliefs and compliance perfectly
match (only) in the first round (78%, with corr. = 0.71). Despite this initial flawless match, from the
second round onward a gap (average four, maximum seven percent points) emerges between the
two variables, but they keep being highly correlated on average (corr. = 0.66).
Besides,  even  though  the  two  measures  slightly  tend  to  diverge  across  rounds20,  the
compliance rate follows the beliefs path. In general this is consistent with the so called reaction
theories (Attanasi 2008, Croson et al. 2004), which claim that individual choices and actions are
basically driven by beliefs on the others’ behaviour. Thus the participants comply with a tax regime
in the (discounted) measure they expect the other players in the group to comply with.
When data is then the separated according to the treatment (Chart 7) we find that compliance
in the first rounds is higher in the baseline treatment than in the veil treatment. However, in general,
across  rounds  we  do  not  observe  any  significant  difference  in  compliance  levels.  On  average
compliance in  the  baseline design is  64%, while it  is  63% in the veil  treatment.  This  result  is
consistent with our hypothesis H2.
Chart 7 – Individual tax compliance and beliefs per treatment
The just  mentioned result is  not as pleonastic as it  might seem to be at  first  glance. The
consideration that about 25% of experimental subjects behind the veil of ignorance “changed their
mind” and accepted a fairer tax regime to be adopt in phase 2, joined with H2 constitutes a result in
20 The increasing divergence between predictions and compliance might be due to the experimental structure. Subjects
do  not  receive  a  feedback  on  others’ individual  contributions,  but  they  are  only  shown  the  total  tax  revenue
generated  in  each  round.  However,  the  fact  that  aggregated  beliefs  and  average  compliance  follow a  similar
(decreasing) path (Chart 6) indicates that players can clearly adjust their behaviour in response to their beliefs.
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favour of the veil of ignorance. Indeed, the fact that people can move to fairer tax schemes, where
tax rates are lower for the poorest and higher for the richest, without it affecting the average level of
tax compliance (Chart 8) is certainly a merit of the veil of ignorance procedure, which should not be
undervalued. 
Chart 8 – Compliance tax regime D
Getting back to the general dynamic of tax compliance, we observe (Chart 7) that in the veil
treatment  the  compliance  path  is  constantly  decreasing,  that  is  in  our  game compliance  across
rounds is neither self-enforcing nor stable as predicted by the theory. Thus we have to reject  H3.
The rejection of the hypothesis is evident even focusing only on tax regime D (Chart 8), the one that
impacted mostly on the deliberative voting in phase 1 and that produced the major reallocation of
votes between the two treatments.
H4,  which  according to  Grimalda et  al.  (2005) essentially  predicts  an alignment  between
beliefs and compliance in the veil treatment, is verified (Chart 10), while that is not true in the
baseline treatment (Chart 9) because the two measures constantly diverge across rounds. The effect
of the veil on beliefs is even more evident when we focus the attention on the behaviour of the
participants who chose tax regime D. Looking at the trend lines of compliance and beliefs in the
veil treatment (Chart 12) we can clearly see that the two measures, despite showing a constant gap,
are almost perfectly aligned. On the contrary, in the baseline condition they do not seem to have a
common direction (Chart 11).
This  effect  of  the  veil  on  the  beliefs  can  be  also  remarked  through a  simple  descriptive
statistic: for the tax regime D the correlation between the average level  of compliance and the
individual predictions at each round is 0.24 in the baseline condition and it raises to 0.81 in the veil
treatment.  Therefore we can claim that  in our repeated game the veil  of ignorance,  despite  not
93
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
compliance_base
compliance_veil
Round
having  a  positive  effect  on  compliance,  plays  a  significant  role  on  the  empirical  expectations
(Bicchieri 2008. Bicchieri et al. 2009, Bicchieri et al. 2010) making them more aligned to the actual
choice (however, this does not seem to be true in general, where the correlations are 0.92 and 0.89
respectively).
However, even though behaviours are aligned to predictions, in our specific design choosing a
non-binding (tax regime) distributive scheme behind a veil of ignorance did not produce a stable
path of (tax) compliance as predicted. Instead, consistently with the standard literature, voluntary
compliance keeps being fragile and the impossibility to communicate or to sanction free riders after
the agreement represents a strong limit to the duration of cooperation and therefore of compliance
itself (Fehr et al. 2002, Kroll 2007 and Ostrom et al. 1992).
The fact that the impartial perspective offered by the veil of ignorance cannot generate, by
means of sufficiently stable beliefs, a constant level of compliance across rounds has two immediate
implications.
First of all the conclusions related the one-shot exclusion game (Faillo et al. 2008, Faillo et al.
2014, Sacconi et al. 2005, Sacconi et al. 2010 and Sacconi et al. 2011) may need to be reviewing in
order  to  take  into  account  the  limited  effect,  also  across  time,  of  a  (laboratory)  non-binding
agreement behind a veil of ignorance. Indeed, although the reciprocal conformity model (Grimalda
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et al.  2005) is verified, because round by round the compliance level is directly correlated with
beliefs, the veil of ignorance cannot boost beliefs to keep compliance high across rounds21.
Furthermore, the results concerning the tax compliance levels in our experiment shed light on
a portion of the “slippery slope” curve (Kirchler 2008 and Kirchler et al. 2018), which might have
been misrepresented. In particular the “slippery curve” should be reshaped and conceived as an
asymmetric curve, because it has not been proved yet that full tax compliance can be based on the
sole “trust in authorities (people)”.
Given that in the two treatments we observed no differences in compliance levels, we are
allowed to pool the data together in order to identify other interesting empirical regularities which
were not taken into account by the predictive hypothesis. In Table 2 we report the coefficients of
two  linear  models  where  the  individual  tax  compliance,  expressed  in  percentage  terms,  is  the
dependent variable. The second column of the Table checks for a treatment effect (model 1), while
the coefficients of the third column are obtained pooling together the data of the two treatments
(model 2). The errors of both estimations are clustered for group and for round.
For example, we can observe significant negative effects of the game round and of the payoff
earned in the previous round. Each round compliance is reduced of about 1%, wile earning 1000
ECU more from one round to the next one decreases compliance of about 0.2%.
On the contrary, the assigned endowment and the predictions on the others’ choices have a
strong positive effect on tax compliance. In particular, believing that the other two players of the
group will increase their compliance level of 1%, raises the individual compliance of 0.7 percentage
points.  If  we  then  focus  on the  extremes,  we  can  notice  that  according  to  the  data,  when  the
participants think that the other players will contribute with zero ECU to the common tax revenue
(6% of the observations),  they pay on average 5% of the due taxes.  On the contrary,  when an
individual believes that the other participants of the group will fully comply with the chosen tax
scheme (21% of the observations) they pay on average 89% of the due taxes. Therefore we can
confirm again how behaviours are mainly driven by the expectations on the others’ compliance
(Croson et al. 2004 and Grimalda et al. 2005).
21 More specifically, the dynamic concerning the update of beliefs in the should be enquired (Battigalli et al. 2005)
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individualcompliance i ; t=α+β1treatment i ; t+β2 roundagreement i+ β3 taxschemei+β4 endowment i
+β5round i ; t+β6averagebelief +β7 treatment x averagebelief ¿+β8 payoff ECU i; t−1+controlsi ; t+ε i ; t
Table 2a – Determinants of individual complianceModel 1 - treatment Model 2 – pooled datatreatment - 0.093 (0.056)round agreement - 5.9e-04 (0.015) - 0.003 (0.016)tax scheme    0.009 (0.020) 0.005 (0.019)endowment         0.118 (0.0367) ** 0.110 (0.0037) **round - 0.009 (0.004) ** - 0.009 (0.004) **average belief 0.725 (0.049) ** 0.763 (0.036) **treatment * average belief 0.077 (0.076)payoff ECU (round -1) - 0.181 (0.054) ** - 0.178 (0.055) **experimental experience - 0.002 (0.003) - 0.001 (0.003)gender 0.076 (0.030) * 0.074 (0.030) *age 0.005 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006)field of studies 0.017 (0.034) 0.014 (0.033)Participants 153Number of observation 1530* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%Adjusted R-squared 0.4674 0.4647F-statistic p-value 2.2e-16 2.2e-16a  The variable round agreement refers to the round the agreement was reached (ranging from 1 to 6); tax scheme is thechosen tax regime, ordered from the flat tax scheme (1) to the most progressive (4); endowment is the gross amount inECU expressed in thousands; round refers to the round of the tax compliance game (from 1 to 10); average beliefs takesin consideration the predicted average tax compliance of the other two players in the game and it  is  expressed inpercentage; the interaction term tries to capture the additional effect of beliefs in predicting the compliance in the veiltreatment;  payoff  ECU is  the  lagged  term  which  captures  the  individual  ECU  payoff  of  the  previous  round;experimental experience is simply the number of previous experiments; gender is a binary dummy for the gender effect(male = 0); age is the personal age; field of studies refers to the undertaken studies (a dummy variable, where the value1 corresponds to economic disciplines, whereas 0 to any other field, the second one is a discrete variable).Besides, across the rounds compliance was higher for the players endowed with the highestlevel of income. Taking into account also the related predictions, it emerges the rich players paymore taxes (in percent terms) than the poorer ones because they think the latter will comply more.
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The opposite occurs for the lowest levels of income. In other words, since the poor players think
that the richer ones will contribute less, they comply less. Adding to the regression (model 2) an
interaction  variable  between  the  income  level  and  the  beliefs  in  order  to  try  to  capture  the
mentioned  extra  effect  does  not  provide  any  further  significant  result.  However,  this  particular
phenomenon can be observed in Chart 10.
Chart 10 – Compliance and income level (EMU)
Finally, and consistently also with previous studies (Kastlunger et al. 2010), we can observe a
gender gap in tax compliance. The difference between male and female tax compliance is captured
by the term gender, and being female increases tax compliance of about 8%.
Instead, there are not remarkable differences concerning the field of studies (economic field
versus  all  the  other  disciplines).  The  accumulated  “experimental  experience”  is  not  significant
either. In the veil treatment beliefs become more predictive, but not in a significant measure.
Conclusions
Moving  from  the  exclusion  game  design,  we  tested  some  further  hypotheses  related  to
Rawls’s social contract theory. In particular we focused our attention on the pure veil effect and on
the compliance dynamic of an impartial and non-binding agreement. In particular, we designed our
experiment as a tax compliance game. The data collected from our game (with three players and
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four possible tax regimes), showed that the veil of ignorance procedure has an important effect on
the ex-ante votes allocation and a non-negative effect on compliance. However, the laboratory veil
could not generate a path of compliance stable over time,
Going more in detail, the consideration that behind the veil of ignorance about 25% of groups
moved from a less progressive towards a fairer tax regime (compared to the baseline treatment),
together with the observation that this change had no significant impact on the average level of tax
compliance should be considered a result in favour of the veil of ignorance. This is of course a week
result, but it demonstrates that from a certain point of view the veil of ignorance is not a purely
hypothetical  tool:  reasoning behind the veil  of  ignorance  helps  us  to  change our  redistributive
concerns without jeopardizing the economic outcome.
From a more general perspective our result shows that there is room for fighting inequalities
without compromising the result in terms of efficiency (interpreted here in its broadest meaning). In
other words our result shows that we can exploit the veil of ignorance to avoid, up to a certain
degree, the trade-off between equality and efficiency in voluntary contribution mechanisms. Indeed,
in  our  experiment,  despite  moving towards  fairer  tax  regimes  the  average (considering  all  the
rounds) contribution diminishes only of 3%, passing from a mean contribution of 446 ECU to 431
ECU. 
Nevertheless, the laboratory veil did not produce any encouraging result as for the second
main  aim is  considered,  that  is  it  could  not  generate  a  stable  effect  across  time.  Without  the
introduction of enforcement mechanisms, round by round compliance showed to be monotonically
decreasing, as broadly documented for different voluntary contribution mechanisms. These specific
result have relevant implications not only for the Rawlsian moral psychology and its experimental
literature,  but  also  for  the  “slippery  slope”  design.  Indeed,  if  no  arrangements  are  possible  to
generate full voluntary tax compliance, the slippery curve should be redesigned as asymmetrical.
Thus,  a  possible  improvement  of  our  tax  game might  consider  the  introduction  of  some
sanctioning  mechanisms  in  the  compliance  phase  not  so  much  to  compensate  the  level  of
compliance for negative effects induced by the veil  of ignorance,  as  for sustaining the level  of
compliance over time. This is a conclusion we can reach also reading more in depth John Rawls’s
words. In one passage, dealing with equal liberties, he admitted that tax compliance cannot survive
over time reling on the sole sense of justice:
“even in a well-ordered society the coercive powers of government are to some
degree necessary for the stability of social cooperation. For although men know
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that they share a common sense of justice and that each wants to adhere to the
existing arrangements, they may nevertheless lack full confidence in one another.
They may suspect that some are not doing their part, and so they may be tempted
not to do theirs. The general awareness of these temptations may eventually cause
the scheme to break down. The suspicion that others are not honoring their duties
and obligations is increased by the fact that,  in the absence of the authoritative
interpretation and enforcement of the rules, it is particularly easy to find excuses
for  breaking  them.  Thus  even  under  reasonably  ideal  conditions,  it  is  hard  to
imagine, for example, a successful income tax scheme on a voluntary basis. Such
an arrangement is unstable. The role of an authorized public interpretation of rules
supported  by  collective  sanctions  is  precisely  to  overcome  this  instability.  By
enforcing  a  public  system  of  penalties  government  removes  the  grounds  for
thinking that  others  are  not complying with  the  rules.  For this  reason alone,  a
coercive sovereign is presumably always necessary, even though in a well-ordered
society sanctions are not severe and may never need to be imposed. Rather, the
existence of effective penal machinery serves as men’s security to one another”
(Rawls 199, p. 211).
In synthesis, “[t]he need for the enforcement of rules by the state will still exist even when
everyone is moved by the same sense of justice” (Rawls 1999, p. 236).
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Appendix: instructions of the veil treatment
Good morning,
We kindly ask you to read these instructions carefully. The instructions will be also read aloud by
one of the experimenters. If at the end of the instructions you have any doubt, please raise your
hand and wait for one of the experimenters to answer your questions.
EXPERIMENT
You are about to take part in an experiment which aims to investigate the tax attitudes of individuals
who receive an income. During the experiment you will not be allowed to communicate in any way
with  the  other  participants.  If  you violate  this  rule  you  will  be  excluded  from the experiment
without being paid. The amount of money you can earn will depend on your decisions and on those
of the other participants. The decisions you make will remain completely anonymous and no one
will be able to associate your choices to your name. At the end of the experiment payments will be
made by a bank transfer to your bank account.
The experiment will be run using Experimental Currency Units (ECU). 4.000 ECU are equivalent to
€1.00. You will also earn €3.00 as show-up fee (SF) and €2.00 if you win the bonus (B).
PHASE 1
At the beginning of phase 1 you will be randomly assigned to a group of people composed of other
two  participants.  Each  group  will  therefore  be  made  up  of  three  subjects.  The  group  will  be
permanent, that is its participants will remain the same until the end of the experiment.
In phase 1, along with the other two players of your group, you will have to vote for the tax rates
scheme you would prefer to adopt on three levels of gross income. The possible gross incomes are
equal to 1.500 ECU, 2.000 ECU and 3.000 ECU and within the group there will not be two subjects
with the same level of income. In phase 1 you will not know what level of income that will be
assigned to you (this information will be communicated to you only in phase 2). Therefore you will
have to choose the scheme of tax rates before you are assigned a level of income. The tax regimes
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you can choose from are shown in the paper table next to the keyboard of your computer station
(Figure  2)  and  which  you  can  consult  at  any  time  during  the  experiment.  All  values  (except
percentages) are in ECU.
Figure 2 – Screenshot voting phase
The scheme of tax rates must be approved unanimously, i.e. all the subjects belonging to a group
have to express the same choice about the type of tax to adopt in phase 2. In phase 1 you will have 6
rounds to reach unanimity:
-  if  unanimity  is  reached  in  any  of  the  6  available  rounds  you  and  your  group  will  proceed
immediately to phase 2 of the experiment, where only the voted scheme will be available;
- if at the end of the round number 6 you do not reached unanimous agreement on the tax scheme
for you and your group the experiment will end here, and you will be paid only the show-up fee of
€3.00.
PHASE 2
Phase 2 is made up of a predetermined number of rounds that will not be announced, therefore none
of you will know it. However, all the groups that will access phase 2 will have the same number of
rounds available. At the beginning of phase 2 you will be randomly assigned one of the expected
income levels:  1.500 ECU, 2.000 ECU or 3.000 ECU. Within the group there  will  not  be two
subjects with the same income level and the income that will be assigned to you at the beginning
will remain the same throughout all the rounds of phase 2.
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At each round of phase 2 you will be asked to decide how much tax to pay according to your own
income and the tax rates scheme voted during phase 1. The total amount of taxes paid by each
participant of the group will constitute the tax revenue of the group. The tax revenue will be then
multiplied  by  a  capitalization  factor  of  2.1  and  after  that  it  will  be  redistributed  in  the  same
proportion (one third) to each participant of the group.
In the same screen where you will declare the amount of taxes you wish to pay, you will be also
asked to predict the behaviour of the other two participants in your group. The player who will
provide the best predictions on all rounds of phase 2 will get a bonus (B) of € 2.00 which will be
added to his final payment. If two (or three) players provide equally correct predictions, the bonus
will be awarded to both (or all three).
If you and your group access phase 2, the amount in € you will earn will be determined as follows:
Σ(assigned income in ECU – tax paid ECU + 1/3* (tax revenue ECU*2,1))/ 4.000 ECU* € 1.00 + €
3.00 SF + [€ 2.00 B]
Before proceeding with the experiment you will be asked to answer some brief control questions.
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4. Economics of Climate Change and Social Contract
Theory: Intergenerational Insights From a Laboratory
Experiment in a Rawlsian Perspective
Klaudijo Klaser, Lorenzo Sacconi and Marco Faillo
Abstract:  Many actions we take  today will  show some of their  consequences in  the  future.
Therefore future generations, although they cannot have a real voice, should be considered as
direct stakeholders of some of our present decisions. As far as this intertemporal misalignment
between actions and outcomes is concerned, climate change is the most evident example we
have of negative externality towards the future. This paper looks at the climate change problem
and the related international agreements on the reduction of greenhouse gas emission through
the  social  contract  perspective..  We  apply  John Rawls’s  veil  of  ignorance  decision-making
model within an experimental setting. In particular, we implement a sequential group dictator
game where generations (groups of players) are located on a chain representing the time line.
The (laboratory) veil of ignorance induces a fair ex-ante perspective regarding the distribution
of resources between generations,  however ex-post compliance to the agreement remains an
open issue.
JEL Code: D63, D64, F64, Q54
Keywords:  Experimental  Economics,  Climate  Change,  Intergenerational  Allocation  of
Resources, Veil of Ignorance, Social Contract Theory
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“Society  is  indeed  a  contract  […]  it  becomes  a
partnership not  only between those who are living,  but
between those who are living, those who are dead, and
those who are to be born”
Edmund Burke
“The dominant reason for acting on climate change is not
that  it  would  make  us  better  off.  It  is  that  not  acting
involves  taking  advantage  of  the  poor,  the  future,  and
nature”
Stephen M. Gardiner
Introduction 
Climate change is a threat which looms over future generations but that is triggered by some
careless actions of the present one, who enjoys the benefits of those actions. In a technical language
“[c]limate  change  is  an  instance  of  an  externality—when  one  agent’s  activities  have  costs  or
benefits for other agents that are not reflected in the prices the first agent faces” (Clements 2015, p.
263).  This  means  that  only  the  present  generation  can  act  in  advance,  constraining  its  own
behaviour, in order to limit negative externalities, or said otherwise, the risk of bad consequences of
global warming on future generations.
More  importantly,  climate  change  is  a  global  issue  and  it  cannot  be  tackled  by  the
commitment of a minority of virtuous agents, that is environmental issues like the global warming
cannot  be  solved  through  single  community  actions;  instead  they  require  a  certain  degree  of
international  cooperation (Stern  et  al.  2006,  p.  512).  Therefore,  if  soon nations  do not  reach  a
widely shared agreement on how to coordinate themselves in order to limit or to avoid, through
today’s actions, the global warming and its consequences there is the risk to harm seriously future
generations.
However, “notwithstanding more than twenty years of international negotiations to establish
limits, emissions of greenhouse gases continue to rise” (Gardiner et al. 2016, p. 137)1. In other
words, even if mankind understood the dangers intrinsic in climate change long time ago (Nordhaus
1 The first formal attempt to address climate change towards a common solution was the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change in 1992. However, according to the world meteorological organization, in 2019
greenhouse  gas  levels  reached  a  new  top  (https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/greenhouse-gas-levels-
atmosphere-reach-new-record).
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1993),  it  is  not  still  capable  to  pursue the  common goal  of containing the risk to  harm future
generations.  Two are  the  main  reasons  of  this  constant  failure  of  international  negotiations  on
climate actions.
On the one hand the success of agreements concerning the reduction of global greenhouse
gases (the main cause of the global warming) is essentially conditioned upon the distribution of
costs  between  nations:  by  and  large  some  of  them  are  expected  to  make  grater  sacrifices  in
containing emissions, or said more explicitly, some nations are supposed to pay higher costs in
pursuing  the  common  goal  (Gardiner  2011a,  Gardiner  et  al  2016).  However,  nobody  is  really
willing or available to pay more than the others. This makes difficult any agreement, because it is
not  really  clear  which  nations  exactly  should  bear  higher  costs,  that  is  there  is  not  a  shared
intragenerational principle regulating the distribution of costs. This prevents any intragenerational
commitment.
On the other hand, even if some actual agreements were formally reached (e.g. the Kyoto
protocol),  compliance  to  such  agreements  is  known  to  be  extremely  fragile.  Since  reducing
emissions is costly and since in the current geopolitical frame there are not institutions which can
monitor  and  sanction  defectors,  single  nations  have  a  clear  economic  incentive  to  free  ride2.
Therefore, although it might be collectively rational to cooperate, from the individual (national)
point of view it is rational to deviate from the formal agreements.
However, without an international agreement to reduce greenhouse emissions the world will
head a tragedy of commons (Hardin 1968) because the atmosphere, despite being very big, can
contain a limited quantity of greenhouse gases before these show their harmful effects on mankind.
In addition  to  this  concern  we have  to  take  into  consideration  that  the  common-pool  resource
dynamic (Ostrom et al. 1994) which usually drives the appropriation of natural resources over time
(and the resulting parallel creation of noxious waste) is amplified by a strong present bias, since
action  and  consequences  occur  at  different  times  and  on  different  people.  Again,  given  the
asymmetric  relationship  between  generations,  overexploitation  of  resources  most  of  the  times
benefits the present generation at the expenses of the future ones.
For example,  producing electricity through nuclear  power stations we currently benefit  of
energy generated at a lower cost. However within some areas the radioactive slags will constrain
and will jeopardize future generations for hundreds of years. The consequences of an unlimited use
of fossil fuels might be even more tragic because they involve the whole globe. The accumulation
2 Baseically, without supranational institutions it is not possible to change the payoff structure, that is we cannot
introduce incentives to induce or sanctions to enforce cooperation between nations.
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of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere generates the so called greenhouse effect and this, through the
increase of global temperatures, will negatively condition the existence of future generations all
over the world.
Therefore how can the current generation, in its own decisions, take into account in a fair way
the interests  of  future  generations  which have  no voice  (because  not  existing  yet)  at  the  table
discussion but which are clearly direct stakeholders of the present actions? The answer is not easy at
all if we take into consideration many specific features which distinguish allocation of resources
between generations (Meyer 2016) from the circumstances which characterize the more familiar
redistributive issue between contemporaries (Lamont and al. 2016 and Tremmel 2009, p. 147)3.
The  standard  economic  approach  deals  with  the  intertemporal  allocation  of  resources
assuming  that  the  utility  function  to  maximize  depends  positively  not  only  on  the  bundle  of
consumption of the present (person) generation, but also on the consumption or on the utility of
future (people) generations (Solow 1974). Within this kind of functional forms a discount rate is
introduced to represent the degree of concern that one generation bears for the next ones, so that the
maximization  of  the  present  utility  keeps  balanced  with  the  (conjectured)  interests  of  future
generations. In this way a positive discount rate is supposed to avoid overconsumption behaviours
of the present generation which might unfairly damage future generations. 
However the assumption of an intergenerational perspective embodied in the utility function
through a discount rate seems to be quite limiting for different reasons. For example that approach
contradicts  the  classic  pillar  of  the  purely  selfish  homo oeconomicus  who is  supposed to  care
exclusively about his own consumption level and not at all about the welfare of his offspring4.
Besides, within that economic approach very much depends on the social rate of discount and
on  the  utility  functional  form.  However  there  is  not  unanimity  on  how  much  exactly  future
generations are supposed to count in our present decisions. In the environmental economics field
3 “[I]ntergenerational [distributive] justice is saddled with puzzling difficulties, such as the nonidentity problem [...],
the cooperation between generations [...], motivational considerations, conceptualisation of duties and toward future
generations, lack of information, uncertainty and asymmetries of power” (Gabor 2013, p. 301). To not take into
consideration the rationale of deriving intertemporal norms from a purely intragenerational context (Heyd 2009, p.
177). In other words a group of existing people (the contemporaries) is supposed to derive distributive principles
and practices which take into consideration interests of other non-existing groups (future generations) that formally
cannot claim anything. Said otherwise, we have “to build and rationalise a problem of cooperation, duties, rights,
compliance, between non-existent individuals who lived, live or will live in different moments of time” (Gabor
2013, p. 304).
4 Moreover, it is not clear why the other regarding concern is usually assumed to be a one way vertical component.
Thus the following asymmetry is inexplicable: why would it be legitimate to assume that an economic agent cares
only about her children, but not about the welfare of her siblings or her friends, or even of her ancestors (like
parents or grandparents)?
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there is still a heated debate regarding the appropriate weight (social discount rate) to assign to
future generations’ welfare (Nordhaus 2008, Moore et al 2004 and Stern 2008). In the same way,
there  is  complete  uncertainty  about  future  generations’ utility  functions.  Said  otherwise,  future
people do not exist yet for definition and they cannot reveal their preferences (Beckerman 2006 and
Parfit 1984), therefore we cannot really know what is better for them (Barry 1977).
It is within this (considered inadequate) theoretical framework that the social contract theory
can provide a useful  and innovative tool  to  deal  with  climate change and more generally with
distribution of resources between generations.
John Ralws (1999) was the pioneer in extending in a structured way the social contract model
to the allocative problem between generations. In his theory Rawls claims that the set of currently
existing people (therefore not all the generations of the history), instrumentally rational and free of
any  other  regarding  preference,  have  to  design  the  principles  to  regulate  the  intergenerational
distribution  of  resources  (Rawls  1999,  pp.  118-123).  Preventing  then,  by  means  of  a  veil  of
ignorance,  the  current  generation  from knowing  the  specific  moment  of  the  history  it  belongs
induces the (present) parties to design a fair principle for the allocation of resources through the
human history.
The most interesting feature of the Rawlsian intragenerational setting for intergenerational
principles is exactly the designed decision-making model. In particular in Rawls’s intergenerational
theory individuals taking part in the agreement are only contemporaries and they have to choose an
allocative  configuration  which  does  not  affect  exclusively  themselves.  Instead  the  present
generation is called to evaluate distributive principles that will produce effects also on third parties
(future generations) who formally cannot take part in the contract, cannot make demands, cannot
make objections,  cannot threat and cannot punish the actual  decision maker: this  is  exactly the
modern climate change issue5, which is characterized by a dictatorship of the present. 
A further relevant feature of a Rawlsian approach to the specific climate change issue is then
the ex-post compliance to the social contract. Indeed the agreement behind the veil of ignorance is
not conceived by Rawls  as  binding.  In other words,  although the distributive principles are the
outcome  of  a  formally  fair  procedure,  once  the  veil  is  dropped  a  dictatorship  of  the  present
generation over the future ones remains a concrete possibility. This is a strong analogy with what
5 The social contract on intergenerational principles is very different from the standard distributive issue where a set
of (contemporary) individuals has to agree on the way to divide resources among themselves: whether I have to
agree with you on how to split $10 between us or whether I have to agree with you on how to split $10 between
ourselves and a third person who has absolutely no voice on the issue are two extremely different decision-making
frameworks. In the latter case individuals involved in the contract are supposed to take into consideration some
people who remain outside of the contract moment.
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was previously shown: compliance to the international agreements on greenhouse gases reduction is
a big real problem, because they are not enforceable.
In  the  experimental  field  compliance  to  non-binding  agreements  on  intragenerational
distributive principles was explained with the Rawlisan idea of the sense of justice (Degli Antoni et.
al 2016, Faillo et al. 2008, Faillo et al. 2014, Rawls 1963, Rawls 1999, Sacconi and Faillo 2005,
Sacconi and Faillo 2010, Sacconi et al. 2011 and Tammi 2011). Thus we can try to amplify the same
concept of the sense of  justice to the intergenerational  context.  In  particular,  we can extend its
validity, verifying if a different decision-making frame (with the agreement that does not formally
and substantially include the main stakeholders, that is the least advantaged party), concerning a
slightly  different  distributive  problem  (resources  have  to  be  distributed  not  within  group  but
between groups), leads to the same positive conclusions on the sense of justice.
Within the  general  framework described so far,  we apply Rawls’s  intergenerational  social
contract model within an experimental setting in order to provide some useful insights concerning
the modern climate change issue and the related agreements on the reduction of noxious emissions.
The next Sections are therefore organized as follows.
Section 1 introduces Rawls’s social contract theory (Rawls 1999), with a specific focus on its
intergenerational extension. The aim of this part is to provide the theoretical background for the
analysis of distribution of resources between generation in a Rawlsian perspective. Although the
slant given by John Rawls to his intergenerational social contract theory (Rawls 1999, pp. 251-267
and Rawls 2001, pp. 158-160) requires some prudential clarifications (see Appendix A), his idea of
an intragenerational agreement behind a veil of ignorance (Rawls 1999, pp. 118-123) is considered
an adequate model for inquiring the modern climate change issue.
Section 2 describes the experimental design which captures the main features of the modern
climate change problem in a Rawlsian perspective. The game is structured as a group dictator game
(Kahneman et al. 1986) played sequentially (Bahr et al. 2007 and Casol et al. 1998) and it is run in
two distinct conditions, with and without a preliminary voting stage simulating an agreement behind
a veil of ignorance.
Section 3 provides the predictive hypothesis. Section 4 analyses the data of the experiment.
Appendix  A  analyses  in  depth  the  Rawlsian  social  contract  theory  extended  to  the
intergenerational issue. Appendix B contains the complete instructions provided to the participants
and read aloud during each experimental sessions.
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4.1 John Rawls’s social contract theory on allocation of resources between generations
Rawls designs his ethical system (Rawls 1999) in order to identify the main principles which
should lead the human society and its institutions, with particular concern to the division of benefits
generated by cooperation between individuals (Rawls 1999, p. 4). Rawls’s theory establishes then a
procedure  inspired by the  social  contract  tradition,  that  is  the principles are the outcome of an
agreement between those individuals involved in the cooperative scheme.
Within  the  Rawlsian  decision-making  procedure  the  impartiality  in  the  choice  of  the
principles is guaranteed by a veil of ignorance (Rawls 1999, pp. 118-123). This is specific tool is
thought to excludes the access to any particular information to those parties who take part in the
agreement. Therefore, in the agreement phase,
“no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status; nor does he know his
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the
like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational
plan of life, or even the special features of his psychology such as his aversion to risk or liability
to optimism or pessimism” (Rawls 1999, p 118).
Furthermore it  is  important  to  highlight  how according to  Rawls  “persons in the  original
position have no information as to which generation they belong” (Rawls 1999, p 118).
“In this manner the veil of ignorance is arrived at in a natural way”, since it is excluded “the
knowledge of those contingencies which sets men at odds and allows them to be guided by their
prejudices” (Rawls 1999, p. 17). In this way, behind the veil of ignorance no one can take advantage
of personal contingencies to design principles (norms or institutions) which might favour her own
particular position: in the original position everybody is equally represented since everybody has to
choose in the same situation of perfect (mis)informational symmetry and the involved parties reach
an agreement only on the basis of impartial and general considerations (Rawls 1999, pp. 118-123).
Although the distribution of resources between generations is particularly challenging and it
“subjects any ethical theory to severe if not impossible tests” (Rawls 1999, p. 251) John Rawls
(1999 and 2001) does not fail to extend his contractarian system in order to contemplate this topic.
Indeed, Rawls is aware how the account of his social contract theory “would be incomplete without
some discussion of this important matter” (Rawls, 1999, p. 251).
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When Rawls moves from the intragenerational context to the analysis of principles that are
supposed  to  regulate  the  allocation  of  resources  between  generations  he  adds  a  reasonable
specification  concerning  the  decision-making  procedure  described  so  far.  In  particular,  Rawls
specifies  that  although  people  are  deprived  of  the  information  concerning  the  generation  they
belong (Rawls 1999, p. 118 and p. 254), that is even if they ignore the historical period and the
economic development of the society they represent, the parties behind the veil of ignorance are all
contemporaries (Rawls 1999, p. 121). Said otherwise the people involved in the agreement, even
though focused on intergenerational principles, belong to the same generation (and they know it as a
general fact).
With this specification Rawls substantially constrains his intergenerational decision-making
model to the physically existing people (Dierksmeier 2006, p. 74). Indeed, in his opinion it would
be  unrealistic  to  conceive  an  agreement  (although hypothetical)  which  gathers  together  all  the
possible generations of the human history: this all-inclusive approach would stretch imagination too
much, that is it would require a too high level of abstraction6 (Attas 2009 pp. 195-7, Rawls 1999 p.
120, Rawls 2001, p. 160 and Tremmel 2009, p. 156).
Notwithstanding  the  clarification  concerning  the  contemporaneity  of  the  parties  (see
Appendix A for further details), Rawls’s social contract theory seems to be promising for dealing
with the allocation of resources between generations (Tremmel 2013, p. 484) because with the veil
of ignorance the present generation substantially looses its privileged position (dictatorial powers)
towards the future ones. Indeed the veil of ignorance guarantees that the parties involved in the
agreement, despite being and knowing to be contemporary, are encouraged to propose principles for
the division of resources between generations which are impartial7.
However, in Rawls’s opinion the standard difference principle, which requires to maximize
the expectations of the worst-off (Rawls 1999, p. 56, p. 69, and p. 72), is not a suitable tool to deal
with redistribution of resources between generations because it apparently produces some ethically
undesirable consequences (Gardiner 2009, Rawls 1999, pp. 253-255 and Appendix A). Therefore
the issue concerning the intergenerational allocation of resources “must be treated in some other
manner” (Rawls 1999, p. 254). Thus Rawls proposes the just saving principle as the normative rule
6 Indeed Rawls's model is to be “understood as a purely hypothetical situation” (Rawls 1999, p. 11). In other words,
Rawls’s original position coincides with the adoption of a particular perspective, and therefore the agreement is
conceived as a simple mental experiment.
7 According to  Rawls,  even though it  is  formally the present  cohort  to  decide about  the  allocation of resources
between generations, the veil of ignorance procedure induces the parties to take into appropriate consideration also
future generations and to choose “a path over time which treats all generations justly during the whole course of a
society’s history” (Rawls 1999, p. 257)
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to  regulate  the  distribution  of  resources  over time:  “in  following a just  savings  principle,  each
generation makes a contribution to those coming later and receives from its predecessors” (Rawls
1999, p. 254). 
Nevertheless  Rawls  does  not  describe  in  detail  the  peculiar  features  of  the  just  saving
principle (like for example providing a specific saving rate or a schedule of rates). Instead he limits
himself in sketching some general ethical restriction which the contractual parties should take into
account in defining the saving path (Rawls 1999, pp. 255-6). However, those are not of interest for
the most immediate aims, and more details about the derivation and the configuration of the just
saving principle are provided in Appendix A.
For the purposes of the experiment and its Rawlsian interpretation it is sufficient to highlight
the working mechanism of the just saving principle. Basically, according to Rawls, every (present)
generation is expected to give up a share of its own resources in order to pass it to the following
generation. This is the outcome even though the next generations do not take part in the present
agreement.
Therefore, with Rawls’s social contract model (and without discussing about social rates of
discount or about future people’s preferences), it seems to be possible to justify in a compelling way
the idea that a closed set of self-regarding contemporary individuals can take into due consideration
people belonging to future generations. Again, this is the modern climate change issue.
4.2 Experimental design of the baseline treatment
Many different theoretical approaches have been proposed to address the environmental issue
in a Rawlsian perspective, going from considering health and environment as social primary goods
and including animals in original position (Gardiner 2011b and Thero 1995), to running a third level
original  position (Clements 2015).  In the same way many experimental  works aimed at  testing
empirically rither the assumptions or the conclusions of Rawls’s social contract theory (Gaertner
and Schokkaert 2012). Nevertheless, there was not a systematic research which explicitly tried to
merge the two fields. To the best of our knowledge, there was only one single attempt aimed at
testing Rawls’s intergenerational theory within an experimental setting (Wolf and Dron 2015).
Wolf and Dron’s design is very intuitive. A common endowment is provided to a group of five
participants. The single players are then randomly assigned to a position within a sequential dictator
game (Bahr and Requate 2007 and Cason and Mui 1998). Starting from the player occupying the
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first position, the participants sequentially enter the dictator role where they are asked to claim a
share of the common endowment for themselves8 until either the fourth player takes a decision
(therefore the fifth pparticipant becomes a dummy player) or the common endowment is exhausted. 
The underling idea of the game is that each single player in the sequence formally represents a
(non-overlapping)  generation,  because  each  person:  a)  (except  the  first  one)  is  subject  to  the
consequences of the decisions taken by all previous generations; b) with her or his own decision can
influence only the welfare of the following generation(s). Besides, in order to represent realistically
the “dictatorship of the present” issue, every participant who enters the dictator role is allowed to
claim the 100% of the (remaining) endowment, with the consequence that nothing would be left to
the following players.
In one of the proposed treatments Wolf and Dron introduce a preliminary stage where players
are asked to agree on a rule to share the common endowment between the five generations in the
sequence. However, they are asked to do that behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, that is before
knowing the position they will occupy in the actual sequential dictator game. Indeed, after players
agree on a sharing rule they are assigned to a position (generation) and they sequentially enter the
dictator role exactly as in the baseline treatment described above.
However, Wolf and Dron’s (2015) attempt is to be considered unsatisfactory and not very
representative of Rawls’s theory because of two main reasons.
First of all the veiled agreement, even though it included the least advantaged subject (the last
generation),  did  not  produce  a  (significant)  more  equal  distribution  between  the  five  players
compared to the baseline treatment where there was not any kind of agreement before the players
entered  the  sequential  dictator  game.  Thus,  although  the  participants  (representing  each  one  a
generation)  had  the  chance  to  discuss  together  about  the  ex-post  distribution  of  the  common
endowment,  players  located  in  privileged positions  (first  generations)  profited  anyway  of  their
contingency (Wolf and Wagner 2016) as the standard economic theory would predict.
Second, and even more importantly, their experimental design is to be considered inconsistent
in relation to Rawls’s  theory strictly interpreted.  Indeed in Wolf  and Dron’s experiment all  the
generations are put behind the same veil of ignorance, as if different generations could reach an
intergenerational  agreement (Anderson 2013).  Instead John Rawls  is  really careful  and clear  to
specify  how  the  agreement  for  intergenerational  principles  is  intragenerational,  that  is  only
contemporaries, generation by generation, are involved in the deliberative process behind the veil
8 In the experiment, the share that the players decide to withdraw from the common endowment during their turn
constitutes their final payment.
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(Rawls 1999 pp. 118 -121). Therefore, since Wolf and Dron’s design represents generations with
single individuals it also excludes the possibility of an agreement within generations.
It is true that according to Rawls the agreement behind the veil of ignorance is a mere mental
experiment (see footnote number 6), so a formal agreement should not be necessary at all in order to
derive principles of justice. Therefore, that each generation is represented by only one subject might
be considered a reasonable and representative simplification, because the veil of ignorance turns the
choice in the original position into an individual choice (or a choice from the point of view of a
representative individual). However, at the same time, from an experimental point of view, it seems
to be also  too ambitious to simulate a fictitious intragenerational agreement with the unilateral
decision of one single person, above all if we consider that without a formal agreement we cannot
apply the model of conformist preferences. 
Notwithstanding  the  simplifying  and,  in  a  certain  degree,  imprecise  design  and  its
discouraging outcome, Wolf and Dron provide a valid basis to inquire Rawls’s intergenerational
theory, also because they follow a widespread practice within the economic experimental literature,
that is to simulate generations assigning players to different positions in a sequential game9.
Thus, in order to design our experiment we started from Wolf and Dron’s sequential dictator
game.  We  improved  it  taking  into  account  the  further  specifications  made  by  John  Rawls
concerning the nature of the impartial agreement for intergenerational principles. In particular we
focused our attention on the structure of the agreement: even though behind the veil of ignorance
contractual parties assume an intergenerational perspective (since they do not know the generation
of the history they belong), all of them strictly belong to the same generation, that is the impartial
agreement is intragenerational and involves only contemporaries.
In our particular design the generations are constituted by groups of three participants10. The
groups  are  then  randomly  assigned  to  a  position  in  chains  (sequences)  of  different  lengths11.
Essentially, every group is meant to represent a (non-overlapping) generation of contemporaries.
Starting from the first generation players are asked to play a group sequential dictator game.
9 This practice has indeed occurred in trust games (Schotter et al. 2006), within public good games (Baggio et al.
2018 and Chaudhuri et al.  2006), with ultimatum games (Schotter et al. 2007) and with common pool resource
games (Chermak et al. 2002 and Fisher et al. 2004). Usually, in this kind of intergenerational experiments, there is
not  any  strategic  interaction  between  players  belonging  to  different  positions  in  the  sequence,  because  later
generations cannot directly influence the payoff of the previous ones - while the opposite is true.
10 According to the introductory framework, in the experiment the single parties should be considered representatives
of nation-states, like in the Law of People (Rawls 2001a, p. 10).
11 The shortest chain was made of one group (generation), the longest one of a sequence of five groups (generations).
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During the game nobody can know the total length of her own chain because  it  is  never
communicated12. However players can deduce how many generations exist (how many groups play)
before their own enters the dictator role since all chains start with the generation number one. For
example, if a group is assigned to the generation number three, the players belonging to this group
do not know how many generations there might are after theirs, but they know for sure that other
two groups have to play before they can possibly take any decision.
The decision-making task for the dictator group is then designed as follows (for further details
it is possible to consult Appendix B, which contains the instructions provided to the experimental
subjects).
The first group (generation) of each chain has at its disposal a common endowment of €21.
Each of the three participants of the group individually has to decide how much money to withdraw
from the common pool, choosing an integer value between €0 and €713. The amount that each player
claims for himself  in  this  stage constitutes  her  individual  final  payment.  Finally,  after  a  player
makes a choice and before he is revealed the outcome of the group decision he is asked to guess,
through an incentivized scheme14, the decisions taken by the other two players of his group. 
After all the 3 players decide how much money to withdraw from the common endowment,
one of the two following scenarios occurs:
- if the common pool is left with at leas €6 in total, the chain continues and the next group in
the  sequence  enter  the  decision-making  phase  becoming  the  dictator  group.  The  common
endowment  is  refilled  up  to  the  initial  value  of  €2115 and  the  new generation  faces  the  same
identical decision-making problem described so far;
12 This is a standard practice in experiments of this kind (see for example Fischer et al. 2004 or Hauser et al. 2014).
This hidden information basically avoids that generations think about the last one as a pure dummy which is not
supposed to take any decision.
13 It is important to remark that given the structure of the game players belonging to the same group are endowed with
symmetric opportunities, that is among the players who belong to a single generation there are neither formal nor
substantial differences. In the game differences between players are exclusively relevant with regard to the group
position in the chain. Therefore within this design one of the two problems linked to the unsuccessful international
agreements on climate actions, that is the distribution of individual costs, is basically put aside. Indeed within a
situation of perfectly symmetric roles there are not formal reasons to distribute costs  unequally.  However,  this
simplification does not make the experiment less useful in order to solve the climate change issue: if nations were
not able to reach an agreement in a situation of symmetry, a fortiori we could not expect a widely shared agreement
in the case of asymmetric costs and benefits. Therefore our experiment constitutes an important preliminary step in
understanding international agreements on the reduction of greenhouse gases.
14 Players with the best guess were rewarded with €2 extra. Given the symmetry of the roles within each group, in
order to determine the player(s) with the best guess we adopted a simple sum of absolute distances between the
guess and the actual choices. See Appendix B for further details.
15 The technology is known and identical for every group in the sequence.
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- if in the common pool players leave a total of €5 or less, the common pool is emptied and
the chain  breaks  up,  with  the  consequences  that  all  the  following generations  cannot  take any
decision and do not get paid.
An experimental session lasts up to the point that all chains either get to their natural end or
break up.
The  minimum material  threshold  of  €6  has  a  clear  interpretation.  It  simulates  the  threat
embodied in the climate change: if the present generation overexploits the environment and does
not constrain itself in consuming some available resources which actually increase its own welfare,
it does that at the expense of all the future generations. On the contrary, if the players of the group
called to take a decision (present generation) coordinate for not overexploiting the environment and
for leaving a minimum amount of resources for the next generation, the latter can enjoy the same
opportunities as the former. However, some clarifications are due about what was described so far.
It might be argued that the endowment level and the minimum threshold should not be fixed
amounts, but they should be rather represented by a spectrum of values, proportionally adjusted
according to the resources left by the previous generation. Thus, if one generation complies with the
minimum threshold, the next generations should deal with the same situation (same endowment
amount and same threshold).  And this  is  true  also  for  our  experiment.  However,  if  the  current
generation saves more (less) than what required by the minimum threshold, the next one should
have a higher (lower) endowment and face a higher (lower) threshold. In other words, the effect of
the savings should not have a binary effect of zero or one on the continuation of the chain, but they
should affect the possibilities of the following generation in a proportional manner.
This kind of design, despite being less dramatic and at the same time more realistic than ours,
leads to two complications that are not indifferent from the experimental point of view. First of all,
in the veil treatment (see the next paragraphs) participants should vote a set of multiple principles
and thresholds,  depending on the possible levels of the endowment.  This  would complicate the
agreement phase, unless we introduce very general principles like “withdraw the amount which
makes your chain sustainable over time” against “save as much as you wish being unconcerned
about the effects that your decision might have on your chain”.
Second, varying the endowment levels, and therefore the thresholds across generations would
make heavier the interpretation of the data with regards the ex-post phase. Indeed, we could not
really compare, for instance, the choices of a generation with an endowment of €21 and a saving
threshold of 6€, one with an endowment with €24 and with a sustainable threshold of €7 and a
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generation with only €12 as endowment and a target of only €3, because they would depend too
much on the choices made by the previous generations.
Thus we modelled the experiment in order to avoid the mentioned issues and the choice of
refilling the  pool  up  to  the  same initial  level  (however  not  new in  the  experimental  literature,
Hauser  et al.  2014),  despite it  might appear unrealistic,  it  was made to facilitate the agreement
framework in the veil treatment and to facilitate the interpretation of the compliance task. Indeed,
having one unique and certain level of endowment ensures that each group reaches the agreement in
the same structural conditions. Besides, in this way the compliance decision is less dependent from
the actions taken by the previous generations. 
In short, we tried to simplify as much as possible de decision-making frame, such that the
participants could entirely focus their attention on the main concern: in order to take into account
the interests of future generations in a fair way, avoiding the global warming consequences, each
generation must coordinate (constrain itself)  to reduce today the consumption natural resources.
Instead,  if  active  players  (those  who  enter  the  dictator  role  time  after  time)  do  not  take  into
sufficient  consideration the interests  of the following groups, the former  can seriously harm all
future generations.
At the end of the experiment a general socio-demographic questionnaire was provided.
4.2.1 The veil treatment and its interpretation
The veil  treatment,  which  adopts  the  Rawlsian  insights  to  address  the  concern  for  future
generations, adds to the baseline treatment described above a preliminary stage where the three
players of every single group have to reach an (intragenerational) agreement in order to enter the
(intergenerational) group dictator game. In particular, at the beginning of the experimental session
every  group  is  asked  to  unanimously  agree  on  one  the  two  following  rules  dealing  with  the
management of the common endowment:
- Continuation of the chain: each participant of my group should withdraw a maximum of €5
from the common account, ensuring in this way a minimum total saving of €6 that allows the chain
to continue16
16 This rule is meant to represent scheme consistent with Rawls’s just saving principle.
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- Interruption of the chain: having the possibility to do it each participant of my group should
withdraw from the common more than €5, even if that means interrupting the chain.
As  mentioned,  in  order  to  enter  the  sequential  game  every  group  is  asked  to  reach  a
unanimous agreement behind a veil of ignorance, that is before being assigned to a position in a
chain.  Therefore,  consistently  with  Rawls’s  setting,  while  groups  of  contemporaries  vote  for  a
principle aimed at managing the appropriation of common resources over  time,  they do so not
knowing the generation (position) they belong in the history (chain).
Before moving to the predictive hypothesis, two specific features of the veil treatment deserve
attention.
In the first instance, we need to clarify the interpretation we give either about those groups
who might not reach an agreement in the voting phase of the veil treatment or about those groups
who formally reach an agreement, but cannot de facto play any game because a previous group of
players left less than €6 in the common pool, breaking in this way the chain up.
With  regard  to  the  first  case,  the  interpretation  seems  to  be  quite  intuitive.  Groups
(generations) that do not reach an agreement end up with living in the so called “state of nature”. In
other words generations who do not agree to enter a society built on the cooperative attitude and on
mutual  advantage  enter  anyway  the  intergenerational  chain  (the  history),  but  they  do  not  put
themselves in  the  minimum essential  condition  to  exploit  the  available  resources  (the  common
endowment of €21). We have to imagine a situation where fossil fuels are fully available in the
nature  and  ready to  be exploited.  Nevertheless,  the  generation  of  people  who did  not  reach  a
preliminary agreement can only look at those resources without being able to “touch” them, because
the interested parties did not agree on how to cooperate in order to organize their extrapolation.
Thus, people who did not reach an agreement come to the existence but they live in poverty because
they cannot exploit the available resources.
As  far  as  the  second  case  is  concerned,  the  interpretation  seems  to  be  even  more
straightforward. Even if a group agreed to enter a society based on the cooperative ttitude, they end
up with living in minimal conditions as well. However this time it is not for their own (missing)
willingness too coordinate and too cooperate, but because some of the previous generations did not
leave enough resources to allow their society to be wealthy enough. In this case we have to imagine
a situation where the unlucky society, despite having reached an agreement, observes that fossil
fuels (the common endowment of €21) are not physically available because previous generations
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overexploited the nature. In this perspective the unlucky generation basically pays the consequences
of the global warming generated by the previous unconstrained behaviours.
Thus, the two mentioned situations are identical about the substantial material consequences
of the existing generations. In none of the cases they can enjoy the common endowment. However,
they are  the  result  of  different  causes:  they  do not  coordinate in  the first  case;  they suffer  the
decisions of other groups in the second case.
Second, it is important to remember how the agreement reached behind the veil of ignorance
is not conceived by Rawls as binding. Said otherwise,  after  the veil  is dropped and groups are
assigned  to  a  chain  and  to  a  position,  the  outcome  of  the  agreement  is  not  automatically
implemented (like it was did in other intergenerational experiments, e.g. Hauser et al. 201417).
Thus, in our design, generations that are called to take a decision are not constrained by any
external enforcement mechanism to apply the principle of the agreement reached behind the veil of
ignorance. This implies that in the veil treatment the sequential dictator game exactly replicates the
baseline treatment, and the compliance to the agreement is left to an individual choice. Again, this is
a realistic structure since in the real world we have no formal institutions which can substantially
constrain  the  present  generation to  care  about  the  future  ones,  even if  formal  intergenerational
norms are the outcome of a fair procedure.
4.3 Predictive hypothesis
Given the theoretical framework and the experimental design described so far it is possible to
formulate the predictive hypothesis of our game. Our first hypothesis regards the baseline treatment
and it  follows from standard economic assumptions18.  Without any other formal element in the
17 The mentioned practice is considered unrealistic. Even though the authors justify the binding vote as a good proxy
for  informal  institutions  which  usually  enforce  cooperative  attitudes  (like  punishments  or  rewards),  those
enforcement mechanisms work only when there are repeated interactions among the same subjects, so that paying a
cost now (punishing) can generate long-term benefits. Indeed, this kind of institutions cannot be as much effective
in one-shot games as in repeated games. In their Intergenerational Good Game there are no reasonable motivations
(except maybe spitefulness) to punish another player who did not comply with the approved rule since there will
not  be  a  second chance to  interact.  A player  could  only  loose  utility  by  materially  punishing  somebody  else
belonging to the same group (generation). Therefore, the pretension to assimilate a binding vote to an informal
institution which can  enforce  cooperation has  to  be  considered ambitious,  at  least  for  a  context  simulating an
intergenerational game played sequentially.
18 Except for special cases (Bardsley 2008, Cherry et al. 2002 and List 2007) threshold established in our experiment
(6/21) mirrors exactly the average amount of money left by dictators (28.5%) to dummy players (Engel 2011).
However, the impossibility to coordinate represents a non.-indifferent obstacle to allow chains to continue, since
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game, the sub-perfect equilibrium is represented by the triple (€7, €7, €7) for every (so also the
first) generation in any chain. Therefore players in the first generation participants are expected to
appropriate the total available endowment, leaving no resources in the common pool. This means
that  the chains will  not  be  sustainable,  that  is  they  will  not  continue  after  the  first  generation,
because the choices of the first group undermine the entire scheme of cooperation over time. Thus,
H1: in the baseline treatment the generations number 1 will mostly break all the chains up
Our second hypothesis concerns the veil treatment ant it directly follows from the Rawlsian
theory. As we have seen, according to Rawls, groups behind the veil of ignorance should agree “on
a path over time which treats all generations justly during the whole course of a society’s history”
(Rawls 1999, p. 257). More precisely, players should agree on a just saving principle, according to
which  “each  generation  makes  a  contribution  to  those  coming  later  and  receives  from  its
predecessors” (Rawls 1999, p. 254). Therefore, in order to guarantee a positive amount of savings
to each generation, allowing in this way the chains to continue, behind the veil of ignorance most of
the groups are expected to agree on a rule which somehow constrains a pure self-interest behaviour.
In short,  participants  will  agree that  each  individual  should withdraw a maximum €5 from the
common endowment.
H2: in the veil treatment, because of the impartial perspective, during the voting phase groups will
mostly  agree  on  the  rule  representing  the  Rawlsian  just  saving  principle  which  guarantees  the
continuation of the chain
The  third  assumption  follows  as  much  from  Rawls’s  social  contract  theory  as  from the
experimental literature based on it:  although the agreement behind the veil  of ignorance is  not
conceived as binding, individual compliance to the chosen principle is expected to be high even in
those cases where  players  face  a  counter-maximizing situation.  Instead,  this  is  not  true for the
standard economic theory. Indeed, since the agreement does not introduce any formal constrain
mechanism, every individual in the decision-making phase should follow his purely selfish impulse,
claiming €7 regardless of the chosen principle behind the veil of ignorance.
In particular, the so called exclusion game (Degli Antoni et. al 2016, Faillo et al. 2008, Faillo
et al. 2014, Sacconi and Faillo 2005, Sacconi and Faillo 2010 and Tammi 2011) inquired from an
one purely selfish dictator can nullify the effort of the other two.
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experimental  point  of  view  the  Rawlisan  concept  of  the  sense  of  justice  (Rawls  1999).  The
exclusion game is a one-shot resource allocation game contemplating a preliminary voting stage
carried out behind the veil of ignorance, where the participants are prevented from knowing their
role in the actual game (dictator or dummy).
In the game the agreement concerning the sharing rule is not binding, therefore players who
are assigned the dictator roles are supposed to pursue their own interest regardless of the rule agreed
in the voting stage. This is a clear analogy with the situation faced by the present generation in our
intergenerational experiment. The experimental evidence of the exclusion game showed how the
(unconstrained) ex-post compliance with the ex-ante chosen distributive norms is unexpectedly high
even in those cases where groups agreed on an egalitarian (counter-maximizing) distributive rule19.
Therefore we expect that
H3: in the veil treatment the individuals will comply with the rule agreed with the intragenerational
agreement
 
The fourth and last hypothesis becomes a logical sum of the previous two: if groups agree on
an  intergenerational  sustainable  behaviour  (just  saving  principle),  and  if  they  comply  with  the
chosen norm, chains will continue up to the last generation.
H4:  compared to  the  baseline  treatment,  in  the  veil  treatment a significantly  higher  number  of
chains will continue until their natural end
The just mentioned hypothesis might be also formulated in other two equivalent manners
H4a: the proportion of people claiming an amount of €5 or less will be significantly higher in the
veil treatment than in the baseline condition
H4b: the average individual claim will be lower in the veil condition than in the baseline treatment
19 However, it is important to keep in mind the dissimilarity between the exclusion game and our intergenerational
agreement: the agreement of the former includes all the least advantaged individual (the dummy player), while the
latter in the voting phase leaves out the direct stakeholders. This might have an impact on the reciprocal conformity
and therefore on compliance. See also footnote number 5.
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4.4 Data analysis and comment
All the experimental sessions took place in  the Computable and Experimental  Economics
Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento. They were run using the free software for economic
experiments zTree (Fischbacher 2007). All the participants took part in the experiment after a public
call.
In the experimental laboratory participants were randomly assigned to a computer terminal.
All  the  emplacements  were  isolated  by  separation  walls  to  avoid  communication  between  the
individuals. The participants were given paper instructions and the instructions were also read aloud
to ensure common knowledge. In the final questionnaire participants declared on average that the
provided instructions were very clear (4.6 on average, where 1 = not at all clear, and 5 = very clear).
Before the actual experiment could start, in the baseline (veil) treatment 4 (6) control questions
about the structure of the game were asked.
The experiment involved a total of 141 participants (60 in the veil treatment and 81 in the
baseline treatment). On average the participants were 22 years old, 54% of them were females and
46% of the total participants were enrolled in programs related to the economic discipline, the rest
in other fields going from humanities to natural sciences. The participants were privately paid in
cash at the end of each session and on average they earned about €6 (included the show-up fee of
€3). Each experimental session lasted most 50 minutes.
In the baseline treatment we run 4 sessions with a total of 8 chains distributed as shown in
Table 1.
Table 1 – Distribution of chains per session in the baseline treatment
Session Number of chains Chains' length (n. generations)
1 2 2 and 5
2 2 2 and 4
3 2 2 and 5
4 2 3 and 4
In the baseline treatment 6 chains out of 8 (that is 75%) broke up after the choices made by
players belonging to the first generation. In the two remaining chains (session 1 and 3), despite
having only two generations, the second generations substantially behaved such that they would
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have broken their chains up. Thus out of 81 participants only 30 (37%) of them played in the active
role of the game taking an actual decision. These first data are sufficient to support  H1: in the
baseline treatment chains (mostly) brake up after the first generation.
In  the  baseline  treatment  active  players  withdrew  on  average  €5.30  from  the  common
endowment believing that the other two players in the group claimed €5.20 on average. These last
data shows an interesting empirical regularity which was not taken into account by the predictive
hypothesis: generations in the baseline treatment waste resources20, because on average they left in
the common pool 1.70€. In the game this amount of money is substantially destroyed since it is not
distributed to anybody. Indeed, despite left by the active players with the hope to support the next
generation, that average amount was not enough to allow the chains to continue.
Seen from another point of view, we can claim that some players are altruistic individuals.
Indeed, they renounce to consume (to withdraw) a part of their individual endowment without any
possibility to be directly reciprocated by the future generations. More specifically, it can be said that
they are intergenerationally altruistic, because they take into account the interests of possible future
generations at expenses of their own material payoff. However their good purposes are nullified by
the actions of a minority of players who do not do their part in contributing to the savings.
With  regards  to  the  preliminary  voting  stage  of  the  veil  treatment  all  groups  reached  a
unanimous agreement on a rule by the second round (out of six available). In particular, 18 out of
20 groups agreed on the sustainable rule labelled  “continuation of the  chain”.  Therefore  H2 is
supported by the data too, because most of the participants (54 people, representing the 90%) voted
for the just saving principle. 
In the veil treatment there was a total of 6 chains divided in 3 sessions (Table 2).
Table 2 – Distribution of chains per session in the veil treatment
Session Number of chains Chains' length (n. generations)
1 2 2 and 5
2 2 2 and 4
3 2 3 and 4
20 In general all active groups left in the common pool at least €2. A total of €36 was left to the experimenters.
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After the agreement phase 80% of those participants who could take a decision complied with
the rule chosen behind the (laboratory) veil. Thus, data support also H3, because the majority of the
participants followed the approved rule even when that was against their own material interest.
Nevertheless, although participants mostly choose the just saving principle and even though
they mostly complied with that rule, as in the baseline treatment in the veil treatment no one chain
continued after the second generation. Therefore, H4 is rejected by the empirical data, because no
one chain reached its natural end as predicted.
That H4 is not supported follows also from the rejection of the equivalent hypothesis. H4a is
rejected since between treatments the proportion of players claiming an amount of €5 or less is
exactly the same and corresponding to 0.7.
In  the  same  way  H4b is  rejected  because  in  the  veil  treatment  the  players  claimed  for
themselves an average share of the common endowment not statistically different (two tails Welch t
of  student  test  is  t=  -0.78,  with  a  corresponding  p-value  of  0.44)  from the baseline  treatment,
withdrawing on average €5.5021. The comparison between treatments is shown in Chart 1.
Chart 1 – Individual average claim and average belief (€) per treatment
claim belief
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
baseline
veil
The undifferentiated behaviour which leads to the rejection of H4b and therefore of H4 can be
highlighted also with a  simple linear  model  (1) where the individual  claim is  regressed on the
treatment (dummy variable, where the baseline assumes the value 0), on the generation (position in
the chain), on the average belief (in €) plus a series of control demographical factors. The model
clusters the standard error per single groups (Table 3).
21 In the veil treatment the broken chains left to the experimenter a total of €21. Therefore in the veil treatment active
players wasted on average €1.40.
131
(1) individualclaimi=α+β1 treatment i+β2generationi+β3averagebelief i+controlsi+εi
From the econometric estimation of the model we can see that there is not any statistically
significant difference in the average claim between the two treatments. Among the main predictors,
only the average beliefs on the others’ withdrawal and the generation number had a strong and
significant effect on the individual choice. In other words, a higher expectation of €1 on the others’
withdrawal and belonging to the second generation (the last generation who actively played in our
game) in both cases increased the average claim of about €0.5.
Even though the veil treatment did not show the expected effect on the individual claim and
therefore on the chains sustainability,  there is  a further interesting comparison between the two
conditions  we  may  look  at.  In  particular,  in  the  veil  treatment  only  50%  of  the  chains  were
interrupted by the first generation (compared to the 75% of the baseline treatment). Thus, thanks to
the agreement 45% (27 out of 60) of the participants who took part in the veil treatment had the
possibility to make an active choice, while that ratio lowers to 37% (30 out of 81 subjects) with
regards to the baseline treatment. However, in the perspective of our experiment, these results do
not lead to different conclusions given that they are not statistically significant (chi square test 0.29
on the proportion of participants who actively chose).
4.5 A less radical experimental design
The results showed in the previous sections highlighted what should be considered a limit of
our  experimental  design:  even  though  in  the  veil  treatment  of  our  experiment  the  average
compliance rate (about 80%) is high and consistent with the previous empirical evidence provided
by the exclusion game, this percentage seems to be low compared to the 100% of compliance (to
the just saving principle) necessary in the intergenerational game to allow the chains to continue.
In other words, in our experiment a society is sustainable, that is a chain can continue only if
compliance to the just saving principle is total. This situation is very interesting from an ethical
point  of  view, because climate change may present  us with a singular situation wherein a high
percentage of compliance is not enough to protect the future generations against possible disasters,
such that a little degree of deception can cause very bad consequences for the whole humanity.
However, this theoretical result seems to be too demanding from a pragmatic point of view: it is
utopian to expect perfect voluntary compliance, as much in an experiment as in the real world.
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Table 3 – Determinants of individual claimsFull model Pooled modeltreatment 0.18 (0.296)generation  0.53 (0.267) * 0.53 (0.266) *average belief 0.48 (0.113) ** 0.50 (0.119) **clearness instruction 0.35 (0.134) ** 0.38 (0.125) **number previous experiments 0.04 (0.005) ** 0.03 (0.007) **age - 0.07 (0.080) -0.08 (0.066)gender - 0.39 (0.264) -0.37 (0.268)nationality 0.75 (0.307) ** 0.81 (0.265) **field of studies - 0.4 (0.218) -0.07 (0.206)years of studies 0.11 (0.108) 0.13 (0.106)risk attitude 0.04 (0.037) 0.04 (0.038)family yearly income 0.24 (0.110) ** 0.25 (0.111) **general economic situation 0.55 (0.213) ** 0.45 (0.200) **Participants 141Number of observations 48b* significant at 5%** significant at 1% Adjusted R-squared 0.6013 0.6052F-statistic p-value 6.5e-07 2.9e-07a  The variable instructions refers to the comprehensibility of the initial instructions (ranging from 0 to 5), experimentsis the number of previous experiments,  age the personal age,  gender is a binary dummy for the gender (male = 0),nationality is a dummy variable for the nationality (0 Italian, 1 foreigner), field of studies and year studies refer to theundertaken studies (the first one is a dummy variable, where the value 0 corresponds to economic disciplines, whereas 0to any other field, the second one is a discrete variable),  risk is a subjective statement about the risk attitude (1 riskadverse, 10 risk seeker), income and economic situation measure respectively the yearly family income and the currenteconomic status (both are discrete variables and range from 1, very low/bad, to 5, very high/excellent).b  The number of the observations is lower than stated so far because we could not collect the demographic statementsof three participants in the baseline treatment, so the model drops those data. However, those three observations did notinfluence the outcome since the model considering only the three fundamental variables (treatment, average belief andgeneration) do not differ from the one presented here 
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Besides this  speculative consideration,  our non-positive result  requires  a deeper reflection
which goes beyond the simple compliance rate. In particular, if we look closer at the distribution of
the withdrawals in the two treatments (Table 4) we can better  understand why our institutional
mechanism of the veil of ignorance did not work as predicted. In the Table 4 within-group claims
were ordered in ascending triples order, moving from the left column (player with a low claim) to
the  right  (player  with  a  medium  and  high  claim).  Furthermore,  we  highlighted  in  grey  the
participants who withdrew €6 or €7.
Table 4 – Distribution of individual claims (average belief) per treatment and group
BASELINE TREATMENT VEIL TREATMENT
Player low Player med. Player high Player low Player med. Player high
4
(4.5)
4 
(4.5)
4
(4.5)
5
(5)
5
(5)
5
(5)
4
(4)
5
(2.5)
7
(6)
5
(5)
5
(5)
7
(5)
5
(5)
7
(6.5)
7
(7)
4
(4.5)
5
(5)
5
(5)
4
(5)
5
(5)
7
(6)
5
(5)
5
(5)
7
(5)
4
(5)
5
(4.5)
7
(6)
5
(5)
5
(7)
7
(7)
5
(5)
5
(5)
5
(7)
4
(5.5)
5
(5)
7
(5)
5
(5)
5
(5)
6
(7)
5
(5)
5
(5)
5
(5)
4
(4)
5
(5)
7
(7)
5
(5)
5
(6.5)
7
(7)
5
(2)
5
(5.5)
6
(6)
7
(7)
7
(7)
7
(7)
5
(5)
5
(5)
7
(7)
As pointed out also earlier in the Chapter, given the structure of our game one high claim (€6
or €7) in a group is  sufficient  to  undermine the  entire  scheme of intragenerational cooperation
necessary for the intergenerational continuation of the chain. In particular, from the Table 4 we can
clearly observe how the agreement phase of the veil treatment did not produce any effect on the
participants who seek to withdraw a high amount from the common pool. Therefore there is a share
of subjects which is somehow immune to the impartial agreement since the last one cannot change
134
their  psychological  equilibrium.  This  observation,  together  with  the  consideration  that  it  is
necessary a total compliance for making the chains sustainable over time, is probably at the basis of
the unwanted results of our experiment.
In order to mitigate the veto power in the ex-post phase described above, we designed a new
experiment. In the new design the chains were not broken definitely up by the defection of one
player in the group. Instead, every chain was shortened proportionally to the savings left for the
next  generation.  This  time the  common fund was  of  €18 and  the threshold  to  leave the chain
unaltered was settled at €9 (50%of the initial endowment). If the group of one generation saved less
than the threshold level, the chain was shortened of one generation if they saved between €9 and €6
(excluded),  of  two  generations  if  the  group  saved  between  €6  and  €3  (excluded),  of  three
generations if the group saved €3 or less.
This structure implies that the decisions of a single player could have limited consequences on
the destiny  of  all  future generations.  We also  modified  marginally  the  two rules  on which the
participants were asked to vote to adapt them to the new design. We left unaltered the remaining
parts of the initial design (groups formation, elicitation of beliefs etc.).
This time we involved 81 participants of the University Milano Bicocca to take part in the
new veil treatment. 60% of the participants were male and 75% of them enrolled in courses related
to the economic discipline. On average they were 24 years old.
We run the experiment in the computer lab of the Department of Economics of the University
and paid the participants with book coupons they could spend in a library close to the mentioned
Department. We run three separate sessions including two chains constituted of two generations,
three chains of five generations and two chains of four generations. At the end of the experiment the
average payoff was about €6.
This time in the preliminary voting stage only 16 groups out of 27 (59%) agreed on the just
saving  principle,  casting  doubt  on  the  solidity  of  our  H2.  Besides,  among  the  groups  who
unanimously agreed of the just saving principle and took an active decision, only 14 participants of
33 (42%) complied with the rule. Thus the average claim was of €4.3022, not sufficient to allow the
generational chains to continue until their natural end: indeed none of the chains continued after the
second generation.
Given these preliminary results, we decided not to run the baseline treatment for this version
of the experiment.
22 The average belief of those participants was of €3.50.
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Conclusions
Relying on Rawls’s  intergenerational  social  contract  theory  and some  of  its  experimental
evidence, through our laboratory experiment we tried to address the modern issue regarding the
climate change agreements. In doing so we left aside the problem concerning the distribution of
costs  between  contemporaries  (nations)  assuming  symmetrical  situations  between  the  players
belonging  to  the  same generational  group.  Therefore  we  focused on  the  pure  intergenerational
problem,  trying  to  see  if  the  Rawlsian  theory  could  help  to  structure  a  fair  intragenerational
agreement for the intergenerational distribution of resources.
The experimental results showed that a laboratory veil of ignorance induces people to reach
an ex-ante fair agreement concerning the management of common resources over time and that the
voted rule was consistent with Rawls’s just saving principle. At the same time, however, in the first
version of the experiment the compliance to that principle, despite being high, was not sufficient to
allow chains to survive significantly longer than in the baseline treatment, where no agreements
were possible.
Even after we modified the experimental design in order to mitigate the dramatic effects of
the partial  compliance  observed in  the  first  experimental  version,  the  general  outcome did  not
change,  because  the  chains  always  interrupted  within  the  first  two  generation.  However,  the
common result  of the  two experiments leads to two conclusions  that  somehow differentiate.  In
particular,  in  the  first  design  the  conformity  model  seemed  to  work  properly,  but  the  general
structural conditions were too demanding to produce the expected results. Vice versa, in the second
version of the  experiment the  model  of  conformist  social  preferences did not  seem to work as
supposed, because beliefs on others’ compliance did not play a significant role. Thus, in both cases
the veil of ignorance was not able to produce the sufficient conditions for a sustainable society over
time, but for different reasons.
In  general  however,  it  seems  that  the  sense  of  justice  to  an  impartial  agreement  is  not
triggered when a set of people X agrees to undertake a specific redistributive action towards a set of
people Y (different from X). In other words, when the subjects representing the weakest part are not
included in the formal agreement, the conformist preference model is made lane and cannot show
its full power. As highlighted several times, within the Rawlsian theory a set of contemporaries is
called  to  evaluate  distributive  principles  that  will  produce  effects  on  third  parties  (future
generations) who formally cannot take part in the contract. And this structure exactly implies that
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the ex-post redistributive actions of mutual advantage (the savings) are not directed towards the
same set of people (the contemporaries) who agreed on the intergenerational principle.
In conclusion, the Rawlisan sense of justice, based on mutual expectation of compliance and
which is supposed to be the glue that fosters the general compliance to an impartial redistributive
principle,  does not  enter  into  play  when a  set  of individuals  has to choose  distributive  actions
towards some subjects who are left outside of the agreement itself. This might be do to the fact that
in the ex-post phase the outside-parties cannot enter a mutually beneficial relationship with the
agreement-parties. This is quite evident in the intergenerational setting, where the future generations
cannot  directly  cooperate  with  the  present  one,  and  the  absence  reciprocal  expectations  of
compliance between generations might undermine the intergenerational fairness.
These are only preliminary conclusions we can draw from the analysis of our experiment, but
further research seems to be necessary to disentangle better the sense of justice between the two
situations where the weakest parts are included or not in the agreement moment, because without
the  sense  of  justice  there  cannot  be  compliance  to  the  redistributive  principle;  and  without
compliance we cannot expect chains to continue.
At this stage, the big issue on how to structure international agreements on climate actions
keeps open.
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Appendix A: Rawlsian intergenerational justice and derivation of the just saving principle
The starting  point  of  the  reflection  of  John Rawls  concerning the allocation  of  resources
between generations is an extension of the main hypothesis of his social contract theory, which
portrays the human society as a cooperative venture for the mutual advantage (Rawls 1999, p. 4).
Thus Rawls assumes that “life of a people is conceived as a scheme of cooperation spread out in
historical  time”  (Rawls  1999,  p.  257,  emphasis  added,  Rawls  1977,  p.  161 and  Rawls  2001).
Therefore,  according  to  Rawls,  it  is  necessary  to  agree  “on  a  path  over  time  which  treats  all
generations justly during the whole course of a society’s history” (Rawls 1999, p. 257).
Since for Rawls “persons in different generations have duties and obligations to one another
just  as  contemporaries  do”  (Rawls  1999,  p.  258)  and  since  according  to  him justice  between
generations “is to be governed by the same conception of justice that regulates the cooperation of
contemporaries”  (Rawls  1999,  p.  257)  it  might  be  reasonable  to  extend  the  standard
(intragenerational) principles of justice (Rawls 1999, pp. 47-101)23 over the time dimension.
Even more relevant for the present discussion about redistribution of resources, given the just
mentioned similarities,  it  might be intuitive to  adopt the canonical  formulation of the so called
difference principle24 to regulate the allocation of resources between generations. After all Rawls
himself explicitly claims how the “appropriate expectation in applying the difference principle is
that of the long-term prospects of the least favored extending over future generations” (Rawls 1999,
p.  252).  Thus  it  seems  that  the  difference  principle,  when  fully  applied,  has  to  take  into
consideration and to operate on two dimensions, space and time.
However, almost contradicting his own claims, Rawls remarks through many passages how
the difference principle’s prescriptions have to be realized exclusively within an intragenerational
context.  Indeed,  in  Rawls’s  opinion,  the  difference  principle  is  inadequate  to  discipline  the
allocation of resources between generations because of its undesirable consequences: "for when the
difference principle is applied to the question of saving over generations, it entails either no saving
at all or not enough saving to improve social circumstances sufficiently so that all the equal liberties
can be effectively exercised" (Rawls 1999, pp. 253-254)
23 "The first principle simply requires that certain sorts of  rules,  those defining basic liberties,  apply to everyone
equally and that they allow the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all" (Rawls 1999, p. 56),
meanwhile  the  second  principle  of  justice,  the  so  called  difference  principle,  prescribes  to  "maximize  the
expectations of the least favored position" (Rawls 1999, p. 69).
24 For a complete presentation of the difference principle see (Rawls 1999, pp. 52-65, pp.130-9 and pp. 153-160).
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In other words, “since the persons in the original position know that they are contemporaries
[...] they can favor their generation by refusing to make any sacrifices at all” for the others (Rawls
1999, p. 121). Here Rawls tries to suggest that since the parties involved in the agreement (who are
contemporaries)  are  instrumentally  rational  and  they  desire  to  maximize  first  of  all  their  own
expectations25, it is not legitimate to expect, from the generation involved in the agreement, any
renounce of  resources  which  could  benefit  (the  least  advantaged)  people  in  another  generation
(Rawls 1999, pp. 254-255, Attas 2009, p. 190 and Buchanan 1987, p. 250). However, this way of
reasoning  cannot  be  compatible  with  the  most  deep  meaning  of  the  difference  principle  itself
(Dasgupta 1974, pp. 330-337)
Besides, even if a difference principle was conceivable for the intergenerational framework,
there would be no way to act on the past (Brandstedt 2017, p. 270), that is, the criterion could be
applied only from the moment of the “entry in society”26 onward, while it would be impossible to
carry out its prescriptions towards any previous generation. For example, if the least advantaged
subjects, after the veil is dropped, were located in the past (in a moment “before” the agreement),
there would not be any concrete way to fully realize the difference principle’s (intergenerational)
prescriptions27. As for this point is concerned Rawls is extremely clear: “there is no way for later
generations to help the situation of the least fortunate earlier generation” since “it is a natural fact
that generations are spread out in time and actual economic benefits flow only in one direction”
(Rawls 1999, p. 254).
Therefore in Rawls’s opinion the difference principle is not a suitable tool to deal with the
redistribution of resources across time: “thus the difference principle does not hold for the question
of justice between generations and the problem [...] must be treated in some other manner” (Rawls
1999,  p.  254).  Rawls  therefore  proposes  the  just  saving  principle  as  the  normative  solution  to
guarantee  intergenerational  redistributive  fairness.  Thus  “the  difference  principle  holds  within
generations” while “the principle of just saving holds between generations” (Rawls 2001, p. 159).
“The just savings principle applies to what a society is to save as a matter of justice” (Rawls
1999, p. 255) and “in following a just savings principle, each generation makes a contribution to
25 In terms of primary social goods, that "are things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he wants"
(Rawls 1999 p. 79). See also (Rawls 1999, pp. 78-81)
26 As  highlighted  many  times  by  Rawls,  the  original  agreement  is  hypothetical,  therefore  the  words  "moment",
"before", "after" and so on and so forth have to be taken with the right caution and interpreted coherently with the
context.
27 This way of reasoning is in line with the idea that within an intergenerational context “ought implies can” (Partridge
2017) and the worst-off should be accessible (Gaspart et al. 2007, p. 203), no matter the generation they belong .
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those coming later and receives from its predecessors” (Rawls 1999, p. 254). However Rawls does
not describe in detail the particular features of the mentioned intergenerational principle (like for
example providing a specific saving rate or a scheme of rates). Instead he limits himself to sketch
some general ethical restriction that the contractual parties should take into account in defining the
saving path (Rawls 1999, pp. 255-6).
Nevertheless here it is not of particular interest to linger on those, although reasonable, ethical
concerns. Instead it is relevant to understand which is the positive reasoning offered by Rawls to
substitute the inadequate difference principle with the just saving principle. He essentially proceeds
in two parallel steps:
- first of all Rawls restates the intergenerational redistrivutive problem. The parties behind the
veil of ignorance are aware of the natural flow of the economic benefits (which is a general and
unalterable  circumstance),  therefore  the  new  issue  becomes  to  understand  how  the  generation
involved in the agreement can fairly treat not all the possible generations of the history but only the
subsequent ones;
-  second,  in  order  to  induce  the  subjects  involved in  the  agreement  to think not  only  as
contemporaries but to take into consideration also the future generations, Rawls amends his own
theory  and  adds  an  intergenerational  motivational  interest  assuming  that  “the  parties  represent
family lines", that is, they "care at least about their more immediate descendants” (Rawls 1999, p.
255 and Brandstedt 2017, p. 276).
These  are  the  further  specifications  introduced  by  John  Rawls  in  order  to  deal  with  the
peculiarities regarding the distribution of resources between generations within his social contract
theory. Thus, reminding how the subjects behind the veil of ignorance are unaware of the historical
period they belong and adding to this premise a carefulness for the closer future generations (the
“family line” assumption), the parties involved in the agreement naturally derive the just saving
principle28.
One important feature of the just saving principle is its duration. In fact, the principle is not
required to apply forever, but the resources have to be moved towards future generations only until
the specific task which the principle was designed for is accomplished. In particular “once just
28 Rawls  concludes  his  intergenerational  theory  adding  a  really  important  elucidation  concerning  the  just  saving
principle,  outlined  as  a  formula  to represent  the  duty  to  sustain  just  institutions  across  time.  In  particular  he
specifies how “the difference principle includes the savings principle as a constraint” (Rawls 1999, p. 258). That
means that before applying the difference principle it  is  necessary to fulfil  the requirements  of  the just  saving
principle. Said otherwise “the just savings principle demands that we leave enough capital and resources for future
generations while making transfers to our contemporary poor (as required by the difference principle)” (Heyd 2009,
p. 171).
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institutions  are  firmly  established  and  all  the  basic  liberties  effectively  realized,  the  net
accumulation asked [by the just saving principle] falls to zero” (Rawls 1999, p. 255). Therefore,
“the just savings principle can be regarded as an understanding between generations to carry their
fair share of the burden of realizing and preserving a just society” and “the end of the savings
process is set up in advance” (Rawls 1999, p. 257)29.
In this perspective, the Rawlsian intergenerational theory shows to be essentially structured in
two distinct stages: a temporary phase of accumulation where the just saving principle applies; a
steady  state  where  it  is  not  required  to  apply  any  particular  intergenerational  (redistributive)
principle (Gaspart et al. 2007, pp. 193-197, Gosseries 2008, pp. 18-19 and Gosseries 2016, pp. 79-
85).
While one fringe of the secondary literature almost uncritically accepted Rawls’s conclusions
on the just saving principle, taking them as the basis for further theories (Arrow 1973, Dasgupta
1974 and Solow 1974), the majority of the authors showed instead some perplexities about the
approach adopted by Rawls to deal with the redistribution of resources between generations within
his social contract theory.
For most of the authors Rawls’s approach to intergenerational justice appeared to be limited
and  unsatisfactory  in  its  deductions  (Mathis  2009,  Paden  1997  and  Partridge  2017).  With  his
intergenerational framework Rawls was considered to reach “a modest conclusion” (Heyd 2009, p.
187)  since  he  did  not  provide  any  particularly  elaborated  intergenerational  distributive  theory
(Gosseries 2016, p. 87). Thus, for the critical literature Rawls substantially failed to apply the veil
of ignorance design to the intergenerational context (Tremmel 2009, pp. 149-154). 
The general disappointment is  then ascribable to different  specific critiques. For example,
Gardiner (2009, p. 81) claims that the just saving principle does not treat fairly all the generations
because more concern is paid to the future generations.  Indeed,  the accumulation phases might
violate the maximin prescriptions (Gosseries 2016, p. 79) because a very high price is paid by the
first generations (Agius 2006, p. 324): this is an implicit utilitarian conclusion that Rawls tries to
avoid throughout all his contractarian theory of justice (Rawls 1999).
Besides, the motivational altruistic assumption is to be considered an ad hoc construct (Wall
2003, p.  81) that  reflects  a  conception of the good (English 1977,  p.  93)  and that  undermines
Rawls’s whole theory since it generates tensions between the Rawlsian intragenerational system and
29 This structure implies that the just  saving principle does not pay any direct attention to the worst-off (like the
difference principle does) and more in general it is not concerned with the pure redistribution of resources between
generation.  Instead,  its  main goal  seems to  be  exclusively to  secure  the  conditions for  the  realization  of  just
institutions and of a just society (Attas 2009, p. 211, Heyd 2009, p. 187, Gabor 2013 p. 305, Gosseries 2016, p. 80,
Paden 1997, pp. 28-29 and p. 38, Wall 2003, p. 93).
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his theory supposed to regulate justice between generations (English 1977 and Wall 2003): “the
postulate  of  altruistic  interest  within  the  original  position  therefore  compromises  the  whole
systematic derivation from contract theory” (Mathis 2009, p. 54).
Furthermore  the  artificial  trick  of  the  family’s  chains  substantially  eludes  the  real
intergenerational problem since according to some authors it is not possible to derive an adequate
concern for the whole future from the thin interest for the own offspring (Heyd 2009, p. 175 and
Mathis  2009,  p.  54).  In  other  words  the  “concern  for  the  future  cannot  be  understood  in
individualistic terms” (Norton 1989, p. 151).
Rawls was not indifferent to some of those critiques and tried to improve his social contract
approach  to  the  allocation  of  resources  between  generations.  In  particular  he  simplified  the
framework (Wallack 2006, p. 91), but he did not change the main outcome concerning the just
saving principle. Thus, following some hints provided by other philosophers (Rawls 2001, p. 160,
footnote 39), Rawls dropped the most controversial hypothesis within his intergenerational system,
that is the altruistic intergenerational concern.
In the last  version of his intergenerational  theory Rawls assumes that the full  compliance
condition of his ideal theory (English 1977, Heyd 2009, p. 179 and Attas 2009 p. 220) is sufficient
to  guarantee  intergenerational  fairness:  now  the  parties  in  the  original  position  are
intergenerationally disinterested but they “are to ask themselves how much [...] they are prepared to
save at each level of wealth as society advances, should all previous generations have followed the
same schedule” and “the correct principle, then, is one the members of any generation (and so all
generations) would adopt as the principle they would want preceding generations to have followed
it” (Rawls 2001, p.160)30.
However, despite the new theoretical frame, nothing new was added to the substance of the
just saving principle.
30 It is interesting to highlight how more than thirty years before the final version Rawls essentially reached the same
conclusion: “the correct principles for the basic structure are those that the members of any generation (and hence
all generations) would agree to as the ones their generation is to follow and as the principles they would want other
generations to have followed and to follow subsequently, no matter how far back or forward in time” (Rawls 1977,
p. 161)
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Appendix B: instructions for the experiment in the veil treatment
The instructions for the baseline and the veil treatment are exactly the same for what concerns the
sequential game. The latter integrate the former only with the agreement phase.
Good morning,
You  are  about  to  take  part  in  an  experiment  on  economic  decisions.  By  participating  in  the
experiment you will be able to earn an amount of money that will depend on your decisions and on
those of other participants. The decisions you make will remain completely anonymous and no one
will be able to associate your choices with your name. During the experiment you will not be allow
to communicate in any way with other participants. In case of communication you will be excluded
from the experiment without being paid.
We ask you to read carefully the instructions that have been provided to you and which you can
consult at any time during the experiment. The instructions will also be read aloud by one of the
experimenters. If at the end of the instructions you will have doubts, raise your hand and wait for
one of the experimenters to answer to your questions. At the end of the experiment you will be paid
privately in cash. To the payment depending on your decision you will earn an extra €3 as show-up
fee.
EXPERIMENT
At the beginning of the experiment you will be randomly assigned to a group of 3 participants (you
included). The experiment will then be divided into two phases and will start from the phase 1.
However, for clarity, the instructions first show the details of the phase 2
PHASE 2
Only groups that pass the phase 1 will have access to phase 2. At the beginning of phase 2, each
participant in each group will be assigned an identification letter (A, B or C). All groups that will
access the phase 2 will be randomly ordered to constitute various "chains". Within each chain each
group of three participants will represent a generation. The chains will have variable length. The
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shorter chain will be long 1, and therefore will include only one group, but there may be chains of
two, three, four, and more groups.
Each group in each chain will be then assigned a number (N) corresponding to the position of the
group within the chain. All chains will start with a group in position N = 1, which will represent the
first generation of the chain. To the second generation, if there will be, will be assigned the number
N = 2, to the third the number N = 3 and so on for all the groups which compose the chain. Even if
you will know the position of your group (N) in your chain, you will not be notified of the total
length of the chain, that is you will not know the number of generations that will be there after
yours. You will only be certain that within your chain there are other N-1 groups before your group.
For example, if your group is assigned to the position N = 3, you know that in your chain there are
other two groups in the previous positions, but you do not know how many groups there will be in
the subsequent positions.
Below is an example of chains of length 2 and 4
Figure 1 – Example of chains
PHASE 2 – DECISION
Each group that will take a decision in the phase 2 will face the same type of choice. Participants of
the group assigned to the first generation (N = 1) will be the first to make a decision within each
chain.
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At  the  time  of  the  decision,  the  group  will  have  €21  available  on  a  common  account.  Each
participant in the group will be asked to decide how many euros s/he wants to withdraw from the
common account by inserting an integer between €0 and €7. The sum that you decide to withdraw
on this occasion will constitute your final payment, to which we will add the €3 of the show-up fee.
In addition, when you will have to decide how much to withdraw from the account you will not
know how much the other members of your group have claimed for themselves.
When all the participants will have made their choices, depending on the amount of euros left on the
common account two distinct scenarios might happen:
- If the total amount left on the common account by the group (N) will be at least €6, the chain will
continue and the next group (N + 1) will enter the decision phase. In this case the sum left by the
group (N) will be completely integrated and on the common account of the next group (N + 1) there
will be again available €21.
- If the total amount left by the group (N) on the common account will be less than €6, the chain
will be interrupted and the common account will be emptied of any remaining euro. In this case, all
participants  of any subsequent groups (N + 1, N + 2, N + 3 etc.) will  not be able to take any
decision and their will be paid only the participation fee of €3.
If your group came at the decision phase,  after  the choice of how much to withdraw from the
common account you will also be asked to make a prediction on the behaviour of the other two
participants of your group. You will have to indicate the forecast by entering an integer between €0
and €7 for each of the other 2 participants in your group. The participant of the group who will
provide the best forecast will get a bonus of €2 that will be added to their final payment. If two (or
three) players provide equally accurate predictions, the bonus will be awarded to both (or all three)
participants. The best forecast will be defined according to the following rule (imagining that you
are the player A):
SCORE_A=  (distance  between  forecast_on_player_B  and  decision_of_player_B)  +  (distance
between forecast_on_player_C and decision_player_C)
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Thus the SCORE can vary between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 14. The bonus will be won
by the participant(s) whose SCORE will be smaller (or equal) than that of the other two members of
the group.
The phase 2 of the experiment will end when all the chains are either exhausted or interrupted.
PHASE 1 – AGREEMENT
In the phase 1, along with the other two players in your group formed at the beginning of the
experiment, you will have to vote to decide which rule to adopt on the management of the common
account in case your group comes to the decision moment in the phase 2. However, during phase 1
you will have to vote not knowing which generation (N position in the chain) your group belongs.
This information will be provided to you only at the beginning of the phase 2. Therefore in the
phase 1 your group will have to agree on a resource management rule before knowing which N
position the group belongs within a chain.
Each subject in your group will have to vote for the rule you prefer, choosing between the following
two:
Continuation of the chain: each participant of my group should withdraw a maximum of €5 from
the common account, ensuring in this way a minimum total saving of €6 that allows the chain to
continue
Interruption  of  the  chain:  having  the  possibility  to  do  it  each  participant  of  my  group  should
withdraw from the common more than €5, even if that means interrupting the chain
 
The resource management rule of the common account must be approved unanimously, that is the
agreement will be reached only if all the subjects belonging to the same group have voted for the
same rule. In the phase 1 you will have 6 rounds to reach unanimity. Groups that do not reach
unanimity within the 6 rounds will not be able to access the phase 2 and they will be paid only the
show-up fee.
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In the phase 2 you will then decide whether to apply the rule chosen in the phase 1, choosing to
withdraw an amount compatible with this rule, or withdraw another sum.
SYNTHESIS
PHASE  1  -  In  the  phase  1  you  will  have  to  unanimously  vote  for  the  rule  concerning  the
management of the common account in the phase 2 without knowing which generation (position) of
the chain your group belongs. The agreement on a rule is an essential prerequisite to access the
phase 2.
PHASE 2 - In the phase 2 you will know the generation (N) your group belongs in the chain and
you will have to decide whether to apply the rule unanimously chosen by the participants of your
group in the phase 1 or to withdraw a different amount.
Your final payment will therefore depend on the choices made by you and your group during the
phase 1 and the scenario in which you will be during the phase 2 and it will  be determined as
follows:
- In case your group does not reach unanimity during one of the 6 rounds of the phase 1 you will
receive only the €3 of the show-up fee 
- In the event that your group enters the phase 2 but you have not made any choices on how much to
withdraw from the common because your chain was interrupted before your group entered could
take any decision you will receive only the €3 of the show-up fee
- In case that your group enters the phase 2 and you take a decision on how much to withdraw from
the common account you will be paid €3 of the show-up fee as + the amount of money that you
have decided to withdraw from the common account + [€2 bonus in case yours is the best forecast]
Before starting with the experiment you will be asked to answer some brief control questions.
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General Conclusions:
Main Results, Limits and Insights for Future Research
The general purpose of my thesis was to model the behaviour of economic agents within three
areas – European Union integration,  tax compliance and environmental  sustainability  – using a
Rawlsian  framework.  In  particular,  the  thesis  aimed at  answering to  the  following  overarching
research  question:  is  an  impartial  and non-binding  agreement,  conceived  in  a  Rawlsian  frame,
sufficient to generate fair and stable redistributive institutions?
Before entering the specific research fields, in the Introduction of the dissertation I stated the
necessity to contextualize each economic analysis within an ethical frame. In the Appendix to the
Introduction  I  corroborated  this  thesis  showing  the  hierarchy  between  ethics  and  economics
established by Adam Smith,  largely considered as the founding father  of the modern economic
science. In particular, according to Smith’s all-encompassing project, the figure of the sympathetic
but impartial  spectator,  who represents  the  ethical  touchstone,  plays a fundamental role also in
regulating the market mechanism. The last one is based not only on mutually advantageous material
exchanges, but also on messages of moral approval or disapproval.  Said in other  words,  the so
called  homo oeconomicus has to be always conceived operating within a larger sphere of ethical
nature.  Thus,  the  precise  relationship between ethics  and economics  identified  by Adam Smith
shows  how it  is  fundamental  to  define  a  broader  context  made  of  ethical  connotations  before
proceeding with an economic inquiry.
Then I moved to set out the specific ethical frame adopted throughout the economic analysis,
that  is  John  Rawls’s  social  contract  theory.  It  was  shown  that  in  Rawls’s  ethical  system  the
constitution of a well-ordered society is essentially based on a (hypothetical) agreement between
individuals. The device of the veil of ignorance guarantees then a condition of impartiality given
that  it  excludes  the  availability  of  any  particular  information  to  the  parties  taking  part  in  the
agreement. In this way the moral norms that arise from the agreement and that are supposed to
shape the main society’s institutions are chosen independently from any subjective and accidental
condition. In particular, in the agreement under the veil of ignorance applies the maximin criterion,
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so Rawls identifies two specific principles of justice which must be complied in their lexicographic
order:  1)  to  implement a  scheme of individual  liberties  as  broad as  possible;  2) to redistribute
resources  in  order  to  maximize  the  expectations  of  the  most  disadvantaged  by  the  natural
distribution  of  social  circumstances  and individual  talents.  The second principle  of  justice  was
labelled by Rawls himself as difference principle.
I then dedicated the reminder of the Introduction to contextualize the two main areas analysed
in depth through the following Chapters: the Rawlsian approach to the international distribution of
resources, with a particular focus on the European Union case, and the empirical Rawlsian justice.
As for the latter is concerned, I specified the model of social conformist preferences at the basis of
the two experimental works
From the Chapter 1 onward I engaged in the analysis of three different economic issues under
the assumptions and the conclusions of the Rawlsian theory.
In the Chapter 1 the analysis started with ascertaining the existence  of an institutional gap
between the European economic integration and the European social integration. Within this general
context I applied Rawls’s ethical frame to the European Union. The analysis compellingly showed
that  the  constitutional  elements  which  currently  characterize  the  European  Union,  that  is  1)  a
scheme of mutually advantageous cooperation between its member states and 2) a common basic
structure, according to Rawls’s domestic theory imply a precise redistributive scheme consistent
with  the  difference  principle.  In  particular,  the  European  difference  principle  requires  that  the
resources generated by the European economic cooperation are redistributed in order to maximize
the expectations of the (group of) European citizen(s) least advantaged. A corollary that followed
this conclusion concerned European Fiscal Union, representing a possible way to pool the European
surplus and to implement the derived redistributive scheme. 
The  Chapter  2  was  developed  together  with  Luigi  Mittone.  Within  the  “slippery  slope”
framework  we  adapted  the  Rawlsian  social  contract  theory  and  some  of  its  experimental
applications to the tax compliance context.  In particular,  implementing a veil  of ignorance in  a
laboratory experiment our study aimed to analyse in depth the effects over time on tax compliance
of a non-binding agreement reached in an anonymity condition. We designed a repeated tax game
with three players and four tax regimes. With our experiment we tested two main hypothesis related
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to Rawls’s theory: 1) behind the veil of ignorance players  should vote for the tax regime most
consistent with the difference principle and 2) ex-post compliance should be non-declining over
time, even in the absence of enforcement mechanisms. The result showed that the veil of ignorance
procedure had an important effect on the votes allocation concerning the preferred tax regime and a
non-negative effect on compliance. However, the laboratory veil could not generate a stable effect
of compliance across time compared to the baseline treatment. Indeed compliance showed to be
monotonically decreasing round by round.
Chapter  3  was  written  with  the  collaboration  of  Lorenzo  Sacconi  and  Marco  Faillo.  It
addressed the modern climate change issue within a Rawslian framework. In particular the paper
focused on the two main reasons of decades where international negotiations on climate actions
failed  in  being  implemented:  1)  there  is  not  a  broad consensus  about  the  distribution  of  costs
between nations; 2) given the absence of institutions which can monitor and sanction defectors,
compliance is  fragile.  It  is  within  this  framework that  we implemented Rawls’s  social  contract
theory in order to provide useful and innovative insights to deal with climate actions agreements. In
particular, we approached the problem by means of a laboratory experiment designed on Rawls’
intergenerational justice. In his setting the individuals taking part in the agreement behind the veil
of ignorance are only contemporaries, simulating quite well the modern climate change issue. We
put  groups  of  experimental  subjects  on  chains  of  different  length,  asking  them  to  choose  an
intergenerational distributive principle before letting them know the position occupied in the chain
(veil of ignorance). The results showed that most of the groups agreed on a fair distributive rule and
After highlighting the conclusions reached in the specific areas of inquiry it is possible to
provide a common answer to the general research question at the basis of thesis. Again, the research
question  was  stated  as  it  follows: is  an  impartial  and  non-binding  agreement,  conceived  in  a
Rawlsian framework, sufficient to generate fair and stable social and economic institutions? The
answer to this question may be introduced quoting Immanuel Kant, who once wrote: “this may be
true in theory but it does not apply in practice”.
In  other  words  the  Rawlsian  economic  agent  works  in  theory.  However  its  pragmatic
observation is less immediate. Indeed, on the one hand, the formal theoretical constructions always
result compelling and harmonious, and they are followed by interesting speculative conclusions.
This makes possible to provide a positive answer to the research question. Nevertheless, on the
other hand, the practical  implementation of the procedures aimed to replicate the theory is  less
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immediate because of many hurdles. This means that according to the empirical tests run in the
Chapters 3 and 4 the research question proves to be wrong.
 Thus, the general conclusion is that the Rawlsian theory, and in particular the simulation of
the veil of ignorance procedure, is not universally applicable, that is it is not validated always and
anywhere. Instead, the situations in which it is possible to observe a Rawlsian economic agent seem
to be limited.  This is  also true when compliance is  concerned: the model of social conformist
preferences apparently is not as general as claimed.  This means that in the experimental field, in
order to obtain the predicted results, the conditions to implement the procedures have to be carefully
tailored.
Nevertheless this general conclusion does not have to be interpreted as a warning message to
give  up  doing  empirical  research  on  Rawls’s  social  contract  theory.  Instead,  it  is  exactly  the
opposite. It is an incitement to work more in the direction of the experimental research, in order to
understand the conditions under which Rawls’s social contract theory may produce useful practical
results, because "empirical insights are necessary if one wants to apply any theory of justice in the
real world"(Gaertner et al. 2012, p.7).
For example, with regards to the European difference principle, a counterfactual empirical
analysis  might  be  undertaken  to  measure  the  actual  amount  of  the  European  surplus.  Indeed,
without an empirical evaluation of a possible European budget the European difference principle
keeps being only an elegant theoretical result.
Tax compliance might be approached in a more simplified framework, trying to disentangle
whether it  is the agreement itself  which fosters tax compliance or whether it is the impartiality
condition offered by the veil of ignorance that produces a high compliance rate. However, none of
the two procedures seems to be able to trigger and to sustain empirical expectations over time.
Therefore the psychological mechanism behind the compliance should be analysed in depth also
from a dynamic point of view.
In the same way the intergenerational distribution of resources might be studied considering a
design which takes into account that generations overlap, so that the least advantageous subject is
somehow included in the agreement. Indeed, up to a certain point it is plausible a mechanism of
direct reciprocity between generations which might sustain compliance
Many are  the  possible  improvements  which can be implemented to  understand better  the
practical implications of the Rawlsian social contract theory. This thesis was another step in that
direction.
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Appendix to the Introduction: Why According to Adam
Smith Ethics has to Play a Major Role in the Economic Theory
Abstract: I sustain that the Adam Smith Problem is a fictitious problem. There is not any real
inconsistency or discontinuity between Adam Smiths’ Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) and
his well known Wealth of Nations (WN). On the contrary, there is a precise relationship between
the two books, with the latter being a subset of the former. Focusing on Smiths’ words, I show
how the ethical system developed in the  TMS constitutes the (moral) ground on which Smith
could conceive his homo oeconomicus at the basis of the WN. Thus, within the Smithian project,
which concerns the theme of human interaction in its different courses, the market mechanism
can work on the sole axiom of “self-interest” (WN) if, and only if, we preliminarily assume the
human capacity of “sympathy” (TMS): following this reasoning, I reinforce the interpretation
according to which the “invisible hand” of the  WN,  usually meant to regulate mere market
exchanges,  has  to  be interpreted from a broader  perspective  as the  “invisible  hand” of  the
“sympathetic but impartial spectator” that disciplines human behaviour on a more general level.
I conclude claiming that this precise hierarchy assigned by the father of the economic science to
the two mentioned fields implies the necessity of an ethical contextualization in order to have a
reliable economic analysis.
JEL Code: B12, B40
Keywords: Adam Smith, Adam Smith Problem, Economics, Ethics
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Introduction
The Adam Smith Problem refers  to  the idea of  a substantial discontinuity  and of  a more
general  asymmetry  between  the  two  books  written  by  Adam  Smith,  The  Theory  of  Moral
Sentiments (Smith 1976, since now TMS) and the Wealth of Nations (Smith 1994, since now WN).
The debate about the  Problem can be traced back to the  late 19th century,  when some German
authors  started  observing  how  Adam  Smith  (apparently)  conceived  two  distinct  (apparently
irreconcilable) representations of the human nature  within the  two mentioned works:  the  homo
oeconomicus uniquely  led  by  self-interest  drafted  in  the  WN and  the  sympathetic  individual,
spontaneously capable to take into account the others’ interests, meticulously described in the TMS.
From those first objections the literature has constantly contributed to examine the Problem in depth
by means of different approaches, either defending its actual existence or denying any apparent
inconsistency.
The aim of the present paper is neither to review slavishly the debate occurred since the first
formulations of the Adam Smith Problem, nor to reorganize in a systematic paradigm the different
attempts which tried to disentangle the claimed inconsistencies. Other authors made a great work in
pursuing similar goals (Gocen 2007, Montes 2003, Otteson 2000, Teichgraeber 1981). The aim of
the  paper  is  rather  to  deny  the  existence  of  any  inconsistency  in  Adam  Smith  proposing  a
compelling  interpretation  of  the  exact  relationship  between  the  two  books  (human  natures)
conceived by Adam Smith. This interpretation mainly relies on the explicit words written by the
Scottish author himself. There is room to undertake similar direction since, although the majority of
authors agrees on the fact that the Adam Smith Problem is a fictitious  problem, “there is still no
widely agreed version of what it is that links [those] two texts, aside from their common author”
(Wilson & Dixon 2006, p. 251). Thus it is not enough to reach the conclusion that Adam Smith was
not inconsistent. In order to make the analysis complete it is also necessary to demonstrate, in a
compelling way, in which terms Smith was consistent, understanding his general project: that is the
main aim of the paper.
In particular I will sustain that once we acknowledge how in putting forward the WN’s homo
oeconomicus Adam Smith implicitly took for granted the thesis and the conclusion stated in the
TMS, it becomes natural to interpret the figure of the sympathetic but impartial spectator (developed
within his ethical reflection) as the (moral) regulating mechanism for the market exchanges, the
latter providing the basis of the economic development of nations. Through a detailed analysis of
the two textbooks it will be possible to conclude how the TMS substantially constituted the ethical
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foundation  on  which  the  Scottish  author  was  able  to  shape  his  meagre  (in  terms  of  human
connotations) economic agent described in the WN. This specific conclusions will be then extended
sustaining, as Sen did (1987), that the development of an ethical ground becomes an essential step
in developing a plausible economic analysis.
Starting, for expository convenience, with a brief review of the WN, Section 1 will highlight
how in Smith’s economic analysis the division of labour, together with the existence of a market
system, constitute the propelling engine of the economic development. The motive to the division of
labour is then identified by Smith in what can be considered an axiom, since the Scottish author
does not linger to explain its anthropological origins: the self-interest innate in every human being
(economic agent).
Section 2 will outline the dense analysis concerning the moral principles of sympathy and
approval contained in the TMS. According to Smith the sympathetic but impartial spectator becomes
the prescriptive mechanism which regulates human interactions occurring in society: assuming his
perspective everybody can take into consideration the others’ interests in the most equitable way.
Section 3 has the aim to recall the Adam Smith Problem which might emerge reading in an
approximate manner the two above mentioned books. The Problem was approached from different
perspectives, but in general it concerns the idea of an irreconcilable inconsistency between the two
distinct representations of the human being given by Smith in the two texts. On one side there is the
dispassionate economic agent moved by the sole self-interest who merely weigh material costs and
benefits.  On  the  other  there  is  the  individual  endowed  with  sympathetic  capacities  indirectly
expressing other-regarding preferences. Within the present paper the (fictitious) Problem will be
overcome identifying the precise relationship which ties the TSM and the WN. It will be shown how
the self-interest axiom is not sufficient in itself for the market mechanism to work and to produce
public  virtues from private vices.  Indeed Smith adopts  that  postulate  only as a  complementary
assumption  of  his  moral  theory  previously  developed  in  the  TMS.  In  particular,  the  market
institution that, together with the division of labour (the last one motivated by the self-interest),
leads to the economic development of nations is founded by Adam Smith on the ethical system
based on the sympathetic but impartial observer. That ideal figure, by means of his “invisible hand”,
regulates  and  coordinates  personal  interests  of  all  economic  agents  in  such  way  that  positive
benefits are produced for the whole community (nation). 
In the light of similar conclusions and from a broader perspective it is possible to interpret the
TMS as the ethical background of the Smithian economic theory. The last one is not self-sufficient
and  cannot  operate  in  autonomy without  any  further  (moral)  assumption.  Thus  Section  4  will
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generalize the obtained result concerning the existing relationship between Adam Smith’s WN and
TMS.  In  particular,  it  will  be  corroborated  the  thesis  that  ethics  and  economics  constitute  an
inseparable binomial and are to be in a precise hierarchy: before carrying out any economic analysis
it is recommended a broader contextualization in ethical terms. This is a way to restate a conclusion
reached by the Nobel prize Amartya Sen (with a less analytical approach) 30 years ago.
A.1 The Wealth of Nations
In his most famous work, the  Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith (1994) proposes a systematic
analysis of the main economic phenomena which characterize a modern economy. Many of those
topics are still nowadays the subject of intense debate and extensive research1. Those themes were
not unknown when Smith investigated them; however, Smith was the first author who attempted to
give to those economic forces a coherent representation and who tried to link them in a unitary
system. In his WN Smith “took the inchoate economic literature generated between 1650 and 1750
and fashioned it into an intellectual discipline he called political economy” (Landreth & Colander
2002, p. 16). In other words Smith was the first  who “had been able to  integrate into a single
volume an overall vision of the forces determining the wealth of nations” (Landreth & Colander
2002, p. 82).
The  literature  is  therefore  unanimous  in  recognizing  how  Smith’s  contribution  to  the
(foundation of the) economic science in terms of original ideas is much less important then the
successful attempt of codifying in a systematic representation the state of the economic knowledge
of his  time.  Of  course  it  would  be improper  to  deny the  existence of  new notions within  the
Smithian economic analysis, however it is essential to remark how “his role was [mostly] to take up
the best ideas of other men and meld them [...] into a comprehensive system” (Landreth & Colander
2002, p. 88) rather than having developed completely new concepts. Thus, the main contribution of
Adam Smith’s WN was to have introduced a new (scientific) method within the economic analysis:
for this reason he is usually defined as the funding father of the economic science.
In his inquiry into the nature and the causes of the wealth of nations Smith lingers  in an
analytic and systematic manner on the cause-effect relationships which occur between the different
1  The book deals with topics like comparative advantage, free market institution, protectionism, perfect competition,
monopoly,  money, taxation.  At the  same time it  is  possible to find out traces of  an  infinite  variety of  themes
nowadays assumed as obvious, going from inflation to capital markets, from opportunity-cost analysis to credit risk,
from collusions to lotteries.
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economic  courses.  With  regard  to  the  specific  contents  of  the  book,  as  mentioned in  the  note
number 1, they encompass a countless number of thematic areas; however, this does not mean that
within the Smithian economic project there are not a starting point, a common thread and some
clear conclusions: it has to be remarked the scientific method of his economic inquiry. In particular
the Scottish economist starts his reasoning dealing with the division of labour, which is assumed to
be the engine of the economic development, since “so far as it can be introduced, occasions, in
every art, a proportionable increase of the productive powers of labour” (Smith 1994, p. 5)2.
However the increased productivity of individuals is necessary but not sufficient to produce
general wealth.  In order to achieve a general  progress by means of the division of labour it  is
essential  the  existence  of  a  coordinating  mechanism which  can  “recompose”  what  through the
division of labour “is divided”: this is the market exchange system, which allows every individual
to benefit of the higher productivity accomplished by everybody else. Thus
“[w]hen the division of labour has been once thoroughly established, it is but a
very small part of a man’s wants which the produce of his own labour can supply.
He supplies the far greater part  of them by exchanging that surplus part  of the
produce of his own labour” (Smith 1994, p. 24).
Therefore a market mechanism, where it  is possible to exchange productivities yet before
products,  is  the symbiotic  element which has to  develop simultaneously to  the progress of  the
division of labour if we want to achieve, according to Smith, an increase in general wealth. About
these two categories of interpretation, Adam Smith is straightforward in claiming how the measure
in which the division of labour is feasible essentially depends on the extent of the available market
(Smith 1994, pp. 19-23): it follows an unavoidable relationship between the two elements at the
basis of economic development. Smith moves then to highlight the inconvenience in exchanging
every product(ivity) with every other product(ivity), and how this obstacle was overcome by the
introduction  of  money  as  universal  mean  of  exchange.  However,  deepening  similar  technical
analysis becomes superfluous for the purposes of the present paper.
Instead it is relevant to linger on the binomial constituted by division of labour and market
mechanism. In particular it is fundamental to understand which is the spark that turns on what in
Adam Smith’s opinion is the engine of the economic development, or said otherwise, which is the
motive that pushes individuals to undertake the division of labour. Smith clarifies how the latter is
2  Smith attributes to three specific circumstances the higher productivity achieved through the division of labour:
increase of dexterity, saving of time and invention of machines (Smith 1994, pp. 7-11)
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neither the outcome of a structured agreement between people nor a sober reflection on the possible
net benefits deriving from exchange; instead, Smith explicitly identifies the origin of the division of
labour  in  what  in  his  opinion  is  a  peculiar  feature  which  distinguish  human  beings,  viz.  “the
propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another” (Smith 1994, p. 14), up to the point
that “[e]very man [...] lives by exchanging, or becomes, in some measure, a merchant” (Smith 1994,
p. 24).
But the quoted words, if considered in isolation, induce an interpretative difficulty since they
generate  a  cycle  of  vicious  nature  about  the  relationship  between  division  of  labour  and
development of a market. Those words do not say much if they are not jointly read and integrated
with those of an excerpt become famous within the economic discipline: in Smiths’ opinion every
human being
“has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is in vain for him
to expect it from their benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can
interest  their  self-love  in  his  favour,  and  shew  them  that  it  is  for  their  own
advantage to do for him what he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a
bargain of any kind, proposes to do this. Give me that which I want, and you shall
have this which you want,  is the meaning of every such offer; and it is in this
manner that we obtain from one another the far greater part of those good offices
which we stand in  need of.  It  is  not  from the benevolence of  the butcher,  the
brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own
interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity,  but to their self-love, and
never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages. Nobody but a
beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens (WN
Smith 1994, p. 15)”3.
In other words it is the propensity to truck and to barter which gives origin to the division of
labour and the parallel development of a market, since without that inclination neither the former
nor  the  latter  would  take  place;  however,  similar  propensity  is  not  else  then  a  derivative,  a
phenomenal display of a more primitive but existing selfishness characterizing the human being:
only the self-interest induces the economic agent to undertake the exchange action, or equivalently,
the division of labour4.  And given that it  is  the personal interest to  move the economic subject
towards  the  specialization  of  labour,  a  question  follows  immediately:  how  can  a  multitude  of
3  It is from those words that it is usually inferred that Adam Smith would have designed the prototype of the cold
homo oeconomicus, solely focused on comparing own and other’s people material costs and benefits
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egoistic interests coexist and to be of use to a society? How is possible that there are growth and
development there where everybody undertakes only those actions which are the reflection of their
personal interests? It is exactly at this point that intervenes the second component concerning the
economic progress developed within the Smithian theory: the market exchange mechanism.
The market  institution  is  generally  illustrated  by Adam Smith  as that  natural  mechanism
which ensures that the division of labour can be realized and can find its (economic) convenience;
yet, the market is designed as that spontaneous process of co-ordination which, to the extent it is left
to act freely, leads to general positive outcomes that are not explicitly taken in consideration by the
self-interest of economic agents. The latter idea can be made clearer through the words of Adam
Smith himself, quoting another paragraph which became famous in the economic textbooks. With
regard to the economic subject moved solely by his own self-interest, Smith writes that, within the
market mechanism, he is “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention.[...]  By  pursuing  his  own  interest  he  frequently  promotes  that  of  the  society  more
effectually than when he really intends to promote it” (Smith 1994, p. 485)5
In this  perspective the  market  is  designed as  that  institution  which,  without  any artificial
constrain, can govern in a coordinated manner the innumerable individual interests, and that, by
means of the invisible hand can lead to achieve an unintentional aim, that is the welfare of the
whole society. But at this point Smith’s reasoning can be interpreted also from another perspective,
the most important in the present paper: it is not necessary to worry if the economic subjects are not
motivated by regards which go beyond their strict personal interests (like for example altruism or
reciprocity) or by evaluations that concern the well-functioning of the general economic system
(like for example the total welfare); even though we assume that  individuals are moved by the
narrowest self-interest, the market mechanism is capable to coordinate conveniently those (egoistic)
human actions in order to produce positive outcomes for the whole society.
4  “Man's propensity for exchange, which makes the division of labour and therefore specialization possible, and
which according to Smith is the basis of the wealth of nations, is not based on altruism. Nobody, says Smith, makes
an exchange  for  the  sole  purpose  of making  happy his  neighbour”  (Rommel & Winter  2001,  p.  69,  my own
translation). Yet, “self-love is the definite source in the Wealth of Nations of exchange activity. And this is vital”
(Macfie 1959, p. 227).
5  A few pages earlier, Smith anticipates the same concept with a more technical language: “[e]very individual is
continually exerting himself to find out the most advantageous employment for whatever capital he can command.
It is his  own advantage, indeed, and not that  of  the society,  which he  has in  view. But  the  study of  his own
advantage naturally, or rather necessarily, leads him to prefer that employment which is most advantageous to the
society” (Smith 1994, p. 482).
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And it is probably in reason of what just said that Adam Smith, in the initial part of his WN,
does not linger  too much on inquiring or deepening in detail the nature of those self-interested
motives which are at the basis of the human (economic) behaviour, but he considers the egoism
more  like  an  axiom:  the  later  claims  on  the  physiognomy  and  the  physiology  of  the  market
mechanism allow to minimize the earlier anthropological assumptions at the basis of the economic
agent. In favour of this second interpretation it is worth to spend some more words with the purpose
to express a reasoning that, although developed from another point of view, remains coherent with
everything written so far.
Substantially, if from one side Smith limits himself in assuming as foundation of the division
of labour, and consequently of the economic growth, the self interest as exclusive motive of the
economic action, from the other side he can do that solely because similar postulate is legitimated
by  the  further  assumptions  concerning  the  extraordinary  coordination  capacities  of  the  market
institution. Yet, outlined a certain configuration to the market mechanism, similar configuration
subsequently allows the possibility to minimize the anthropological assumptions, taking the self-
interest as unique motive. It is then a different issue to understand which specific features attributed
to the market institution allow to validate the just suggested logic. Smith does not describe in the
WN the behavioural assumptions at the basis of the market mechanism; to identify those elements it
is necessary to look at his other book, the TMS.
A.2 The Theory of Moral Sentiments
Anticipating some of the later conclusions, it is possible to sustain how for Adam Smith the
market mechanism is not infinitely virtuous in bestowing its positive benefits. More precisely the
limit of the individual economic (self-)interests must coincide with the wider plot of a moral social
conduct  (approval  of  the  sympathetic  but  impartial  spectator):  only  under  similar  assumption
motives of individualistic nature can generate, even involuntary, positive effects in favour of the
community; only to the extent that every subject is capable to take in consideration (also indirectly)
some meta-personal  interests,  it  is  possible a  general  progress for the  human society under  the
market institution. And which are those social boundaries that are supposed to limit the pursue of
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personal interests, so that the positive effects generated by the market are not offset by some other
negative (social) consequences6, is clearly remarked by Smith himself in his TMS (Smith 1976).
In the TMS, which deals in a broader perspective with human interaction (not limited to the
economic exchange sphere), Smith provides a deep analysis of human moral action. And it is thanks
to the  TMS that it is possible to realize how Smith's real research had a wider perspective than
inquiring the mere  homo oeconomicus: his research deals more generally with the relationship of
the single individual with the society; the Smithian research can therefore be defined as a research
about  the  human  being  in  its  intersubjective  dimension,  with  the  economic  environment
representing only a particular case, a subset of all human interactions7.
As for the WN, also in the TMS Smith sets a starting point around which to develop his system
of moral regulation. In particular, the whole Smithian ethical analysis is founded on the concept of
sympathy, meant as a (moral) capacity that allows individuals to take part, more or less intensely, in
the feelings of other human being8; the sympathy itself then “does not arise so much from the view
of the  passion,  as  from that  of  the  situation  which  excites  it"  (Smith  1976,  p.  12).  Indeed the
Scottish author specifies "[a]s we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can
form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should
feel in the like situation" (Smith 1976, p. 9): in this way imagination, understood as that capacity to
identify  ourselves  with  a  certain  third-party  circumstance,  assumes  a  central  role  within  the
Smithian moral system. Similar capacity is not neutral, that is, it  does not consist in a pointless
representation of the considered situation; on the contrary, it  allows the observer to "relive" the
observed state of affairs and thus to sympathize with the passions of the observed individual.
Thus Smith clarifies what is the purpose of the whole process unfolded through imagination
and sympathy:
"[w]hen the original passions of the person principally concerned are in perfect
concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, they necessarily appear to
this last just and proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary, when,
6  In the TMS Smith “tried to establish the appropriate institutional framework so that particular [self-]interests could
be expressed without harming [others] individuals” (Pena López & Sánchez Santos 2007, p. 75).
7  Sen’s words are really clarifying with regard to that point: “Smith was concerned not only with the sufficiency of
self-interest  at  the moment of  exchange but  also with the wider moral  motivations and institutions required to
support economic activity in general” (Sen 2010, p. 50).
8  Smith opens the TMS with the following claims: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to
him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it”. (Smith 1976, p.9)
165
upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they do not coincide with
what he feels, they necessarily appear to him unjust and improper, and unsuitable
to the causes which excite them" (Smith 1976, p. 16).
Therefore the aim of the sympathetic process is to express a judgement in terms of moral
appropriateness or inappropriateness of the affections of other subjects with regard to the situation
that  generated  them;  appropriateness  established  according  to  the  harmony  or  dissonance  of
spectator’s moral feelings with those of the observed individuals.
In  short,  an  observer,  by  means  of  sympathy  and  following  the  imaginary  exchange  of
circumstances,  will judge whether or not the passions of another individual are appropriate with
regard to the situation that generated them according to a correspondence or a discrepancy with his
own feelings. And since also the observed subject is capable of sympathy, being able to grasp the
approval  or  disapproval  of  his  own feelings  by the  spectator,  but  above  all  since  everyone is,
according to Smith, in search of approval9, the observed individual will be induced to "level" his
feelings, and then his behaviour, up to that point in which the latter are considered appropriate and
are approved by the spectator. That is the empirical balance mechanism proposed by Adam Smith
within his ethical system.
However, similar system of moral evaluation, if limited to what was said so far, would easily
leave  room  to  the  objection  of  ethical  relativism10 since  it  does  not  conceive  any  objective
prescriptive mechanism. To avoid similar critique, and in completing his moral system, the Scottish
author  adopts  the  expedient  of  the  ideal  sympathetic  (but  impartial)  observer:  all  “passions  of
human nature” writes Smith, “seem proper and are approved of, when the heart of every impartial
spectator entirely sympathizes with them, when every indifferent by-stander entirely enters into, and
goes along with them” (Smith 1976, p. 69). Thus,
“though man has, in this manner, been rendered the immediate judge of mankind,
he has been rendered so only in the first  instance;  and an appeal  lies  from his
sentence to a much higher tribunal, to the tribunal of the [...] impartial and well-
informed spectator” (Smith 1976, p. 130).
9  “[N]othing pleases us more than to observe in other men a fellow-feeling [approval] with all the emotions of our
own breast; nor are we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary [disapproval]” (Smith, 1976, p.
13).
10  It  is  almost superfluous to highlight how different spectators might express different degrees of approval with
regard to the same circumstances. 
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Through the figure of the impartial spectator Adam Smith wants to state firmly the importance
of  the  depart  of  the  observer  from  all  those  personal  peculiarities  which  could  influence  the
approval judgement. In fact, the comparison with the feelings of an impartial and well-informed
observer allows to discriminate objectively a correct (approved) behaviour from an incorrect one to
the extent which the feelings of the subject under judgement are aligned with those of the impartial
spectator:  in  this  way  the  sympathy  becomes  a  social  bond  (Macfie  1959,  p.  212)  and  the
sympathetic but impartial observer becomes a normative figure for the moral equilibrium within a
society. Equilibrium which is required in every situation of social interaction, included the market
exchange environment.
The system of the impartial but sympathetic spectator leads then to two important corollaries:
first of all, the continuous exercise of evaluation of human conduct through the eyes of the impartial
spectator induces the society to derive some general rules regarding what is appropriate to do or to
avoid in some specific circumstance. In this way Smith tries to justify the so-called social norms:
we  are  not  supposed  to  enter  the  impartial  observer  perspective  in  every  single  moment  or
circumstance since “habit and experience have taught us to do this so easily and so readily” (Smith
1976, pp. 135-136 and for a more complete dissertation of the theme see Smith 1976 pp. 156-170);
secondly,  it  enables the  single  individual  to  be  an  objective  judge  of  himself,  since  it  will  be
sufficient for him to refer to the impartial observer's sentiments to evaluate his own behaviour. But
once again those technicalities go beyond the aim of the paper.
A.3 TMS and WN: the Adam Smith Problem and its solution
What is relevant at this point is to focus on how the ideas belonging to the two books (moral
and economic sphere) are supposed to be read within a single framework. After having sketched
both, the economic system relying on selfishness and division of labour proposed in the WN, and
the moral apparatus based on the figure of the sympathetic but impartial spectator described in the
TMS, it is necessary to identify a clear connection between these two discourses in which human
interaction is the protagonist. And what might seem a mere academic exercise is in fact the result of
a heated controversy over what was supposed to be an inconsistency of premises, hence also of the
conclusions, developed by Adam Smith in his two main works, WN and TMS.
With "Adam Smith Problem" the literature labelled that debate concerning the (apparently)
contradicting and incompatible anthropological views which emerge within the two Adam Smith’s
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texts. As stated in the introduction, it is not a purpose of the present paper to sum up the different
positions,  which dealt  with the Problem through various methodologies:  other contributions can
serve better  similar  purpose (Gocen 2007,  Montes  2003,  Otteson  2000,  Teichgraeber  1981).  In
general however, the debate concerned the existence of a dualistic human nature such as represented
by Smith; dualism reflected in the two works according to the following scheme: an empirical
(phenomenal) agent lead by mere self-interest placed at the foundation of the WN, which implies to
take into account of a second subject only to the extent he is necessary for immediate personal aims;
an ideal (noumenic) actor endowed with sympathetic capacities playing a central role in the TMS,
which in turn requires to take into consideration another subject according to a broader perspective
than treating him as a pure mean.
While it is not the main purpose of this paper to retrace the debate about the Adam Smith
Problem, it is important to ascertain the point which the controversy has arrived to. Pack (1997)
shows, by means of the reading of a third Smith’s work11, how the WN and the TMS are part of a
broader common system. Evensky states how “the confusion lies not in the pen of Adam Smith, but
in the eyes of those who profess to see an Adam Smith Problem” (Evensky 1987, p. 464); Raphael
and Macfie quickly get rid of the Adam Smith Problem defining it as a “pseudo-problem based on
ignorance  and  misunderstandings”  (Smith  1976,  p.  20);  Montes  makes  a  further  clarification:
despite  the Adam Smith Problem is fictitious,  it  “had not yet been fully  exhausted [because a]
second stage in the debate [requires] also defending the consistency position” (Montes 2003, p. 79).
Boff remarks the same point: “even if one accepts just one picture of man in both the TMS and the
WN [...]  there  is  still  room in  our  analyses  that  invites  a  questioning as  concerns  the  relation
between both books” (Boff 2014, p.7). Wilson and Dixon are the most exhaustive in pointing out
the status quo of the research:
“[t]he old  Das Adam Smith Problem is no longer tenable. Few today believe that
Smith postulates two contradictory principles of human action: one in the Wealth
of Nations and another in the Theory of Moral Sentiments. Nevertheless, an Adam
Smith problem of sorts endures: there is still no widely agreed version of what it is
that  links  these  two  texts,  aside  from their  common author;  no widely  agreed
version  of  how,  if  at  all,  Smith’s  postulation  of  self-interest  as  the  organising
principle  of  economic  activity  fits  in  with  his  wider  moral-ethical  concerns”
concerning the sympathetic principle (Wilson & Dixon 2006, p. 251).
11  A collection of notes called Lectures on Jurispiudence.
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The general conclusion is that a real "Problem" does not exist, that is, if in the representations
of  human  nature  proposed  by  Smith  there  is  an  inconsistency,  this  cannot  be  attributed  to  a
deliberate  lack  of  the  author  himself12.  However,  even  though  it  does  not  exist  any  real
inconsistency, there is still room to identify the most compelling way to unify the ideas that emerge
in the two texts (once assumed that those do not represent two incompatible categories).
In this  paper  I  claim that  the  best  way to  aggregate Smith’s  TMS and  WN in  a  coherent
framework is indirectly suggested by Montes (2003) when he reports the reactions of some authors
to the first formulations of the Adam Smith Problem (Montes 2003, pp. 73-77). Summarizing here
in a single concept those different positions, I sustain that the two systems, respectively based on
self-interest and sympathy, are fully complementary, and therefore compatible, to the extent  we
assume the latter  (modality) as the regulating principle of the former (motive): self-interest and
sympathy are not exclusive (Witztum 1998); it is the capacity of sympathy (the approval of the
impartial  observer)  that  circumscribes  the exact  limit  of individual  self-interests  in  general  and
within the market exchange system in particular. Montes (2003) himself does not agree with this
interpretations since “narrows Smith’s concept of sympathy” (Montes 2003, p. 85), not considering
the latter as a possible motive of action too; however it will be shown how the reading provided
throughout the following analysis enlarges the role of sympathy instead of narrowing it. 
Thus, the main thesis of the paper is that the "invisible hand" that coordinates the personal
interests  of  economic  agents  within  a  market  economy  is  to  be  essentially  interpreted  as  the
invisible hand of the impartial spectator, because “the economic man also is under the sway of
social sympathy and the impartial rulings of the informed spectator” (Macfie 1959, p. 223). The
impartial  spectator,  thanks to  his  sympathetic  sentiment,  balances the  selfishness of the various
agents  acting within the market,  producing positive benefits  for the society as whole: as  Smith
himself  clearly  writes,  “by  acting  according to  the  dictates  of  our moral  faculties  [through the
perspective of the sympathetic but impartial spectator],  we necessarily pursue the most effectual
means for promoting the happiness of mankind” (Smith 1976, p. 166). Similar interpretation on the
12  If we accept the hypothesis of the existence of a Problem we are required to explain Smith's intention to ignore the
conclusions reached in the TMS when writing the WN, and vice versa: indeed, if we take into account that Smith
published six editions of the  TMS, two of them after (1781 and 1790) the first publication of the WN (1776, and
then four additional editions), with no significant structural changes introduced in the  TMS, we can immediately
conclude how the author did not write the two books in air locked rooms. From this perspective it should not
surprise that Smith did not introduce any big revision of the two book from one edition to the other (Viner 1927, p.
201 and p. 217).
relationship between the impartial observer and the market institution, that is between the TMS and
the WN, is supported by the intuition of other authors13:
“from  this  point  of  view,  the  'invisible  hand  theorem'  becomes  much  more
interesting  than  traditional  microeconomics  manuals  suggest.  In  the  market,
economic agents do not exchange only goods, but also messages of approval or
disapproval, so that individuals, while behaving in a self-interested way, tend to do
so respecting the legitimate expectations of others [...] In this way opportunism is
kept at bay and the cooperative behaviour is stimulated. In short, the invisible hand
that  contributes  to  the construction  of  the good of  all  seems to  be that  of  the
impartial spectator” (Screpanti & Zamagni 2004, p. 111, my own translation).
Therefore the interaction between Smith's two works does not give rise  to  a conflict,  but
rather to a coherent, broader system that assumes the perspective of the impartial observer at the
basis of  the market institution.  Again,  the thesis  sustained in this paper is  that  the  TMS theory
constitutes a (moral) background on which Smith promoted his own economic reflections of WN14:
“the Wealth of Nations is simply a special case - the economic case - of the philosophy implicit in
the Moral Sentiments” (macfie 1959, p. 223). However it is important to remark how Screpanti and
Zamagni did not provide a real justification on what drives their conclusions. Therefore, in order to
reinforce the just proposed interpretation and to understand more exactly how, according to Smith
himself, the moral sphere plays a major role with regard to the economic theory, it is useful to quote
an extended paragraph taken from the TMS and which sustains the proposed interpretation:
“[t]here  can  be  no  proper  motive  for  hurting  our  neighbour,  there  can  be  no
incitement to do evil to another, which mankind will go along with, except just
indignation  for  evil  which that  other  has  done to  us.  To  disturb  his  happiness
merely because it stands in the way of our own, to take from him what is of real
use to him merely because it may be of equal or of more use to us, or to indulge, in
this manner, at the expence of other people,  the natural preference which every
13  Another similar interpretation is provided by Pena López and Sánchez Santos: “the well-known metaphor of the
"hand invisible" of the WN also appears in the TMS (IV, 2) alludes to an involuntary coordination of interests. That
is, the self-regulation of the moral system plays a direct role either in the TMS or in the WN, because the imaginary
[spectator] that sustains the liberal society supposes not only the coordination of the individual interests but also the
of individuals as  homines ethici  or members of a social group. (Pena López & Sánchez Santos 2007, p. 83,  own
translation).
14  As recalled in the note 11, the TMS was written before (1759) than the WN (1776).
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man has for his own happiness above that of other people, is what no impartial
spectator can go along with. Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally
recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any
other person, it is fit and right that it should be so. Every man, therefore, is much
more deeply interested in whatever immediately concerns himself, than in what
concerns any other man: and to hear, perhaps, of the death of another person, with
whom we have no particular connexion, will give us less concern, will spoil our
stomach, or break our rest much less than a very insignificant disaster which has
befallen ourselves. But though the ruin of our neighbour may affect us much less
than a very small misfortune of our own, we must not ruin him to prevent that
small misfortune, not even to prevent our own ruin. We must, here, as in all other
cases,  view  ourselves  not  so  much  according  to  that  light  in  which  we  may
naturally appear to ourselves, as according to that in which we naturally appear to
others. Though every man may, according to the proverb, be the whole world to
himself, to the rest of mankind he is a most insignificant part of it. Though his own
happiness may be of more importance to him than that of all the world besides, to
every  other  person  it  is  of  no  more  consequence  than  that  of  any  other  man.
Though it may be true, therefore, that every individual, in his own breast, naturally
prefers himself to all mankind, yet he dares not look mankind in the face, and avow
that he acts according to this principle. He feels that in this preference they can
never go along with him, and that how natural soever it may be to him, it must
always appear excessive and extravagant to them. When he views himself in the
light in which he is conscious that others will view him, he sees that to them he is
but one of the multitude in no respect better than any other in it. If he would act so
as that the impartial spectator may enter into the principles of his conduct, which is
what of all things he has the greatest desire to do, he must, upon this, as upon all
other  occasions,  humble  the  arrogance  of  his  self-love,  and  bring  it  down  to
something which other men can go along with. They will indulge it so far as to
allow him to be more anxious about, and to pursue with more earnest assiduity, his
own  happiness  than  that  of  any  other  person.  Thus  far,  whenever  they  place
themselves in his situation, they will readily go along with him” (Smith 1976, pp.
82-83).
And Smith concludes his reasoning with the following words, which make extremely clear
how  to  regulate  the  market  (competition),  that  is  to  coordinate  the  countless  self-interests  of
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economic agents acting within a market, it is not possible to rely on narrow behavioural premises,
but only on a moral system embodied in the impartial spectator:
[i]n the race for wealth, and honours, and preferments, he may run as hard as he
can,  and  strain  every  nerve  and  every  muscle,  in  order  to  outstrip  all  his
competitors. But if he should justle, or throw down any of them, the indulgence of
the spectators is entirely at an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot
admit of. This man is to them, in every respect, as good as he: they do not enter
into that self-love by which he prefers himself so much to this other, and cannot go
along with the motive from which he hurt him. They readily, therefore, sympathize
with the natural resentment of the injured, and the offender becomes the object of
their hatred and indignation. He is sensible that he becomes so, and feels that those
sentiments are ready to burst out from all sides against him” (Smith 1976, p. 83).
From those words it is possible to understand how for Smith it is legitimate and natural that
every human being, according to his own perspective, primarily prefers himself to anybody else.
However, to make morally licit the pursuit of his own (economic) interests he must take in due
consideration the interests of others. And the way in which every (economic) agent is supposed to
take into consideration the claims of other subjects is specified by Smith himself in a subsequent
passage (which partly recalls what was quoted above):
“to the selfish and original passions of human nature, the loss or gain of a very
small interest of our own, appears to be of vastly more importance, excites a much
more passionate joy or sorrow, a much more ardent desire or aversion, than the
greatest  concern  of  another  with  whom we  have  no  particular  connexion.  His
interests, as long as they are surveyed from this station, can never be put into the
balance with our own,  can never restrain us from doing whatever may tend to
promote our own, how ruinous soever to him. Before we can make any proper
comparison of those opposite interests, we must change our position. We must view
them, neither from our own place nor yet from his, neither with our own eyes nor
yet with his, but from the place and with the eyes of a third person, who has no
particular connexion with either,  and who judges with impartiality  between us”
(Smith 1976, pp. 135-136, italics added).
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Therefore,  assuming the point  of view of the impartial  spectator  becomes the perspective
which leads to a (more general) ethical equilibrium in human relationships, but also to an economic
equilibrium within the exchange market: in fact similar regulator mechanism allows the single agent
to take into account, in an appropriate manner, the self-interest of those who he interacts with (also
within  the  market),  making in  similar  way his  own selfishness (morally)  licit.  The self-interest
assumed by Smith as the first principle of economic development is then limited up to that precise
point in which it is approved by the impartial spectator: the "invisible hand" of the latter purifies the
personal  interests  of  economic  agents  from those  components  that  could  be detrimental  to  the
interests of society in general.
In other terms, in the market system “[t]he impartial spectator censures our [excessive] selfish
impulses and restores things more nearly to their correct proportions” (Cam 2008, p. 108), or said
through the words of Smith himself “the natural misrepresentations of self-love [is] corrected only
by  the  [hand]  of  this  impartial  spectator”  (Smith  1976,  p.  137).  Since,  according  to  this
interpretation, market exchanges are directly regulated by the impartial spectator, it becomes also
clear why for Smith motives of altruistic nature are not necessary at all for the good functioning of
the economic system and for the wealth of nations, and beneficence becomes an "ornament which
embellishes, not the foundation which supports the building" of the market economy (Smith 1976,
p. 86).
A.4 In Smith’s perspective: ethics as foundation of the economic theory
The specific conclusion related to the (non-existent) Adam Smith Problem allow to enlarge
the considerations regarding the Smithian ethical-economic system. Before to proceed, I wish to
quote once again the words of Screpanti and Zamagni, which effectively summarize what has been
hitherto claimed: "the incriminating passage[15] of the WN presupposes in its enunciation the thesis
of the  TMS,  and in particular those related to the existence of a system of 'norms of civic and
economic morality' based on sympathy. This system of rules guarantees the orderly functioning of
the market without individuals having to resort to violence and coercion to force the parties to
respect 'the rules of the game'. So the aforementioned maxim simply says that a market economy
could  function  even  if the  additional motivations  of  all  the  individuals  belonging  to  it  were
exclusively of self-interested nature" (Screpanti & Zamagni 2004, pp 114-115, my own translation).
15  See footnote number 2.
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That is, within the Adam Smith’s project the ethical background plays a major role in the
construction  of  his  economic  system based on  the  market  institution;  again,  his  ethical  theory
constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for a correct reading, interpretation and functioning of his
economic system; the TMS constitutes the foundation of the WN (Macfie 1959). However, what is
even more important is the possibility of extending those specific conclusions and the "Smithian
logic"  on  a  more  general  level:  an  ethical  contextualization  becomes  essential  before  making
assumptions  within  the  economic  analysis.  This  was  the  path  followed  by  that  author  who  is
considered the father of the economic discipline. Smith developed a marvellous system that requires
ethics to play a major role within his economic theory, and there are no reasons to deviate from
similar practice. Ethical considerations have to be at the basis of every economic theory.
Similar  intuition  is  in  line  with  an  idea  expressed  by  Amartya  Sen  30  years  ago,  who
denounced the “impoverishment of welfare economics as a result of the distance that has grown
between ethics and economics” (Sen 1987, p. 51). Sen was the first personality of international
relevance to reaffirm strongly the limited view of the modern economic theory; limitation derived,
in his opinion,  from having constantly subtracted the study of economics to a comparison with
considerations  of ethical  nature.  Sen was convinced that  an almost  unanimous interpretation of
Adam Smith achieved reading in isolation his economic theory (WN), implied that reflections of
ethical  importance,  far  from being ignored by Smith  (TMS),  lost  their  natural  place  within  the
standard economic theory.
In other terms, according to Sen, having ignored the moral reflection made by Adam Smith,
and  more  generally,  having  misunderstood  the  importance  of  ethical  considerations  within  the
economic field, led to a depletion of any result obtained within the economic theory: Sen comes to
similar conclusion showing how Adam Smith was consciously concerned with delineating in detail
an ethical premise (TMS) before carrying out his pure economic analysis (WN). With the following
words  Amartya  Sen’s  thought  can  be  summarized:  "it  is  precisely  the  narrowing  of  the  broad
Smithian  view of  human  beings,  in  modern  economies,  that  can  he  seen  as  one  of  the  major
deficiencies of contemporary economic theory" (Sen 1987, p. 28). In conclusion, ethical premises
must be taken in account to produce reliable economic theories.
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Conclusions
The  primary  aim  of  this  paper  was  to  highlight  the  necessity  of  lingering  on  ethical
considerations before moving to develop any economic theory. The thesis that an economic analysis
requires some precise ethical premises was defended through a particular methodology: in the paper
I showed which hierarchy Adam Smith,  considered  the  father  of  the  economic science,  clearly
established between ethics and economics. In particular it was pointed out how Smith assumed, in
the elaboration  of  the  WN,  the  thesis  developed in the  TMS:  the  figure of  the  sympathetic  but
impartial  spectator,  put  at  the  centre  of  his  ethical  system,  plays  a  fundamental  role  also  in
regulating the market mechanism and the division of labour (which solely relies on self-interest). In
other words, market exchanges are only a particular subset of all the possible human interactions.
The reason of lingering on the Adam Smith Problem to restate the importance of an ethical
perspective  within  the  economic  theory  is  that  the  Problem  “entails  the  relationship  between
individual  and  society  and,  more  specifically,  the  interdependence  of  ethics  and  economics.”
(Montes  2003,  p.82).  The  single  model  proposed  to  reconcile  the  two  discourses  (ethics  and
economics) in Adam Smith is to consider the  WN  as a strict subset of the  TMS. In the Smithian
system mutual economic benefits are possible only where there is mutual sympathy, and the market
institution  is  only  one  branch  of  the  society  where  the  sympathy  and  the  prescriptions  of  the
impartial spectator take place. Since Adam Smith chose to proceed in that way, it is important to
recognize the necessity of an ethical reflection before moving to pure economic considerations:
premises  of  moral  nature  are  not  only  ancillary,  but  rather  necessary  before  engaging  in  an
economic analysis.
However the analysis provided in this paper does not exhaust a further issue: “Smith did not
refer even once to the TMS in the WN” (Wagner-Tsukamoto 2013, p .77) so “why should we think
that  economic behavior  is  rightfully  subject  to the  impartial  spectator's  judgment if  there is  no
mention of any such thing in WN?” (Otteson 2000, p.66). Given the interpretation provided in the
present paper (the WN as subset of the TMS), it becomes important to provide a reliable justification
to the decision of Smith to not mention explicitly similar relationship. Here there is no space to
inquire that choice. A reliable answer probably requires to include in the analysis other Smith’s
works, beyond the WN and the  TMS. What remains clear anyway is that Adam Smith’s economic
theory cannot work without the assumptions made throughout his ethical analysis. This conclusion
is broadened and assumed as a method valid for encompassing my whole doctoral thesis.
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